ABSTRACT

This paper looks at the inhibiting factors to development in Africa. It argues that there are numerous factors inhibiting development in Africa, and these can be either exogenous, because of external pressures or endogenous, because of internal deficiencies; or even both simultaneously. However, it focuses on the endogenous factors while acknowledging the significance of exogenous challenges. The emphasis is that it is not only the inequalities in globalization, world trade or Western interferences that are the major inhibiting factors to the prospect of development in Africa, but also that Africa challenges are largely of its own making; a result of internal factors which are summed up by the inability of most countries to produce capital even though they have the potential to do so. These endogenous factors include political instability, pandemics like HIV/AIDS & Malaria, foreign debt, aid dependency, and the pervasiveness of corruption, embezzlement, and bribery.

INTRODUCTION

Africa as a development entity has amassed considerable development narratives since the end of World War II until today. Literarily it has become like a piñata filled with all economic and socio-political worries that any economist, political scientist, and self-proclaimed development expert can take a pick at it and hypothesize on how to make it better. A keyword search of the literature on development and Africa yields many research articles, newspaper articles, reports, books, and innumerable masters and doctoral theses. Underlying this enormous research material are three assumptions: first is the firm premise that development in Africa is feasible even though its tangible fruits are invisible. Second is the assumption from a post-development perspective that the notion of development in Africa is dead, obsolete, and bankrupt since its narrative is replete with stories of failures.[1]  The third is the claim that development is neither alive nor dead but only stalled diplomacy.[2]

Actual or not, the fact is that Africa has been the subject of development initiatives for literally much of the 20th century, even until the 21st century. Many prescriptive solutions derived from different schools of thought, such as economics, political science, anthropology, and more, have been designed in anticipation of remedying the puzzle called the development of Africa. Despite these reactive/proactive prescriptions, the developmental problems experienced by African populations such as poverty, economic stagnation, poor health conditions, and inadequate education facilities continue to persist unabated, and the prospect for development appears even more and more elusive.

Many hypotheses are justifying the inhibiting factors shaping the prospect for development in Africa. These hypotheses can be classified into exogenous or external factors and endogenous or internal factors. The former mainly considers the developed countries as the inhibiting factors shaping the prospect for development in Africa based on colonialism, the inequalities in globalization, world trade, and many of the conditionalities in aid. The latter considers Africa itself as a critical obstacle to its prospect of development. It posits that, despite being resource-rich, Africa has needlessly been complicit in its underdevelopment for various reasons. In this paper development is defined as a process that brings about social change that allows people to achieve their human potential.

This paper intends to focus solely on the endogenous challenges while acknowledging the significance of the exogenous factors in shaping the prospect for development in Africa. It unfolds in three parts. First, it will provide a brief definition of development. Second, it will give a short insight into the development situation in Africa and highlight some of the inhibiting factors shaping the prospect for development. Third, it will explain in detail each of the inhibiting factors using concrete examples (albeit sporadically) to bolster the arguments made. As a caveat, it should be noted that Africa is not monolithic, and as such, not all countries are in the same boat; some are doing better than others, but the majority are not.

THE CASE OF AFRICA?

Recitations of Africa’s economic woes and political failings have become truisms. The high hopes of independence have been shattered in most African countries through such painful realities as economic stagnation, political instability, civil strife, famine, and failed development strategies. A few African scholars have argued that since independence, many African countries have experimented with diverse approaches to economic development. Still, they have failed because the experiments were designed mainly by experts who have never lived in or been to Africa and whose plans did not fit the circumstances in Africa:

One of the greatest enigmas of our time that begs an explanation is how a continent endowed with so much wealth and resources (human, food, mineral and land) can be so poor as to have 16 of the 20 poorest nations on earth. The fact is that Africans have struggled to develop in vain for decades. Regardless of these attempts, economic growth and sustained human-centered development continue to prove elusive and unattainable. In the development literature, reasons for explaining the inability to develop in sub-Saharan countries are not uncommon. These reasons, among others, include the lack of adequate financial capital, low saving rates, high population growth rates, political instability, natural disasters, poor climatic conditions, and excessive levels of embezzlement, bribery, and corruption (EBC).

These factors rationalize the inability of Africans to develop economies and improve the quality of life. Further, all these factors are endogenous and have persisted for quite a long time, and it does not seem likely that this trend will ever change soon. This paper will focus only on the more concrete underlying obstacles to the future of development in Africa. These are political instability, the debt situation of African countries, heavy dependence on foreign aid, the prevalence of excessive levels of corruption, embezzlement and bribery, and the persistence of pandemics such as HIV/AIDS and Malaria.

FACTORS INHIBITING DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

For centuries now, Africa has struggled to develop to improve the well-being of its citizens. As noted earlier, many reasons have been suggested both by scholars and activists as to why this has been the case. In the following few paragraphs, the paper will examine these factors.

1.     Political Instability/Civil Wars/Insecurity

Africa has been plagued by insecurity caused by civil strife more than any other region in the world. Many countries have experienced civil war over the past decades, causing hundreds of thousands of deaths, destruction of physical infrastructures such as education and health infrastructures, loss of arable land as the land becomes a contested zone, displacement, and emergence of insecure environment for the population as has been the case in Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Sudan, and South Sudan, to name a few. Some civil wars have persisted for more extended periods and have led to massive insecurity. People’s liberties are compromised, and authoritarianism and junta laws took over and became the norm. The 2005 Human Development Report notes that “insecurity linked to armed conflict remains one of the most significant obstacles to human development. It is both a cause and a consequence of mass poverty.”[3]  As Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary-General, put it, “humanity cannot enjoy security without development or development without security, and neither without respect for human rights.”[4]  This indicates that security and development are inextricably linked, and one cannot prosper without the other.

Civil war damages the economy by destroying some resources, such as killing or maiming part of the labor force and blowing up bridges. Furthermore, as rebels and government forces fight to control strategic areas, roads linking these areas become unsafe because of extensive land mining. For many African countries, the road is essential for export and import as goods and other tradable commodities are transported from one border to the next by road. The inability to access safe roads affects these conflict-ridden countries’ export and import capabilities, leading to collateral damage to economic growth in neighboring countries. For instance, during the civil war in Sudan (1983-2005), its borders with Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo were inaccessible, which in turn negatively impacted these countries in terms of bilateral trade with Sudan and through Sudan to other neighboring countries.

There are also direct damages to agricultural production as farmers lose access to arable land, which in most cases becomes a rebel stronghold or government forces’ zone of operation. These direct losses to agricultural production can have devastating consequences for poverty reduction efforts. For example, the Centre for International Cooperation and Security noted that the net losses to agricultural production from armed violence in Africa are estimated at $25 billion for 1970–97 or three-quarters of all aid in the same period.[5]  In Sierra Leone, where some 500,000 farming families were displaced, rice production (the main staple crop) during the 1991–2000 civil war fell to 20 percent of pre-war levels.[6]  Civil war and political instability have also been associated with deterioration in the economic environment as it becomes hostile to private investors. This condition forces private agents to engage in portfolio substitution and shift their assets, including human and physical, and financial, out of the country. As Collier notes:

During civil wars, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita declines at an annual rate of 2.2 percent relative to its counterfactual, and this decline is partly because war directly reduces production and partly because it causes a gradual loss of the capital stock due to destruction, dissaving, and substation of portfolios abroad.[7]

Another consequence of the political instability is that these countries would not have access to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as the investment climate would not be suitable for investors. One of the significant determinations of a country’s economic development and well-being is investment structure and volume indicators. These indicators show the economy’s attractiveness for foreign investors and give clues for analyzing countries’ development processes. However, civil war and political instability tend to erode it. In short, the persistence of and the consequence of political unrest in Africa is the enormous stagnation in economic and human development. The 2005 Human Development Report expertly and succinctly sums the issue by stating:

Violent conflicts disrupt whole societies and can roll back human development gains built up over generations. It disrupts food systems, contributes to hunger and malnutrition, and undermines progress in health and education.[8]

A recent phenomenon is the prevalence of violent extremism in Africa and how it has impeded progress and destabilized communities in many countries. In a 2019 report by the UNDP focusing on the economic cost of violent extremism on 18 African countries (Nigeria, Tanzania, Central African Republic, Niger, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Cameroon, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania, and Libya) due to physical infrastructure damage, impacts on formal and informal economies and security spending on development processes, “estimates that 16 of the 18 focus countries have lost an average of US$97 billion per year in informal economic activity since 2007.”[9]   Furthermore, between 2007 and 2016, terrorism cost the African continent a minimum of US$119 billion.  Additionally, driven by the extensive impacts of terrorism in Nigeria, the four countries considered to be the epicenter countries for violent extremism, Nigeria, Mali, Somalia, and Libya, have accounted for 94 percent, or US$103 billion, of the total economic impact of terrorism since 2007.[10]

2.     Embezzlement, Bribery, and Corruption

Embezzlement, bribery, and corruption have been described as Africa’s cancer. In many African countries, the practice of embezzlement, bribery, and corruption is a system-wide problem. Literally, in any African country, government representatives have constantly misappropriated and misapplied vast sums of money and other economic resources.[11]  The reason being the fear of an uncertain and unknown future on the part of the officials due to the unstable political situation in many of the countries in Africa. According to Abijolosoo, this fear is then translated into “diabolical economic rent-seeking behavior.”[12]  Classic examples of countries replete with despicable corruption, embezzlement, and bribery in Africa are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria, to mention a few.[13]  According to the 2013 East African Bribery Index, the rate of corruption remains high and will remain a serious problem to tackle. To emphasize the seriousness of the issue, the report notes:

The citizens still encounter informal charges and levies as pre-condition bribery. Bribery is most likely a manifestation of deeper governance challenge. As this remains the situation, the governments in the region have in the recent years expended a lot of financial resources and legislative attention in combating corruption. The reasonable conclusion is that these resources and efforts are not bearing fruit as expected.[14]

Furthermore, according to the Global Corruption Barometer for Africa 2019, the police, government officials, and members of the parliament are the most corrupt institutions.[15]  Additionally, the report noted the unequal effects of bribery noting:

Bribery does not affect all people equally, it hits the poorest harder than the wealthiest-often denying people access to critical healthcare, education, and legal protections, with devastating consequences. Young people, aged 18-34 years, are more likely to pay bribes than older people, aged over 55 years.[16]

In Zimbabwe, senior government officials acquired lands and farms meant for resettlement of the rural poor. System-wide corruption, an outcome of decades of severe human factor decay (HFD), has destroyed Zimbabwe’s social, economic, political, and educational (SEPE) engine.[17]  Public fund-diversion is a common phenomenon in Nigeria. The practices of bribery and corruption are found in education, federal and local governments, the military, law, medicine, banking, trade and commerce, and industry. As Adjibolosoo excellently puts it, “every form of corruption is prevalent in Nigeria.”[18]

The unwanted consequence is that resources set aside to implement social, economic, and political programs frequently disappear unnoticed and unaccounted for. As a result, severe damages to the development process can occur when scarce financial resources are used in this way. It creates significant hindrances and contributes to the problem of underdevelopment. As Vakunta notes, “corruption, bribery, and embezzlement are like a spoke in Africa’s wheel of development. It hampers developmental initiatives throughout the continent.”[19]

In short, it is worth noting that “corruption hinders economic, political and social development. It is a major barrier to economic growth, good governance, and basic freedoms, such as freedom of speech or citizens’ right to hold governments accountable. More than this, corruption affects the well-being of individuals, families, and communities.”[20]

3.     Foreign Debt

Among the known barriers to development in Africa, the external debt stands out. Not even the most stable democracy in the world can sustain economic growth if it bears external debt of more than 100 percent of Gross National Product (GNP) and devotes more than 30 percent of its income to debt service. It will cease to grow economically as the gap widens between investment and domestic savings. This is the plight, the burden of more than half of African countries. Most countries are saddled today with massive public debts to foreign countries and multinational organizations that they have no prospect of repaying. They are kept from international bankruptcy only by the inflows of aid provided, which are harmful to African development. Much has been made of how debt may be limiting social expenditures on the continent. However, even more important is that the combination of debt and overseas development assistance provides no incentive for African leaders to avoid irresponsible policies and causes them to orient their attention externally to the international system rather than internally to the productivity and welfare of their populations.

According to the World Bank, 80 percent of the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) are in Africa, and that 94 percent of these countries have unsustainable levels of debt.[21]  The typical HIPC owes international debts that are 126 percent of its GNP and 349 percent of its export earnings.[22]  As Leonard and Straus note, “this latter figure is crucial because these debts are payable in international currencies that can be earned only through exports.”[23]  Thus, the typical HIPC would have to devote all its export revenues to debt repayments for three to four years without receiving any imports in return to retire its debts immediately.[24]  Not only would the welfare consequences of such trade be disastrous, but also it would be impossible to accomplish – for it takes imported inputs to produce the exports that these countries sell. For the specific country, it is difficult to see how it could meet even its debt service payments out of its resources, which represent 15 percent per annum of its export earnings.[25]  The debt payments can be completed only by providing extremely high levels of aid to these countries, which according to the current nature of things, is highly unlikely because it will further exacerbate the dependency of these countries, which may also lead to no development.[26]

Moreover, many developed countries have realized within the last few decades, albeit with the help of public and other organized civil organizations’ protests, that the current debt situation of countries in Africa is the reason behind their lack of development. The resulting demand was a univocal request for these debts to be written off for those HIPC that cannot afford to repay their loans. However, the World Bank and some national governments (such as the United States) appeared reluctant to own the publicly guaranteed debts in Africa. Some argue that African countries are responsible for their indebtedness, and forgiveness of the debt would encourage improvident behavior (i.e., it would create a ‘moral hazard’). Fortunately, the moral hazard hypothesis did not get traction among members of the G7/8. All recognized that these debts might never be repaid and proposed to cancel some billions of dollars in debt of the most vulnerable countries. According to the HIPC Initiative, as of 2018, “37 countries, 31 of them in Africa, have debt-relief for which they were eligible through the HIPC initiative and the MDRI.”[27]  For instance, Sudan got debt relief under the HIPC initiative in May of 2021.[28]

4.     Aid Dependency

Another factor inhibiting development in Africa is foreign aid. Foreign aid is meant to encourage developing countries to develop, but this seems not to be the case on most occasions. Africa is often cited as the paradigmatic example of the destructive political effects of foreign aid. It is “aid-dependent” in the sense that few of its states cannot carry on routine functions or deliver essential public services without external funding and expertise.[29]  The degree of aid dependency has been growing over the past few decades, and many African leaders have become addicted to it.[30]  The current extreme dependence on foreign aid is quite dysfunctional to governance. Leonard & Straus note that aid tends to contribute to and exacerbate the problems associated with enclave production.[31]  This dependency further leads to instances where issues caused by poverty or a dysfunctional economy are resolved by calls for higher levels of aid. Many scholars also argue that, over time, aid contributes to the emergence of weak states. In other words, heavy reliance on foreign assistance exacerbates social contract problems as their structure of incentives tends toward accountability to the international system, not to domestic populations, leading to the emergence of weak states.[32]

This dependence on usually significant levels of foreign aid has severely hampered development in Africa. Overreliance on aid has trapped countries in a vicious circle of aid dependency, corruption, market distortion, and further poverty, leaving them with nothing but the “need” for more aid.[33]  Goldsmith argues that the perverse impact of foreign aid is a “moral hazard.”[34]  According to him, it is seen as growing out of the tension between aid donors, who generally want political liberalization, and aid recipients, who supposedly prefer things as they are. Moral hazard is thought to occur because aid frees authorities currently in power from bearing the full consequences of the status quo. It thus entices them to become even less willing to reform.[35]

Carol Lancaster suggests, for example, that foreign aid in Africa prolonged the life of some corrupt and incompetent regimes by giving them a sense of Security.  Dambisa Moyo also argues that foreign aid has been the most significant single inhibitor of Africa’s development, far from being a catalyst.[36]  According to her, aid is correlated with corruption, fosters dependency, and invariably instills bureaucracy that hinders the emergence of an essential entrepreneurial class.[37]

5.     Pandemics: HIV/AIDS and Malaria

Another critical challenge to the prospects for development in Africa is the ubiquity of diseases like malaria and HIV/AIDS. Malaria historically has been known to have an isolating effect as many foreign investors would be more cautious of going to malaria-prone areas than to less infested regions. In the past, this isolating effect served to protect malaria-infested countries from European colonizers. However, due to globalization, such isolation does have adverse effects in terms of investment.”[38]  Although the impact of disease on decision-making by foreign investors is difficult to gauge, investment failure is likely to be one of the most costly effects of malaria for long-term growth. Jeffrey Sachs and Pia Malaney express the significant impact on investors by noting:

Investors from non-malarious regions tend to shun malarious regions for fear of contracting the disease — a fear that is sadly well grounded, as evidenced by the experience of Billiton, a London-based mining, and metals company. In a US$1.4 billion joint venture investment to build an aluminum smelter in Mozambique, the largest foreign investment so far in that country, the company was faced with 7,000 cases of malaria in two years, and the death of 13 expatriate employees.[39]

Furthermore, industries such as tourism are hard hit by malaria transmission, and investments in all sorts of production may similarly be crippled if the labor force is vulnerable to disease burdens. As Todaro and Smith note, “a healthy society is often very productive, which translates to development.”[40]   Additionally, there is a correlation that “where malaria prospers most, human societies have prospered least.”[41]

Like malaria, HIV/AIDS is also a critical inhibitor to development in many countries in Africa. HIV/AIDS, if not contain, does have a debilitating effect on the economy because it reduces labor supply and productivity, which in turn leads to a reduction in exports, and increases imports.[42]  Several research papers have noted the impacts of HIV/AIDS on the mining sector and other productive sectors of the economy, resulting in reduced productivity and lack of labor as many labor-ready folks are infected and stayed hospitalized.[43]

Finally, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economies of African countries has yet to be determined. However, several research publications already point to the grim reality that African economies will suffer because they were in desperate situations before the pandemic.[44]

CONCLUSION

This paper has argued that the factors inhibiting development in Africa are mainly endogenous while also acknowledging the challenges posed by external or exogenous factors because of international pressures. These endogenous factors consist of political instability, pandemics such as HIV/AIDS & Malaria, foreign debt, aid dependency, and pervasiveness of corruption, embezzlement, and bribery. The paper argued that political unrest is an everyday problem in many African countries that has created considerable economic and human development stagnation. Moreover, embezzlement, corruption, and bribery are chronic problems in many African countries where resources set aside to implement development programs are often misappropriate and frequently disappear unnoticed and unaccounted for. Whereas foreign aid dependency is correlated with corruption, fosters dependency, and invariably instills bureaucracy that hinders the emergence of an essential entrepreneurial class. Finally, pandemics like HIV/AIDS and Malaria have also been argued to adversely impact the labor force and the economy. However, the extent of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on economies in Africa has yet to be determined.

REFERENCES

1. See the works of the post-development scholars like James Ferguson, The anti-politics machine: “development,” depoliticization, and bureaucratic power in Lesotho (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, c1994); Arturo Escobar, Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the Third World (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, c1995); Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid : Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is Another Way for Africa (London: Allen Lane, 2009).
2. David K. Leonard & Scott Straus, Africa’s Stalled Development: International causes & cures (London:Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).
3. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2005: International Co-operation at a Crossroads, 2005, New York: UNDP, pp. 151–154..
4. Kofi Annan, “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All. Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly” (Document A/59/2005. New York).[http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/report-largerfreedom.pdf]. May 2005.
5. Mandy Turner, Jeremy Ginifer, and Lionel Cliffe. “The Impact of Armed Violence on Poverty and Development: Full Report of the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative.” (2005), 21.
6. Turner et al., “The Impact of Armed Violence on Poverty,” 22
7. United Nations Development Programme, “Human Development Report, International Cooperation at a Crossroads: Aid, Trade and Security in an Unequal World” (UNDP 2005), Ch.5. Violent Conflict – Bringing the Real Threat into Focus, 151.
8. UNDP. Measuring the Economic Impact of Violent Extremism Leading to Terrorism in Africa Report 2019. 2020, 1.
9. UNDP. Measuring the Economic Impact of Violent Extremism Leading to Terrorism in Africa Report 2019, 2.
10. Ibidem.
11. Senyo Adjibolosoo, “Economic Underdevelopment in Africa: The Validity of the Corruption Argument” Review of Human Factor Studies Special Edition 11(1), 2005, 90-112.
12. Ibidem.
13. Transparency International, “Citizens Speak Out About Corruption in Africa.” Accessed July 22, 2021 from: Citizens speak out about corruption in Africa -… – Transparency.org.
14. Transparency International, East Africa Bribery Index 2013. Accessed July 22, 2021 from: EAST AFRICAN BRIBERY INDEX 2013: Bribery remains… – Transparency.org.
15. Transparency International, “Citizens Speak Out About Corruption in Africa.” Accessed July 22, 2021 from: Citizens speak out about corruption in Africa -… – Transparency.org.
16. Transparency International, “Citizens Speak Out About Corruption in Africa.”
17. Adjibolosoo, “Economic Underdevelopment in Africa,” 93.
18. Peter Vakunta, “The Trouble with Africa.” CODESRIA Bulletin, Nos 3 & 4, 2006.
19. Transparency International, “Citizens Speak Out About Corruption in Africa.” Accessed July 22, 2021 from: Citizens speak out about corruption in Africa -… – Transparency.org
20. World Bank, “Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.” Accessed July 22, 2021 from: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/debt/brief/hipc.
21. S. Ibi Ajayi and Mohsin S. Khan, eds., External Debt and Capital Flight in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 2000), 1-2..
22. David K. Leonard and Scott Straus, Africa’s Stalled Development: International Causes & Cures (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).
23. Leonard and Straus, Africa’s Stalled Development, 22..
24. D. Cohen, “The Management of the Developing Countries’ Debt: Guidelines and Application to Brazil,” (World Bank Economic Review 2, no. 1 1988).
25. Stijn Claessens, Enrica Detragiache, Ravi Kanbur, and Peter Wickham, “HIPC’s Debt: Review of the Issues,”Journal of African Economies. 6(2), 231.
26. HIPC, “Relieving the World’s Poorest Countries of Unmanageable Debt Burdens.” Accessed July 22, 2021 from: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/debt/brief/hipc.
27. IMF, “Sudan to Receive Debt Relief Under the HIPC Initiative.” Accessed July 22, 2021 from: https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2021/06/29/pr21199-sudan-to-receive-debt-relief-under-the-hipc-initiative.
28. Humphrey Orjiako, Killing Sub-Sahara Africa with Aid (Huntington, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2001).
29. Arthur A. Goldsmith, “Foreign Aid and Statehood in Africa.” International Organization 55, 1 (2001):123-148.
30. David K. Leonard and Scott Straus, Africa’s Stalled Development: International Causes & Cures (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).
31. See the works of Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa (Farrar, Straus and Giroux , 2009); Humphrey Orjiako , Killing Sub-Saharan Africa with Aid (Huntington, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2001); Peter Boone, “Politics and the Effectiveness of Aid,” European Economic Review, 40 (2): 289-329 1996. Craig Burnside, and David Dollar “Aid, Policies and Growth,” Policy Research Working Paper No.1777, World Bank. Gwin, C. and J. Nelson, eds. “Perspectives on Aid and Development” Overseas Development Council, Washington, DC; Ravi Kanbur , “Aid, Conditionality and Debt in Africa”, in F. Tarp (Ed.). Foreign Aid and Development; Lessons learned and Direction for the Future. (Routledge, 2000) http://people.cornell.edu/pages/sk145/papers/africaid.pdf.
32. Robert Calderisi. The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid isn’t Working. Macmillan, 2006.
33. Goldsmith, “Foreign Aid and Statehood in Africa,” 123.
34. Goldsmith, “Foreign Aid and Statehood in Africa,” 124.
35. Carol Lancaster, Aid to Africa: So Much to Do, so Little Done (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999) 66.
36. Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa (Farrar, Straus and Giroux , 2009).
37. Moyo, Dead Aid, 100.
38. Andrew Spielman & Michael DiAntonio, Mosquito: A Natural History of Our Most Persistent and Deadly Foe (New York: Hyperion, c2001), 247.
39. Jeffrey Sachs and Pia Malaney, “The Economic and Social Burden of Malaria.” Nature 415(2002): 684.
40. Michael P. Todaro and Stephen C. Smith, Economic Development. 9th ed. (The Addison-Wesley Series in Economics. Boston; Toronto: Pearson Addison Wesley, 2006).

41.Sachs and Malaney, “The Economic and Social Burden of Malaria,” 684.

42. Simon Dixon, Scott McDonald, Jennifer Roberts, “The Impact of HIV and AIDS on Africa’s Economic Development” BMJ 2002;324;232-234 doi:10.1136/bmj.324.7331.232.
43. Dixon et al., “The Impact of HIV and AIDS,” 232.
44. See Djiofack, Calvin Z. Djiofack, Hasan Dudu, and Albert G. Zeufack. “Assessing COVID-19’s Economic Impact in Sub-Saharan Africa: Insights from a CGE Model.” COVID-19 in Developing Economies (2020): 53; Ataguba, John E. Ataguba, “COVID-19 Pandemic, a War to be Won: Understanding its Economic Implications for Africa.” (Springer 2020): 325-328.

Publisher information: The Intergovernmental Research and Policy Journal (IRPJ) is a unique interdisciplinary peer-reviewed and open access Journal. It operates under the authority of the only global and treaty-based intergovernmental university in the world (EUCLID), with other intergovernmental organizations in mind. Currently, there are more than 17,000 universities globally, but less than 15 are multilateral institutions, EUCLID, as IRPJ’s sponsor, is the only global and multi-disciplinary UN-registered treaty-based institution.

IRPJ authors can be assured that their research will be widely visible on account of the trusted Internet visibility of its “.int” domain which virtually guarantees first page results on matching keywords (.int domains are only assigned by IANA to vetted treaty-based organizations and are recognized as trusted authorities by search engines). In addition to its “.int” domain, IRPJ is published under an approved ISSN for intergovernmental organizations (“international publisher”) status (also used by United Nations, World Bank, European Space Agency, etc.).

IRPJ offers:

1. United Nations Treaty reference on your published article (PDF).
2. “Efficiency” driven and “author-focused” workflow
3. Operates the very novel author-centric metric of “Journal Efficiency Factor”
4. Minimal processing fee with the possibility of waiver
5. Dedicated editors to work with graduate and doctoral students
6. Continuous publication i.e., publication of articles immediately upon acceptance
7. The expected time frame from submission to publication is up to 40 calendar days
8. Broad thematic categories
9. Every published article will receive a DOI from Crossref and is archived by CLOCKSS.