Abstract
The Chinese- sponsored Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an ambitious strategic program aimed at the development of infrastructure platforms connecting China with the rest of the world. The initial plan was announced by the Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 as an economic initiative to revitalize some of the medieval overland trading routes which connected Europe and Asia. Later in 2014, President Xi Jinping announced additional plans to establish robust infrastructure projects linking Asia, Africa, and Europe. In Africa, the Belt and Road Initiative has been manifested through the construction of several infrastructural projects ranging from railways, roads, ports, airports, and pipelines. China’s commercial banks have funded several infrastructural projects in Africa, such as the gas pipeline and railways in Nigeria, roads, and hydroelectric power projects in Uganda, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, and many other countries.
In Kenya, the Belt and Road Initiative has helped establish a high-speed railway connecting the East African port of Mombasa and Nairobi. In fact, this is the first high-speed railway ever constructed on the African continent. Whereas there is growing optimism regarding the economic viability of extending the Belt and Road Initiative in Africa, there is a need to analyze the long-term, potentially undesirable consequences of these projects to the African societies. Several reports and economic statistics indicate how these projects have provided employment opportunities for Africa’s youths and improved their living standards.
However, the fact that these projects have been established with huge loans from China raises serious questions regarding African countries’ ability to service Chinese loans. Other commentators have criticized the program on the grounds that it lacks sufficient transparency and promotes China’s authoritarian political model in Africa.
Using available information from researchers, scholars, and policymakers, this paper offers an analytical examination of the viability and impact of implementing the Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure projects across Africa. The paper is aimed at clarifying existing perceptions, some of which are products of biased generalizations about the Belt and Road Initiative.
- Introduction.
In a continent where almost all countries face infrastructure deficiencies in transport, communication, and power generation, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is popular, and several leaders look forward to having it implemented. Available data from the Chinese government show that over 139 countries across the globe have committed themselves to implement the Belt and Road Initiative. The Belt and Road Initiative involves two infrastructure projects, one maritime (Maritime Silk Road) and another overland (Silk Road Economic Belt). According to Chinese official documents, the Maritime Silk Road starts in Quanzhou’s harbor in Fujian Province, while the Silk Road Economic belt begins in the Western province of Xi’an. To underscore the political and economic importance of the initiative, the BRI was adopted into the Chinese Communist Party’s constitution in 2017. Consequently, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party unveiled its implementation in the following policy statements:
We will set up development-oriented financial institutions, accelerate the construction of infrastructure connecting China with neighboring countries and regions, and work hard to build a Silk Road Economic Belt and a Maritime Silk Road so as to form a new pattern of all-round opening.[1]
By April 2019, out of the 54 African countries, 37 had signed into the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative.[2] It is also important to note that whereas China had been running many infrastructure projects among several countries before the introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative, these projects acquired tremendous momentum and publicity under the initiative.[3] There is a growing belief among scholars that the long-term strategic objectives of the Belt and Road Initiative are to outcompete the current global supremacy of the United States through economic power accumulation, regional diplomacy, and finally, projection of political and military power across the globe. While presiding over the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in 2017, President Xi noted that:
Infrastructure connectivity is the foundation of development through cooperation. We should promote land, maritime, air, and cyberspace connectivity, concentrate our efforts on key passageways, cities, and projects and connect networks of highways, railways, and seaports. We need to seize opportunities presented by the new round of change in the energy mix and the revolution in energy technologies to develop global energy interconnection and achieve green and low-carbon development. We should improve the trans-regional logistics network and promote connectivity of policies, rules, and standards so as to provide institutional safeguards for enhancing connectivity.[4]
Most of the questions raised as to why the Chinese leadership continues to provide billions of dollars in the form of loans to mostly debt-strapped countries in Africa have not been comprehensively answered. Of particular interest is why lend huge sums of money to build infrastructure projects of questionable commercial viability. Little wonder some commentators strongly believe that this is nothing but a quest for regional hegemonic status and global dominance.[5] Nevertheless, given the unresolved controversy regarding China’s intentions, it is prudent to establish what China’s strategic goals for the Belt and Road Initiative truly are. Unlike European and American leaders, who are traditionally cautious about political and economic commitments to unstable economies, the Chinese have demonstrated rare determination and pushed forward with several projects despite mounting economic and political risks.[6]
- 2. Rationale for the Belt and Road Initiative
China’s Belt and Road Initiative has been referred to as the most ambitious project ever attempted to shape and ultimately influence economic discourses within the international system.[7] The initiative is therefore projected to increase China’s growing international stature and supremacy. The ever-increasing Sino-Africa trade relations have been contested through various scholarly debates, with supporters taking an optimistic view regarding the impact. China and its African commercial allies insist that this relationship is a win-win partnership. Critics argue that China is simply using African countries to maximally exploit natural resources, some of which are increasingly becoming rare on the global market. Analyzing the motivations and viability of the Belt and Road Initiative in Africa will provide a clearer understanding of Sino-Africa relations.
According to most scholars and policy analysts, especially from the West, the key motivating factor of the Belt and Road Initiative is to enhance the Chinese global leadership image.[8] The unprecedented Chinese economic growth in the last thirty years has engendered the possibility of a new regional and global hegemony threatening the existing powers, not least the United States. The Chinese leadership in Beijing must be fully aware that to effectively challenge the United States as a global hegemony it requires shedding off its insular image. In such a situation, the Belt and Road Initiative in Africa is comparable to the United States-sponsored Marshall Plan for Europe after the Second World War. It is very likely, therefore, that China is struggling to assume the status of a benevolent power with international stewardship potential.[9] One could therefore predict that the Chinese strategic objective of the Belt and Road Initiative is to project her might using soft power diplomacy. However, Chinese leaders have insisted that the core pillars of the initiative are simple and clear to understand. These pillars have been listed as promotion of policy coordination, facilitation of economic and cultural connectivity, free trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds.[10]
Historically, development and industrialization generate certain national economic opportunities that demand regional expansion. The fact that China has accumulated huge investment potential requires seeking out avenues for consolidating its success. This implies fewer developing countries in Africa provide very good opportunities for capital investment. It is therefore not surprising that China, through the EXIM Bank, has played a key role in giving out huge amounts of loans to construct infrastructure projects across Africa. With huge investments in infrastructure being reliant on Chinese loans, African governments find their survival intimately linked to Chinese financial support. Ultimately, China will automatically establish total political and economic influence among those regions where countries survive on Chinese loans. In the process, their freedom of action will be muzzled by Chinese authorities. And this is not without precedent. Using the same approach as Belt and Road Initiative, China has provided huge infrastructure funding to various less developed countries, sometimes with opaque loan terms. The unfortunate consequence has been to strategically leverage the borrowing countries’ indebtedness to China, endangering their economic, military, and political independence. This is what happened to Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port in 2017. After obtaining an $8 billion loan from China, Sri Lanka failed to repay the loan resulting in the infamous debt-for-equity swap. Consequently, China excused Sri Lanka’s $8 billion debt in the dubious exchange for a 99-year lease of Hambantota port.[11] Ports such as Hambantota port in Sri Lanka are strategic maritime facilities where China is able to conveniently dock its military vessels and patrol the surrounding areas. In effect, China will have successfully checked traditional Indian maritime dominance in the region.[12] The port also provides a strategic linkage between China and the major East African ports of Mogadishu, Djibouti, Mombasa, and Dar es salaam.
- Theoretical framework
This paper takes the theory of realism as its analytical basis for the Chinese-sponsored Belt and Road Initiative among African countries. Assessment of the viability and impact of the project will be premised on the realism paradigm in the political and economic discourses. The theory of realism is based on the following assumptions;
- States are the key players or actors in the international system
- All states focus on survival in the international system
- States are motivated by power in order to maximize their security
- States seek to achieve relative gains rather than absolute gains
- Human beings are inherently egoistic to the extent that their ego overshadows all forms
of perceived moral principles
- Essentially, the international system is a self-help project where states are responsible
for their own survival and are free to define their own interests and pursue power as they see fit.[13]
- There is no place whatsoever for morality in
the conduct of international relations. Realist thinkers are clearly pessimistic about the practical relevance of morality in the conduct of international relations. Demands of morality are clearly incongruent with practical requirements for effective political action. Realist thinkers insist that states have their unique perception of morality quite different from customary morality. They further emphasize that morality, if employed at all, is nothing but a mere instrument used to justify the behavioral conduct of state policy.[14]
Eminent realist scholars such as Professor Hans Morgenthau explain how the insatiable human lust for power and dominance, timeless and universal, is the principal cause of conflict in societies. Morgenthau expressed this concept in his famous statement, animus dominandi- the insatiable desire among human beings to dominate.[15]Among the key cornerstones of Morgenthau’s theoretical approach is the concept of power. States have specific national interests defined in terms of power. According to this concept, all political leaders, irrespective of the political model existing within the system, think and act in terms of interest, defined as power. Using this approach, the autonomy of politics is defined. This helps analyze state foreign policy irrespective of the variables involved, such as motives, preferences, and the moral qualities of individual politicians.[16]
- Uniqueness of the Belt and Road Initiative.
In sharp contrast with traditional and time-tested Western philosophical models and approaches, the Chinese-sponsored Belt and Road Initiative is not a project premised on models. The implication here is that it does not have a clearly stipulated framework, explicitly measurable goals, clearly defined action steps, or a timetable. Rather, it is expected to gradually evolve and adapt to the changing dynamics of the international environment. Consequently, the Belt and Road Initiative generates unprecedented strategic flexibility by seeking relative advantage for China. A far cry from Western models and historical practices, the Chinese approach preaches avoidance of direct conflict in the implementation of the initiative. This is in line with traditional Chinese philosophy, where “a Chinese general does not set goals or make plans; he tries to detect and exploit the internal dynamics of the environment and adapts his decisions to the natural course of things, to make the conditions work in his favor.”[17]
Another important element of traditional Chinese philosophy that characterizes the Belt and Road Initiative is the ideological concept of transformation. According to seminal communist thinkers, notably Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx, historical changes are key in the execution of an ideological vision:
Only in the final analysis is the economy, the driving force of history. But people are becoming aware of the conflicts that are taking place in the economic world in the ideological field. Transformation is a process that causes gradual changes that often are not visible in the short term, reducing the chance of friction, in contrast with the term action (as in Western philosophy), in which friction is usually inevitable.[18]
It is very likely, therefore, that through the Belt and Road Initiative, China seeks to transform the international environment through the promotion of an alternative model of globalization. The new world order would henceforth be adapted to the 21st-century realities, with China enjoying a superior moral advantage over its rivals. Moreover, the Belt and Road Initiative, according to Chinese authorities, is focused on the creation of a fairer world based on globally shared values without discrimination, irrespective of the different political and social systems.[19]
- The Belt and Road Initiative: Opportunities for African states
The Belt and Road Initiative is a continuation of existing commercial and political intercourse between China and African countries, which has been going on for over three decades. It is part of the ‘going global’ policy that has characterized Chinese foreign policy since the end of the cold war. Some media pundits, particularly from liberal western countries, have referred to China as a rogue donor.[20] Others, especially from the developing world, claim that China is actually helping the developing world forge and pave a pathway out of poverty. Most of these debates, however, have taken place with very limited hard facts. This has not been helped by China’s tradition of secrecy, especially regarding its aid packages. Ultimately, this has fueled rumors and speculation, thereby rendering it quite difficult to establish the risks and opportunities provided by China’s growing influence in Africa.[21]
The economic growth of a country or region is predominantly dependent upon existing infrastructure.[22] Among the key infrastructure required is the transport sector. Not only is transport an essential component in the socio-economic growth and development of a country, but it is also a good recipe for the sustainability of other service facilities. There can never be an efficient and effective movement of goods and people from one region or town to another without a robust and reliable transport infrastructure. An efficient transport system facilitates both regional and international trade. Regional development initiatives are often determined by the reliability and efficiency of the transport infrastructure. Economic growth and poverty eradication of a nation or region cannot be possible without an advanced infrastructure. Experience has demonstrated that regions with efficient and vast road and rail networks encourage job creation among the population. Consequently, this leads to increased tax revenues, leading to industrialization courtesy of an efficient transport system.[23] Given the foregoing discussion, the Belt and Road Initiative is good news to African countries with serious deficiencies in transport infrastructure.
Since the new millennium, Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI), mainly in infrastructure, has tremendously risen from USD$1.22 billion in 2004, increased to USD$47.40 billion by 2017, and over US$100 billion by 2020.[24] The implication here is that this upsurge has accelerated more than 81 times. Consistent with the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, China pledged USD$60 billion for the Belt and Road Initiative for African countries to facilitate infrastructural, industrial, and energy development in 2015. Under the Belt and Road Initiative framework, China has since committed resources to promote trade and investment in Africa with an emphasis on infrastructure development.[25]
The current international political economy of Africa cannot be explained without China.[26] Indeed, the improved Gross Domestic Product and foreign exchange earnings in Africa have been attributed partly to the increased trade and investment opportunities ushered in by Chinese enterprises. One of the key characteristics of Chinese loans and contracts in Africa is the focus on infrastructure development. Comparing the recent sectoral distribution of bilateral development support and loan commitments to Africa by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and China between 2005 and 2019, the difference was glaring. Over 65.5% of disbursements from China were allocated to economic infrastructure and services projects. On the contrary, OECD countries allocated only 12.9% to infrastructure development in Africa.[27] Compared to available alternatives, China has demonstrated superior economic efficiency in funding and construction of infrastructure projects in Africa. Unlike most European and American companies, which emphasize insurance costs given the numerous political and security risks in African countries, Chinese enterprises are generally less risk avert and often do not demand a lot of details as preconditions. Most Chinese companies, whether state‐owned or private, have demonstrated a high-risk appetite for the construction of infrastructures such as ports, roads, railways, and pipelines. This willingness by Chinese investors to take risks in Africa has coincided with the national desire in Beijing for the establishment of a strong strategic presence abroad in order to play an important role in global geo-economics and geopolitics.[28]
Consistent with the theory of realism, which emphasizes states as rational actors whose main interest is power, there is no reason to doubt that China is in Africa primarily to acquire more power in order to compete on the international stage. And while China is seriously focused on power accumulation, African countries are also taking advantage to improve their chances of survival in the international system. Countries like Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia have been able to utilize Chinese loans and technical expertise in constructing infrastructure projects hitherto unmanageable. The high-speed railway in Kenya, the first on the African continent, was only possible thanks to Chinese loans and expertise. Clearly, the relationship between China and African countries is motivated by profit, but this is one of the few development opportunities that have come to Africa.
Today there are many African policymakers and national leaders in Africa who strongly defend the China-Africa relationship, especially in the area of infrastructure development. While some commentators claim that the Sino-African trade and cultural relationship is driven by solidarity imperatives of Afro-Asian dialogue, there is reason to suspect that the core drive is national interest. China claims to be defined as a developing country that shares development aspirations with African countries. Moreover, Chinese authorities have time and again explained how they have no imperial ambitions. China’s attractiveness in Africa has been facilitated by the fact that it follows a strict policy of non-interference in local governance. The fact that China has been able to liberate over 600 million Chinese from poverty is good news to African leaders whose focus is on poverty eradication. Indeed China has successfully unlocked the secrets of rapid development. To many African countries, this constitutes a potentially good model that many developing countries across Africa can emulate.[29]
One of the countries in Africa that have benefited from Chinese engagement in Africa is Ethiopia. In fact, studies carried out so far indicate a positive relationship between an increasing Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Africa and improved Africa’s economic growth.[30] One specific example is Ethiopia. The end of the civil war in the East African country in 1990 ushered in the leadership of a charismatic nationalist and strategic genius in the name of Meles Zenawi. Like many African countries highly indebted with loans from Western capitals during the cold war, Ethiopia was in serious economic problems. Following the end of the cold war in 1990, Ethiopia applied for loans for development from the World Bank and IMF. Through the Structural Adjustment Programs, Ethiopia embarked on serious economic transformation. Progress was slow until 2010, when China began to fund Ethiopia’s Growth and Transformation Plans. These plans were heavily reliant on loans from China committed to funding infrastructure projects.
Consequently, Chinese loans have helped the Ethiopian government to quickly refurbish the Addis Ababa‐Djibouti railway totaling 759 km. This important project was completed in 2016 using a loan of 3 billion USD from the EXIM Bank of China. Construction was undertaken by the China Railway Group and the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation. Facilitated by this investment, the Ethiopian government immediately purchased ten cargo ships to enhance the international transport of goods from Djibouti ports. Further infrastructure developments supported by China in Ethiopia include the Addis Ababa Light Rail and the Addis Ababa‐Adama Expressway.[31] These projects consist of constructing the railway, training, personnel training, and operational management. Currently, this China-Ethiopia railway project is the biggest in East Africa. Indeed, China has demonstrated an impressive reputation in railway technology, innovative development, and scientific and technological management.[32] Furthermore, Chinese loans and technical assistance played a key role in the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project.[33] Chinese engineering companies such as China Gezhouba Group, Voith Hydro Shanghai, and China’s Sinohydro Corporation have been involved in the construction of the dam. When completed, this dam shall be the largest hydroelectric power plant on the African continent, with a capacity to generate 6,480MW.[34]
Elsewhere in Africa, other related and impressive infrastructure developments have been funded by China across the continent. In Nigeria, China has tremendously supported infrastructure development. Between the years 2000 and 2019, 18 out of the 19 loan packages to develop infrastructure in Nigeria were from China. Among the key projects was the modernization of the Lagos‐Ibadan railway, power, and ICT projects, totaling 6.8 billion USD.[35] In Kenya, loans for transport totaling 6 billion USD were used to fund the Mombasa–Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway.[36] The announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 is projected to help African countries consolidate their economic achievements emanating from Chinese-funded infrastructure projects across the continent. Currently, 42 African countries are under the BRI agreement with more than US$33 billion.[37]
Furthermore, Kenya has tremendously benefitted from the Belt and Road Initiative through the construction of the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR). Following the completion of the project, the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased by 1.5%.[38] This was due to the fact that the after-effects of the SGR project spilled over to related sectors, thereby increasing investment, production, and marketing. The Standard Gauge Railway has promoted Kenya’s economic growth by creating over 46,000 employment opportunities for local residents. Through the accruing employment multipliers, employees on the Standard Gauge Railway project have utilized their increased incomes not only to support their families but also to save and invest in various local projects, thereby contributing to the economic growth of the country. Indeed there are empirical studies that confirm that Standard Gauge Railway transport infrastructure has strengthened the domestic economic environment and enhanced regional integration of the East African community.[39] The Standard Gauge Railway project has promoted economic, social and strategic unity among the East African countries and consequently played an important role in the integration process of regional constituent sectors. Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo have tremendously benefitted from the Standard Gauge Railway, given the fact that they rely on Mombasa port for most of their international trade.[40]
On the regional scale, the Standard Gauge Railway project has increased regional optimism and potential through a reduction in rail transport costs. The project has led to rail cost reduction from $0.20 to $0.08 per ton per kilometer. This cost reduction is attributed to the use of block trains with economies of large scale. Previously, less efficient and narrow gauges were being used to supplement road transport. Interestingly, the Standard Gauge Railway trains have a speed of up to 120Km/hour, which has tremendously reduced the time required for traders and other passengers to move between the towns connected by the project in Kenya. In fact, the Standard Gauge Railway has reduced travel time from Mombasa to Nairobi to 4 hours for passengers and 8 hours for freight trains. This has significantly reduced travel time for passengers from the previous 15 hours to 4 hours, thereby creating a considerable impact on transport activities in the region.[41] The Standard Gauge Railway has provided regional economic growth opportunities by reducing the costs of routine road maintenance. The reduction of numerous cargo trucks from the roads has helped save resources previously spent, leading to lowered costs of doing business in the region.
In 2016, the Egyptian President, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, accompanied by the Minister for Foreign affairs, signed a memorandum of understanding with China launching the Belt and Road Initiative in North Africa.[42] Historically, Egypt has been a global hotspot because of its geostrategic location connecting Europe to Asia and Africa. One of the key Egyptian assets that are pivotal to global commerce is the Suez Canal. The canal is a strategic transit point between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. Following the launch of the BRI in 2016, China gave USD 1 billion to the Egyptian central bank. Later, another USD700 million loan was given to the National Bank. Furthermore, China committed to foot expansion costs of the Suez Canal, including the construction of a remodeled administrative capital city for Egypt. Expansion of the Suez Canal is projected to cost USD 230 million, while USD 45 billion will be required for the new capital. Analysts suggest that the China-Egypt Suez Economic Zone, consistent with the Belt and Road Initiative regional program, has the potential to create over 10,000 jobs for Egyptians.[43] The leadership in Cairo under President Al-Sisi has demonstrated a willingness to have a partner in China for purposes of funding ambitious projects. Noteworthy, however, is the reality that with the rehabilitation of the Suez Canal falling under Chinese control, China is likely to cause a fundamental change in the geostrategic posture of the Mediterranean. Having an important stake in the Suez Canal comes with substantial influence on power and security dynamics within the region previously dominated by the West. There is no doubt that the benefits to China will be immense. Indeed, Chinese footprints in matters of regional and global security will become obvious. Specifically, Chinese influence in the Mediterranean region will become a thorn in many Western capitals.
China operates a military base at port Dolareh in Djibouti. While it constitutes the main Chinese investment in the country aimed at securing the maritime route, Djibouti runs a close economic partnership with China in several areas. Consistent with BRI programs, China injected 9.8 billion US dollars to fund infrastructural projects throughout the country. Considering the geographical (21783sq.km) and demographic statistics of Djibouti, this is a substantial improvement in its infrastructural investment.[44] With a population of 887,900 in 2015, and a combined GDP of 1.589 billion US dollars, Djibouti does not offer much in terms of market and trade for Chinese products. However, Djibouti’s geostrategic location means a lot to many. Eager to secure interests in East Africa and the Indian Ocean routes and facilities, China established a strong military port base, which cost USD 590 billion. Security analysts contend that this base is of strategic significance to China. Officially, the base is projected to support anti-piracy operations in the region, but speculation is rife that it is intended to establish a linkage with the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal, which China is modernizing.[45] China’s entry into the horn of Africa with a military base makes Djibouti one of the most important allies in geostrategic matters. Currently, 3 of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council have a formidable military base in Djibouti. Through these initiatives, China has established a strategic position in the geopolitics of North Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, a sphere previously dominated by the United States. Not surprisingly, China’s entry into Djibouti was initially opposed by the Western powers.[46] So far, it is quite clear that China has scored huge gains against the West in the horn of Africa. This, coupled with her control of the Suez Canal, will give her immense powers.
In January 2015, China signed a memorandum of understanding with officials of the African Union (AU). The objective of the MOU was to establish reliable infrastructure connecting all the 54 African countries in the form of high-speed rails, ports, and roads.[47] One of these infrastructure projects is the Equatorial land bridge, capable of linking East and West African countries by a land route. The route is scheduled to begin in Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, the Congo, and the Central African Republic through Douala in Cameroon. Another projected route is the railway line in Angola, which is complete on their side of the border, but not yet extended to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia, hence hindering efforts to access the Angolan port to export their products.[48]
Furthermore, China is involved in a number of mega infrastructural projects in Africa. In addition to the 2,700km East African Railway line involving Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudan, China is funding another 1,315km railway project from Kano to Lagos, Nigeria, the 4,000km railway line in Angola constructed by China, the 560km Belinga-Santa Clara railway line in Gabon, the 172km railway line in Libya and the 430km rail in Mauritania.[49] More railway lines are being funded by China in other African countries. The 4000km railway line in Angola is programmed to be linked to Zambia and Tanzania (TAZARA) in the near future. Researchers have estimated that China has funded African rail networks covering over 50,000km. In addition, China has played a key role in the construction of port facilities in Kenya, Tanzania, Gabon, and Djibouti. In East Africa, China has funded the construction of the Lamumega port in Kenya and Bagamoyo port in Tanzania. In West Africa, China is involved in the construction of the Santa Clara deep water port in Gabon, among others. One can clearly see that the BRI is projected to exploit potential commercial opportunities in Africa by opening up the continent.
Apart from the common development projects such as infrastructure, the recent vicious global scare engendered by the Corona Virus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic has proven the importance of promoting international and regional public intercourse through economic linkages and health promotion partnerships.[50] Amidst the global dilemma in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, many African countries were in precarious situations. Given their weak medical and public health infrastructure, most commentators were predicting the worst-case scenario for Africa.[51] Fortunately, China came to rescue Africa by providing vaccines and test kits in the management of the pandemic. This was an impressive follow-up on the Belt and Road Initiative at its best and healthy win-win cooperation with practical benefits. China continues to play a big role in supporting vulnerable countries in Africa to effectively control the COVID-19 pandemic in their communities. Indeed, China and Africa have demonstrated impressive cooperation in the fight against the pandemic. This humanitarian gesture is one of the typical examples of sustainable development through the promotion of peace and quality standards of living. The impressive cooperation between Africa and China during the COVID-19 pandemic is a testimony to the future viability of the BRI in promoting Public Health Cooperation. Such cooperation is extremely important and shall go a long way to control public crises and safeguard public health security.[52]
According to proponents of the Belt and Road Initiative, African countries stand a tremendous opportunity to exploit their natural resources and marketable commodities through sustainable regional and international connectivity. The current road, port, and railway infrastructure projects across Africa have shortened shipping times and lowered trade costs. The initiative has also injected strong impetus into African economies and increased trade intensity networks. The net effect has increased the potential to attract Foreign Direct Investment flows into these economies, which will improve Africa’s position in Global Value Chains.[53]
- Possible Implementation Challenges in Africa
Whereas many advocates of the Belt and Road Initiative-related projects are upbeat about its potential, the project equally involves inherent risks exacerbated by weak risk-prevention and control mechanisms.[54] In many participating African countries, most economies are not premised on strong ideological foundations. Some risks, such as those related to weak legal structures and enforcement mechanisms, pose serious uncertainties to sustainable Foreign Direct Investment, intellectual property protection, and labor rights protection. Furthermore, some of these weak legal systems lack the ability to guarantee enforcement of environmental regulation, taxation, and foreign exchange management. Political expedience, corruption, and general interference in the implementation of legal regimes are potential handicaps to the effective implementation and sustainability of the Belt and Road Initiative projects in Africa. Besides, the unreliability of smooth and peaceful regime changes constitutes a serious challenge to the Belt and Road Initiative projects. The risk of a change in political power increases uncertainties about the executive effectiveness of existing contracts.[55]
Furthermore, some scholars have warned African regimes not to expect a lot because the Belt and Road Initiative is aimed at solving current Chinese industrial overcapacity by opening up new areas of investment and employment. The initiative, according to these analysts, is aimed at enriching China at the expense of African states. Dumping is one of the vices China might inflict on vulnerable African countries.[56] Given the low levels of industrialization in Africa, there are several opportunities to invest and loan out surplus capital, develop new markets for exports, and secure access to natural resources. BRI’s emphasis on infrastructure projects makes sense to China by shifting excess production capacity to African countries, thereby relieving the supply glut at home. The construction of huge infrastructure and industrial bases creates jobs and fetches huge capital returns for China. On the contrary, it destroys the industrial drive of weak African regimes. In short, there is nothing philanthropic about the Belt and Road Initiative.[57]
The inherently limited coordination by African governments when dealing with foreign investors and diplomats is a critical challenge that requires quick attention. Currently, China enjoys economic leverage over African countries in key national sectors.[58] A country of 1.4 billion people and a $19.19 trillion economy, China remains a formidable power compared to Africa’s 54 countries combined with a total population of 1.2 million with an economy of $2.6 trillion (nominal terms). Inherently, African countries do not operate as one regional or continental bloc but rather as individuals. African unity in negotiating trade and investment deals with China is a necessary condition for maximizing the Belt and Road Initiative’s benefits. Continental bodies such as the African Union, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), as well as regional entities such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern Africa Development Committee (SADC), the Maghreb Union, East African Committee (EAC), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), ought to provide leadership lead in this process.[59] Otherwise, the African involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative may not provide the expected benefits.
There is growing concern regarding the capability of many African economies to effectively guarantee debt sustainability. Chinese sponsored projects rely on loans provided by Chinese commercial banks. Failure to repay these loans may lead to the loss of critical national assets usually mortgaged during the loan acquisition process.[60] In situations where African countries fail to pay, the Belt and Road Initiative projects may prove to be a curse instead of a blessing. Many economists insist that it is very important for African leaders to strike a balance between financing development requirements and debt sustainability. Debt sustainability risks often emanate from a country’s capability to fulfill its debt servicing obligations. Macroeconomic stability is a critical precondition to achieving external and public debt sustainability. Huge infrastructure investments require robust financing capabilities, which are often lacking in many African countries. The infamous example of Sri Lanka surrendering Hambantota port to China due to its failure to repay loan obligations is a constant reminder to African economies. One possible solution for this challenge is to carry out stress testing among loan applicants to measure the sensitivity of the potential debt burden index.[61] Risk rating reports would then be produced to help prospective applicants appreciate their vulnerabilities before committing their countries to unsustainable loans.
There is growing skepticism about the long-term objectives of the Belt and Road initiative. Some analysts contend that China’s manifest return to Africa through such programs as the BRI is potentially detrimental to the growth of good governance.[62] Moreover, China’s human rights record is not a commendable one. Chinese influence in Africa is taking place at a time when many countries are undergoing political transitions from autocracy to liberal democratic political systems. There is a possibility that this transition could be suffocated while human rights issues and environmental degradation will be ignored. The possibility that China will make a constructive contribution aimed at supporting transitions to liberal democracy in Africa’s fragile regimes appears farfetched. There is sufficient evidence to conclude that promoting democracy in Africa is not among Chinese foreign policy. The concept of liberal democracy is quite incongruent with China’s relativistic conception of individual civil liberties and human and political rights. It is one of the reasons why Beijing doggedly clings to the dogma of non-interference.[63] Its defense of sovereignty, usually to the benefit of authoritarian regimes, has the potential to undermine existing efforts at political liberalization. Promoting autocratic regimes in the dubious guise of non-interference is potentially detrimental to the freedoms and development of ordinary Africans.
Furthermore, there are scholars and policy analysts who believe that unless good, accountable governance is implemented in African countries, the BRI shall benefit the corrupt leadership corps, and communities shall instead carry the burden of loan repayment.[64] Some analysts contend that large infrastructure projects in authoritarian regimes promote corruption—a common governance risk that is reflected in the abuse of public office for private gain. According to the 2007 World Bank report, corruption in the infrastructure sector involves negative influence during budgeting, project selection, and rent extraction in return for a carriage permit, construction contracts, leases, or concessions.[65] Indeed the World Bank report indicated a close correlation between a country’s development level and the probability of corruption. Moreover, some African countries lack a strict rule of law, and yet combating corruption is largely about addressing matters of poor governance. The corruption Perception Index and the Rule of Law Index are closely related. Countries where corruption levels are high, tend to have a weak rule of law. Therefore, unless the efficiency and transparency of governments undertaking the Belt and Road Initiative projects are vigorously implemented, the general population in Africa may not benefit from the initiative partly due to the loss of Foreign Direct Investment benefits.
Although a number of scholars have sounded their pessimism regarding the viability of the Belt and Road initiative, one can hasten to state that probably, it is too early to determine the BRI endpoint.[66] Whether wholly or partly successful, the existential political risk for the various African countries is substantial. Sustainable achievements will largely depend on the government’s debt discipline and respect for democratic ethos. This should be carefully considered to avoid a potential backlash.
- Paradigm implications
A thorough analysis of the foregoing discourse regarding the Belt and Road Initiative in Africa is a testimony of how the theory of realism truly works. Accusations that China is focused on dominating the region of Africa should surprise nobody. This is what states do in the accumulation of power whenever they seize any opportunity. And it is not only China that is focused on power. African countries are equally focusing on maximum gains from their trade relations with China to leverage their regional competition.
In addition, the realist theory emphasizes the notion that the international system is a self-help project where states are responsible for their own survival and are free to define their own interests and pursue power as they see fit.[67]That China is aggressively consolidating its regional supremacy is clearly in conformity with the self-help nature of states in the international system.
After all, there is no place whatsoever for morality in the conduct of international relations. Realist thinkers are clearly pessimistic about the practical relevance of morality in the conduct of international relations. Demands of morality are clearly incongruent with practical requirements for effective political action. Realist thinkers insist that states have their unique perception of morality quite different from customary morality. They further emphasize that morality, if employed at all, is nothing but a mere instrument used to justify the behavioral conduct of state policy.[68]China is not supporting Belt and Road initiative in Africa for charity.
Furthermore, realist scholars such as Professor Hans Morgenthau insist that human beings possess an insatiable lust for power and dominance. He expressed this concept in his famous statement, animus dominandi- the insatiable desire among human beings to dominate.[69] Among the key cornerstones of Morgenthau’s theoretical approach is the concept of power. States have specific national interests defined in terms of power. And China is not sleeping. According to the concept of power, all political leaders, irrespective of the political model existing within the system, think and act in terms of interest defined as power. This helps analyze state foreign policy irrespective of the variables involved, such as motives, preferences, and the moral qualities of individual politicians. China’s promotion of the BRI in Africa is neither an accident nor a coincidence. It is a grand strategic move aimed at long-term regional and global governance.
Finally, the realist theory stresses the state as the principal actor in international relations. States are rational actors and are focused on relative gains.[70] China is clearly demonstrating rationality in carrying out a wide range of Belt and Road initiative activities. That China is debt-trapping African countries is clearly a matter for Africans, not the Chinese.
- Recommendations.
African countries must establish strategic linkages at the continental and regional levels in order to establish strong bargaining power. The current fragmented approach by Africa disadvantages their bargaining power when dealing with powerful economies such as China. African unity and cohesion in commercial intercourse with China is an important element in maximizing synergy and diplomatic leverage.
Given China’s economic power compared to many African countries, political leaders in Africa should rise to the challenges. The asymmetrical relationship between China and African countries compromises Africa’s assertiveness and negotiation confidence with Chinese Officials. Hence, because of the inexorable technological gap between the two countries, policymakers should ensure the implementation of effective trade policies that pay special attention to learning opportunities. African countries should leverage knowledge offered by Chinese experts within an industrial framework focused on production capability and sustainability.
There is supportive evidence to show increasing trade volume between African countries and China in the wake of the Belt and Road Initiative. Though not particularly robust in all specifications, trade between countries is positively associated with economic growth. African countries benefit from China’s rising demand for raw materials abundant on the continent. However, the asymmetric nature of Sino-Africa trade may not meaningfully contribute to sustainable economic growth and development unless institutional strengthening is undertaken. This will mitigate the potential resource curse syndrome endemic to most developing countries which have failed to achieve economic take-off, the abundance of their natural resources notwithstanding.
While many African economies have benefitted from foreign direct investment from China, most Chinese investments in Africa are not intimately embedded within the local and national development programs. There is a need to improve linkages between foreign firms from China and the domestic economy. This will improve the growth effects of foreign investment. Ultimately, this could lead to improved technology spillovers to domestic firms. Furthermore, the African governments should target key sectors that are essential for economic development and focus foreign direct investment in these sectors. The future impact could imply enhanced productive capacity, domestic investment, increased local employment, and integration of African firms within the global economy.
- Conclusion.
In conclusion, the Belt and Road Initiative is a promising icon of global and regional infrastructural development, especially in developing countries. It is an ideal strategic platform for African countries to access opportunities in technology and skill development, particularly for the construction industry. Critics of the initiative cite corruption, limited technology transfer, and the possible danger of debt-trapping diplomacy as eminent challenges. It is therefore imperative for African governments to emphasize effective policymaking focused on practical effort and follow-up on the implementation. Some leaders see the initiative as mainly a cooperative arrangement among interested states focused on promoting key infrastructure and enhancing connectivity efforts around the world. Whereas the Belt and Road Initiative has not been formalized and institutionalized, it is a highly centralized and coordinated approach by the Chinese political leadership. Indeed, it is a unique and unprecedented megaproject in recent global economic history. And the Chinese leadership is determined to provide its bearing. Since 2017, China has organized three Belt and Road Initiative Forums for International Cooperation in Beijing. A number of analysts contend that the Belt and Road Initiative is nothing but a critical component of a new geopolitical mechanism aimed at the protection and promotion of China’s national and security interests. Others insist that it is China’s anti-containment strategy focused on the dominance of the Eurasian mainland and the developing world in general. The Belt and Road Initiative is believed to be an effort seeking control and dominance of key oceanic transportation networks currently dominated by the United States.
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[1] Pelagia Karpathiotaki et al., ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Contributions to Connectivity,’ in New Dimensions of Connectivity in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Christopher Findlay and Somkiat Tangkitvanich, 1st ed. (ANU Press, 2021), 41–90, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv23hcdsw.10.
[2] David Dollar, ‘Understanding China’s Belt and Road Infrastructure Projects in Africa,’ Global China, n.d., 11.
[3] Karpathiotaki et al., ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Contributions to Connectivity.’
[4] Dollar, ‘Understanding China’s Belt and Road Infrastructure Projects in Africa.’
[5] Anwar, “Belt and Road Initiative: What’s in it for China?”
[6] Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, ‘Dancing with the Dragon. Africa’s Courtship with China’, The Global South 2, no. 2 (2008): 171–87.
[7] Raphael ZiroMwatela and Zhao Changfeng, ‘Africa in China’s’One Belt, One Road’Initiative: A Critical Analysis, n.d., 13.
[8] Anwar, “Belt and Road Initiative: What’s in it for China?”
[9] Zeleza, ‘Dancing with the Dragon. Africa’s Courtship with China’.
[10] ZiroMwatela and Changfeng, ‘Africa in China’s’One Belt, One Road’Initiative: A Critical Analysis.
[11] “New Perspectives April 2019 Risberg.Pdf.”
[12] Xiangning Wu and You Ji, ‘The Military Drivers of China’s Belt and Road Endeavor: Expanding the Global Reach from Land Mess to the Maritime Domains,’ China Review 20, no. 4 (2020): 223–44.
[13] W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz, ‘Political Realism in International Relations, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/realism-intl-relations/.
[14] Korab-Karpowicz.
[15] Korab-Karpowicz.
[16] Korab-Karpowicz.
[17] Karpathiotaki et al., ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Contributions to Connectivity.’
[18] Karpathiotaki et al.
[19] Karpathiotaki et al.
[20] Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (New York, USA: Oxford University Press, 2011).
[21] Brautigam.
[22] Lilian Mboya, ‘Impact of the Standard Gauge Railway on the Kenyan Economy, International Journal of Latest Research in Science and Technology Volume XI, Issue I, January 2022 (28 January 2022): 1–7.
[23] Mboya.
[24] Shikai Wang et al., ‘Analysis of the BRI and China’s OFDI in Sub-Saharan Africa’, The Singapore Economic Review, 16 September 2020, 1–25, https://doi.org/10.1142/S0217590820500496.
[25] Wang et al.
[26] Artur Colom-Jaén and Óscar Mateos, ‘China in Africa: Assessing the Consequences for the Continent’s Agenda for Economic Regionalism,’ Politics and Governance 10, no. 2 (21 April 2022): 61–70.
[27] Colom-Jaén and Mateos.
[28] Colom-Jaén and Mateos.
[29] Zeleza, “Dancing with the Dragon. Africa’s Courtship with China.”
[30] Wang et al., ‘Analysis of the BRI and China’s OFDI in Sub-Saharan Africa.’
[31] Zahra Abdulhadi Shukra, Ying Zhou, and Lingling Wang, ‘An Adaptable Conceptual Model for Construction Technology Transfer: The BRI in Africa, the Case of Ethiopia’ 13, no. 6 (January 2021): 3376, https://doi.org/10.3390/su13063376.
[32] Shukra, Zhou, and Wang.
[33] Bouks, “The Restraints on Egypt’s National Security towards the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).”
[34] Bouks.
[35] Anthony Orji, Ikenna Paulinus Nwodo, and Jonathan E. Ogbuabor, ‘Where Do Real Output Shocks to Nigeria Mainly Emanate from? Empirical Analysis of Nigeria-China-India-USA Economic Interactions’, Studia Universitatis Vasile Goldiş, Arad – Seria Ştiinţe Economice 32, no. 1 (2022): 58–77.
[36] Mboya, ‘Impact of the Standard Gauge Railway on the Kenyan Economy.’
[37] Shukra, Zhou, and Wang, ‘An Adaptable Conceptual Model for Construction Technology Transfer: The BRI in Africa, the Case of Ethiopia.’
[38] Mboya, ‘Impact of the Standard Gauge Railway on the Kenyan Economy.’
[39] Mboya.
[40] ‘Why an Early Belt and Road Initiative East Africa Hub? Economic, Demographic and Security Factors | Emerald Insight’, accessed 18 May 2022, https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/JCEFTS-09-2021-0049/full/html#abstract.
[41] Mboya, ‘Impact of the Standard Gauge Railway on the Kenyan Economy.’
[42] ZiroMwatela and Changfeng, ‘Africa in China’s’One Belt, One Road’Initiative: A Critical Analysis.
[43] ZiroMwatela and Changfeng.
[44] ‘Brief_Report_No.1.Pdf’, accessed 20 May 2022, https://media.africaportal.org/documents/Brief_Report_No.1.pdf.
[45] ZiroMwatela and Changfeng, ‘Africa in China’s’One Belt, One Road’Initiative: A Critical Analysis.
[46] ZiroMwatela and Changfeng.
[47] Shukra, Zhou, and Wang, ‘An Adaptable Conceptual Model for Construction Technology Transfer: The BRI in Africa, the Case of Ethiopia.’
[48] Karpathiotaki et al., ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Contributions to Connectivity.’
[49] Karpathiotaki et al.
[50] ‘Why an Early Belt and Road Initiative East Africa Hub? Economic, Demographic and Security Factors | Emerald Insight’.
[51] Dan Runde, Conor Savoy, and Shannon McKeown, ‘Post-Pandemic Governance in the Indo-Pacific: Adapting USAID’s Strategy in the Face of Covid-19’ (Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2020), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26382.
[52] Wang et al., ‘Analysis of the BRI and China’s OFDI in Sub-Saharan Africa.’
[53] Karpathiotaki et al., ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Contributions to Connectivity.’
[54] Karpathiotaki et al.
[55] Karpathiotaki et al.
[56] Michael Clarke, ‘The Belt and Road Initiative: China’s New Grand Strategy?’, Asia Policy, no. 24 (2017): 71–79.
[57] Clarke.
[58] Zeleza, ‘Dancing with the Dragon. Africa’s Courtship with China’.
[59] Zeleza.
[60] Karpathiotaki et al., ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Contributions to Connectivity.’
[61] Karpathiotaki et al.
[62] Tull, “China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance, and Consequences.”
[63] Tull.
[64] Karpathiotaki et al., ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Contributions to Connectivity.’
[65] Karpathiotaki et al.
[66] Anwar, “Belt and Road Initiative: What’s in it for China?”
[67] Korab-Karpowicz, ‘Political Realism in International Relations.
[68] Korab-Karpowicz.
[69] Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘Common Sense and Theories of International Relations, Journal of International Affairs 21, no. 2 (1967): 207–14.
[70] John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions, International Security 19, no. 3 (1994), https://doi.org/10.2307/2539078.
