ABSTRACT

Rwanda has hosted Congolese refugees since 1996. A few refugees have benefitted from resettlement to Western countries, including the United States of America (USA) and Canada. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has not promoted voluntary repatriation because the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) remains insecure. This paper examines the feasibility of local integration. It draws from the researcher’s dissertation entitled “The Politics of Hosting Refugees in Rwanda.” It uses documents analysis and twenty key informant interviews to collect data. Evidence suggests two significant opportunities: most refugees share a social and cultural background with their Rwandan hosts, while the new nationality law is progressive, both can facilitate local integration. The researcher recommends UNHCR, the Government of Rwanda (GoR), relevant states, and regional bodies to establish all available opportunities, educate refugees and support the process for those interested in these durable solutions.

 

1. Introduction

Rwanda is a resource-scarce country, with a small territory of 26,338 square kilometers (sqkm), with a high population density of 525 per sqkm.[1] It is home to approximately 12,950,000[2] inhabitants, with an overwhelmingly rural economy.[3] Despite recent commendable advances in improving socio-economic development indicators,[4] the country remains among the poorest globally; its poverty incidence is exceptionally high among rural households[5] and high levels of youth and women unemployment.[6] Nevertheless, Rwanda has been hosting refugees from DRC since 1996.[7] Approximately 70,000 live in five camps and urban areas. For the last 25 years, resettlement has been the most preferred solution, though not appropriate for every refugee, meaning that the country has been striving to support its citizens and refugees, which is not always an easy decision, mainly when refugee host countries have limited resources to meet their development needs.[8]

Drafters of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) hereinafter “the 1951 Refugee Convention” intended that a refugee situation would be temporary, paving one of the most appropriate durable solutions to individual refugees: voluntary repatriation, resettlement, and local integration. In the same vein, the Global Compact on Refugees encourages, among other options, a possibility of these three solutions and responsibility-sharing among members of the global community. This paper reviews some extant literature on durable solutions, outlines the research methodology, presents and discusses the progress for each durable solution, draws conclusions, and makes recommendations.

2. Refugees’ Durable Solutions

Per the definition of a refugee in Article 1A (2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, a refugee runs away for fear of prosecution. Similarly, Article 1F provides for exclusion grounds related to the claimant’s perpetration of certain serious crimes. It, therefore, implies that if the information is available at a later stage that the refugee ran away from prosecution or was involved in serious crimes, there will be cancellation of their status. In Mugesera v. Canada,[9] the Court took a decision that withdrew a refugee status. Similarly, article I.4(a)–(d) of the OAU Refugee Convention outlines four circumstances of cessation: (i) reavailment of national protection; (ii) re-acquisition of nationality; (iii) acquisition of a new nationality; and (iv) reestablishment in the State of origin. A close examination of the Convention Cessation clauses highlights two sub-categories: changes in personal subjective circumstances (1-4) and circumstances changes that were a foundation of the refugee claim or ceased circumstances (5-6). Both instruments suggest that a durable solution should supplant a refugee status.

The concept of refugees’ “durable solutions” seems to have been used for the first time after World War II.[10]  It meant voluntary repatriation, resettlement, and local integration, as outlined below:

2.1. Voluntary Repatriation

Voluntary repatriation happens in post-conflict situations after improved conditions in the refugees’ country of origin. It requires humanitarian and development actors to allocate increased resources to create a suitable environment inside the countries of origin to prevent the recurrence of mass outflows and facilitate sustainable repatriation.[11] There must be peace[12] and livelihoods[13]in the country of origin as a precondition for sustainable return.

 

However, refugees may not opt for voluntary repatriation due to a lengthy period of exile and acculturation in host societies.”[14] Specifically, various factors influence repatriation solutions:  from the host State’s perspective, hosting many refugees negatively impacts fragile local infrastructure and strains the social fabric. In most situations, international solidarity is available upon the influx and its aftermath but dwindles with time, which may contribute to the deterioration of the quality of asylum and eventually pressure on refugees to depart.[15] From the sending countries’ perspective, many considerations, including protection of human rights, infrastructure, economic, social, and political life, and the rule of law or ensuring adequate national protection, require labor and time. As was the case for Burundian returnees,[16] there may be tensions between returning populations and those who stayed behind over property rights.[17] From the UNHCR’s perspective, repatriation aims to reavailing national protection. Unfortunately, most repatriations happen amidst a lack of security, inadequate legal and institutional frameworks, inadequate social and economic infrastructure.[18] For refugees, return decisions are complicated; they may have spent decades in asylum countries, are not well informed about the situation in their country of origin, which often require the “go and see, come and tell arrangements.[19] For the international community, sustainable return depends on the sustainable political, financial and economic support to countries of origin[20] to ensure a voluntary, safe, dignified and durable return.[21] Authorities must assure returnees of their physical safety, with the international community’s support, which requires security in the return communities.[22] It requires legal safety to revive legal systems, including traditional legal structures and legal reforms to protect rights, including nationality.[23] In the same vein, states must ensure material safety, including the availability of potable water, health services, education, and tangible measures to guarantee a sustainable return.[24] There is also a need for reconciliation between communities that engaged in conflicts which resulted in refugee outfluxes.[25] Briefly, some refugees do not opt for voluntary repatriation; reasons include a continued legitimate fear of persecution in their country, fear of discrimination against minority groups, and fear of survival due to destruction in the refugees’ place of origin. Also, dissuasion factors include lived traumatic events, lack of capital for the reintegration process, refugees’ links with the local population and the country of asylum, better access services for staying refugees than those returning, and certain refugee groups decide to stay abroad in pursuit of their political objectives.[26]

 

2.2. Local Integration

Not all refugees will opt for repatriation for the reasons laid out above. Such a situation calls for alternative durable solutions such as local integration. It is a process with three interwoven dimensions: first local integration is a legal process where the host State grants refugees a range of rights commensurate to those available to nationals, such as freedom of movement, access to education, access to labor markets, access to public relief and assistance, including healthcare, right to property, legal documentation, which leads to permanent residence. Second, local integration is an economic process whereby refugees become self-reliant and depend less on State or humanitarian actors. Third, local integration is a socio-cultural process whereby the local communities accommodate refugees, which leads to a life without or less discrimination[27] and naturalization.[28] Member States should facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees.”[29]

Various considerations influence local integration; there may be a concern that refugees are a burden to the economy and environment in a country where the State is struggling to meet the needs of its citizens.[30] Governments become reluctant to local integration when the global community is not steadfast to burden-sharing. Also, host states may perceive refugees as threats to local, national, and regional security, especially when there is no observance of asylum’s civilian and humanitarian character.[31] In history, especially after the Great Lakes crisis, refugees became security threats, especially in mixed situations (armed and criminal elements). Some African states’ post-cold war democratization process meant that politicians were interested in mobilizing electoral support based on xenophobic and anti-refugee sentiments.[32]

The High Commissioner proposed “Development through Local Integration (DLI)” for situations where local integration is more viable than repatriation and resettlement. When the State provides opportunities for gradual integration of refugees, DLI will solicit additional development assistance to attain a local integration of refugees as an option and not an obligation.[33] In partnership with development actors, states contribute to the realization of local integration through burden-sharing, ensuring that the necessary resources are available to enhance self-reliance and local integration to sustain the viability of local communities affected by their presence.[34] Access to work opportunities is an essential ingredient of human dignity and the ability to achieve self-reliance, one of the cornerstones of the successful integration of refugees in their host country.[35]

2.3. Resettlement

Resettlement encompasses the selection and transfer of refugees from the first country of asylum to a third State willing to admit them as refugees with permanent residence status.[36] The status provides resettled refugees and dependents with access to rights available to nationals. Resettlement also carries the potential for naturalization in the resettlement country.[37] Resettlement is a refugee protection tool that shares the same goals of protection as those underpinning responsibility to protect (R2P) as it moves refugees from the risk of mass atrocities by minimizing the possibility that overburdened host states will close their borders or return refugees to the manifestly failing State where they face mass atrocities. However, resettlement is a more settled norm and could lend strength to what provisions of the R2P.[38] It performs core functions, the complementary nature of three durable solutions, and the complementary benefits. Resettlement provides international protection and meets the unique needs of individual refugees whose life, liberty, safety, or other rights are at risk in the asylum country. It is a living expression of international solidarity and responsibility-sharing mechanism and eventually helps the assuage the burden from the shoulders of the first asylum country.[39] Finally, it is a platform to demonstrate the complementarity of three durable solutions: neither the 1951 Refugee Convention nor the UNHCR statute set out the hierarchy of the three durable solutions. Resettlement is, therefore, one of the available solutions to UNHCR and States, but it works along with other durable solutions depending on their appropriateness, feasibility, and desirability. In addition, UNHCR promotes other durable solutions concurrently with resettlement.[40]

UNHCR and States have promoted a “strategic use of resettlement”: resettlement provides complimentary benefits to refugees. First, they bring changes in attitudes and practice regarding asylum policy in the first countries of asylum. As it relieves the first country of refuge burden, resettlement can enhance protection and asylum prospects for the remaining refugee population. Second, resettlement programs in new resettlement countries may lead to improved asylum systems, including establishing Refugee Status Determination (RSD) procedures. Third, refugees bring skills, resources, and diversity to the resettlement countries, which incarnate a distinct social, cultural, and economic benefit to the new host State. Finally, a harmonized approach to resettlement processing accessible in a balanced way throughout a particular region can help assuage the secondary movements of refugees in search of protection and resettlement countries.[41] UNHCR and partners must always consider external realities and competing pressures. One of them is protracted refugee situations and burdens on asylum countries: more people need resettlement opportunities than places and resources available. The limbo in the countries of origin and inadequate resources contribute to the protractedness of refugee situations and appropriate solutions, which pose an economic, social, security problems burden on the first asylum countries.[42]

Notwithstanding these realities, policymakers and UNHCR have targeted resettlement to improve protection conditions in countries of the first asylum for refugees.[43] Through the Working Group on Resettlement and the Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement, partners strive continuously to enhance the use of resettlement as a responsibility-sharing tool, especially where the prospects of other durable solutions are remote or absent. It includes ongoing efforts to expand and support the resettlement programs of countries offering resettlement for the first time and expanding the resettlement base.[44]

 

2.4. Are Durable Solutions still Relevant?

In 2016, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) members reiterated the need for responsibility-sharing for refugee situations. The New York Declaration on refugees begot the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) and the Global Compact on Refugees.[45] In December 2019, a Global Refugee Forum (GRF) congregated in Geneva to express solidarity with refugees and their hosts worldwide.  During the Forum, participants shared good practices on how the Global Compact had been making a difference. States and other stakeholders pledged to improve the lives of refugees and their hosts in the same. Although non-binding,[46] the Compact is an opportunity to shape the global refugee regime into a more responsible, predictable, and inclusive of relevant stakeholders, spearheading the sharing responsibility for refugees. It bridges gaps within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) implementation, the 1951 Refugee Convention, and its 1967 Protocol in supporting refugees and communities that host them.

 

3. Methodology

Data for this paper came from two primary sources; documents analysis and interviews. Documents include journal articles, relevant websites, international or municipal laws, public policies, strategic plans, official reports, newspaper articles, handbooks, and training materials.[47] The researcher reviews them to get the background information, get normative evidence, seek corroboration, and breed credibility of findings and conclusions.[48] This technique was helpful for its unobtrusiveness; availability does not necessarily require prior permissions, primarily when published in public domains.[49] The researcher purposively collected data from twenty information-rich participants[50] with specialist knowledge of the research matter (they work with international non-government organizations, national non-government organizations, public servants, independent policy researchers, UNHCR staff, and other UN agencies staff, and are knowledgeable about international law, refugee law, and refugee inclusion matters), willing to participate[51] and share their world views[52] to bridge the data gap. The researcher is aware that quantitative researchers may argue that the sample of 20 participants is too small. However, the researcher argues that qualitative study sample sizes are characteristically smaller than those in quantitative studies.[53] The concern for qualitative studies is the development of categories and the adequacy of information about the phenomenon under investigation[54] and, especially, whether the researcher provides satisfactory answers to every research question.[55]

4. Findings and Discussion

The paper examines the three durable solutions for the Congolese refugees and makes a case for local integration.

4.1. Voluntary Repatriation

There have been international, regional, and bilateral efforts to bring about peace and security in DRC, but achievements registered are not enough to inform voluntary repatriation. The creation of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) goes back to the year 2000 when the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed resolutions 1291 and 1304, calling for an international conference on security peace, democracy, and development in the Great Lakes region.[56] The recognition of ICGLR as a mechanism for combating impunity and promoting justice and human rights requires a critical reflection and understanding of the mechanism’s past, present, and future. In the quest to transform the region into a cosmos of peace, security, and sustainable human development, in 2000, the UN Security Council called for an International Conference on peace, security, democracy, and development in the Great Lakes Region (resolutions 1291 and 1304). In November 2004, the eleven Heads of State and Government of the member states unanimously adopted the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Peace, Security, and Development in the Great Lakes region in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. They convened once again in Nairobi in 2006 to sign the Pact on Security, Stability, and Development in the Great Lakes Region. Later the Secretariat of the ICGLR was established in Bujumbura, Burundi. Among the relevant protocols, one can cite the protocol of non-aggression and mutual defense in the region, on democracy and good governance, protocol on judicial cooperation, and the protocol on the crime of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity and all forms of discrimination, as well as the protocol on the Prevention and Punishment of Sexual Violence Against Women and Children (SGBV). For example, the implementation of the Protocol on Non-aggression and Mutual Defence results from the commitment of Member states to eradicate the hostile forces in the region, minimize interstate conflict by forging a common destiny around security issues. The main achievements here have been the neutralization of FDLR and M23, the main actors in eastern DRC and the neighboring countries. The April 2002 Sun City Agreement, the ensuing July 2002 Pretoria Accord between Rwanda and Congo, and the Luanda Agreement between Uganda and Congo put an official end to the war as the Transitional Government of DRC took power in July 2003.[57] From 2009 onwards, the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilization en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO, United Nations Mission for Stabilization in the Democratic Republic of the Congo), has collaborated more actively with the FARDC than in the past, providing logistical and other support to its military operations. The presidential circle’s greater capacity to address major military threats has lessened the need to co-opt political-military entrepreneurs, which has induced a parallel decline of armed groups’ relevance in national politics.[58]

Nevertheless, the prospects for voluntary repatriation are in a fog. After the deadly demonstration of refugees in Kiziba Camp, about 1,000 refugees have expressed a willingness to return to the country of origin during the verification exercise conducted in 2018/2019. Evidence suggests that the volatility of political situations in DRC has caused a lack of voluntary return, so stakeholders did not promote and facilitate voluntary repatriation. Due to state institutions and rampant corruption, efforts to meet preconditions for a safe and dignified return in DRC have not yielded satisfactory results.[59] During Desire Kabila’s reign, the DRC has slightly improved in response to government transition initiatives and internationally supervised peace processes. It is primarily due to his inability to establish a strong central government and control territory, citizenry, and armed factions.[60]

The Congolese refugees living in Rwanda originate from several areas of North and South Kivu. According to a UNHCR return intention survey in 2007, 80% of registered Congolese refugees in Rwanda want to return to DRC. The primary determinant is the level of security in return areas. The refugees themselves state that the presence of armed groups of Rwandan Hutu refugees in DRC was the cause of their flight.[61] Notwithstanding the reluctance to return, coupled with the complexity of the circumstances on the ground, an official repatriation process took place after a tripartite agreement signed on 17 February 2010 on voluntary repatriation between UNHCR and the governments of Rwanda and the DRC.[62] The signing of the tripartite agreement followed closely on the heels of the March 2009 signing of a peace accord between the DRC government and the CNDP, in which one of the principal demands of the CNDP was the return of members of the Congolese Tutsi community that they claimed to represent.[63] Feelings of hostility towards the idea of their “return” are widespread, with many communities and local leaders in North Kivu claiming that they are, in fact, Rwandan. Indeed, some commentators have accused UN agencies operating in North Kivu of promoting Rwandan encroachment on Congolese territory by facilitating their return.[64] Many people firmly believe that Rwandan citizens mix themselves with returning refugees to escape land scarcity in Rwanda and ‘occupy’ North Kivu.[65] It brings back the nationality challenge in a debate; their return would not be safe and dignified. Also, even if the government restored citizenship fully, the return hinges on their ability to successfully access land rights, survival, and livelihood. However, evidence shows that without legal reforms to accept the Banyarwanda as Congolese, they will remain de facto and de jure stateless until they acquire nationality in Rwanda or the resettlement country.[66]

In 2021, after the eruption of the Nyiragongo Volcano in eastern DRC, thousands of Congolese refugees sought shelter in Rwanda.[67] Tshisekedi and Kagame met in Goma and Rubavu to assess the damage caused, chat about the new future. They presided over signing several agreements linking the two countries,[68] including a double taxation avoidance agreement, an MoU on a mining concession, and a bilateral investment treaty.[69] Speaking during a press conference, the two heads of State expressed the need for friendly and fraternal relations between the two countries.[70] While security and economic cooperation are indirect preconditions to refugees’ durable solutions, the repatriation of Congolese refugees in Rwanda did not appear on the agenda. Voluntary repatriation, therefore, remains a dream since many preconditions are not yet in place.

 

 

4.2. Resettlement: A Popular Solution

For Congolese refugees in Rwanda,[71] evidence suggests that resettlement has been the most active durable solution:

Figure 1: Resettlement Trends for Congolese (DRC) Refugees 2014-2021; Source: Data are available at:   https://www.unhcr.org/resettlement-data.html

 

There have been thousands of refugees resettled, mainly in the USA. However, since President Trump took office, the asylum policy has drastically changed, affecting the successful departures to the USA, the leading resettlement country, which leaves only voluntary repatriation and local integration the most pragmatic solutions.[72]

There are challenges to resettlement as a durable solution: First, most Congolese refugees are exclusively interested in resettlement other than pursuing voluntary repatriation and local integration even without meeting the criteria of resettlement countries. This attitude has a counterproductive effect; they resist any other effort to protect their socio-economic rights, such as livelihoods and education. Second, the USA remains the leading resettlement country, making it impossible to absorb all resettlement submissions. While there is hope for increased resettlement quotas under Biden’s administration, there is a need for international responsibility-sharing among other States with fewer refugee burdens. Third, the situation for Congolese refugees has lasted for more than 25 years. It is no longer a priority for donors, given emerging crises around the world. Unfortunately, the situation in their motherland remains in limbo, despite the heavy investments in the largest peacekeeping operation since the 1990s. It implies that resettlement alone does not suffice to resolve a protracted situation. In the light of GCR, it is high time for the international community to work with regional bodies to bring about sustainable peace in DRC as a precondition to voluntary repatriation.

4.3. Local Integration: A Window of Opportunities?

In Rwanda, the Constitution accommodates dual nationality.[73] However, it may be difficult for the Congolese because the Constitution does not accept dual citizenship.[74] One becomes a Rwandan national by origin[75] or by acquisition.[76]  The new nationality law stipulates grounds for applying for or granting Rwandan nationality by acquisition: they include birth on the territory of Rwanda, marriage, foundling, adoption, national interest, special skills or talent, substantial, sustainable investments or activities, residence in Rwanda, honor, being an immigrant, and statelessness. All these grounds have the potential to help explore local integration and naturalization for refugees on Rwandan territory. It would require UNHCR and protection partners to work with the proper government authorities to jot down these opportunities, inform refugees, and assist individual applicants who may be interested.

Naturalization is the culmination deriving from local integration. Before one naturalizes, one may have permanent residence or another long-term immigration status. The law on immigration and emigration provides temporary and permanent residence permits to foreigners in Rwanda.[77] In order to acquire a residence permit, a person must possess a valid travel document, a national identity card where applicable “or any other relevant document agreed upon in bilateral or multilateral agreements”[78] ^[79]. A temporary residence permit is valid for only three years; sub-categories apply to different occupations, including self-employment in a business and employment contract.[80] A permanent residence permit may be accessible to a foreigner and dependents who have been lawfully resident for ten years, to Rwandans in diaspora residing in a country that does not permit dual nationality, spouses, and “to a foreigner in need of protection due to their circumstances or circumstances beyond their control.”[81]  Residents who are not refugees are issued identity documents and may also be issued travel documents if they cannot acquire a travel document from the country of origin or are stateless.[82] A unique travel authorization is available to Rwandans or legal residents, allowing them to travel to the Communauté économique des pays des Grands Lacs, following agreements signed among those countries (DRC, Burundi, and Rwanda).[83]

Besides legal opportunities and challenges, evidence indicates that around 95% of refugees share socio-cultural backgrounds with Rwandans. Refugees living in camps and urban areas have built social, economic, and family ties with the host community, facilitating refugees’ social and economic integration in Rwanda and hopefully achieving legal integration through marriage with a Rwandan and naturalization. Between 2020 and September 2021, 346 Congolese and Burundian refugees, majority Burundians, have been de-registered and obtained Rwandan alternative legal status in the country. However, key informants were not aware of official statistics about local integration.

5. Implications for the Intergovernmental Action

This paper has reviewed durable solutions from the 1951 Refugee Convention and extant literature. It has also explored the situation surrounding every durable solution. Evidence indicates that only resettlement has gained traction and has remained the most durable solution for most Congolese refugees. With the recent changes in the nationality law in Rwanda, the paper submits that there are opportunities at a legal and operational level. However, the paper observes no sufficient official evidence of whether some refugees successfully pursued this venue.

Further work is necessary to identify opportunities, make refugees aware of such opportunities, and support them in making the right choices and accompanying them as they pursue their opportunities. The evidence herewith suggests an intergovernmental implication; sovereign states receive refugees in compliance with international law.  Durable solutions also require the cooperation of states, including those where refugees came from, those that host them, and those who express solidarity with host states. Therefore, there is a need for concerted action from states of origin, host states, regional bodies, donor states, and organizations to explore the applicability of each solution to individual situations.

6. Conflict of Interest

The author states that there is no conflict of interest.

7. Acknowledgment

I acknowledge all the support from Euclid University and my supervising professor, Prof. Laurent Cleenewerck, in completing the dissertation from which this paper derived.

References

AfricaNews. ‘Rwanda, DR Congo Presidents Strengthen Bilateral Ties.’ Africanews, 26 June 2021. https://www.africanews.com/2021/06/26/rwanda-dr-congo-presidents-strengthen-bilateral-ties/.

Australian Refugee Review Tribunal. Refugee Review Tribunal, RRT Reference N96/12101 (Refugee Review Tribunal 25 November 1996).

Bangura, Ibrahim. ‘We Can’t Eat Peace: Youth, Sustainable Livelihoods and the Peacebuilding Process in Sierra Leone.’ Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 9 August 2016. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15423166.2016.1181003.

Brown, Oswald T. ‘Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo Sign Agreement to Strengthen Bilateral Ties’. The Washington Informer, 30 June 2021. https://www.washingtoninformer.com/rwanda-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-sign-agreement-to-strengthen-bilateral-ties/.

Core Group on Durable Solutions. ‘Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern’. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2003. https://www.unhcr.org/partners/partners/3f1408764/framework-durable-solutions-refugees-persons-concern.html.

Couldrey, Marion, and Jenny Peebles, eds. ‘Return: Voluntary, Safe, Dignified and Durable Return’. Forced Migration Review, no. 62 (October 2019).

Creswell, John W, and David J Creswell. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches. Edited by Amy Marks. 5th ed. Los Angeles; London: Sage Publications, Inc, 2018.

Crisp, Jeff. ‘No Solutions in Sight: The Problem of Protracted Refugee Situations in Africa’. Working Paper. Geneva: The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, December 2002. https://ccis.ucsd.edu/_files/wp68.pdf.

Da Costa, Rosa. ‘Rights of Refugees in the Context of Integration: Legal Standards and Recommendations’. Geneva: UNHCR, June 2006. https://www.unhcr.org/44bb90882.pdf.

DRC. Constitution de la Republique Democratique du Congo, Modifiée par la Loi n° 11/002 du 20 janvier 2011 portant révision de certains articles de la Constitution de la République Démocratique du Congo du 18 février 2006 (2011).

Eastern Congo Initiative. ‘History of the Conflict’. Eastern Congo Initiative. Accessed 9 August 2021. https://www.easterncongo.org/about-drc/history-of-the-conflict/.

Fratzke, Susan, and Lena Kainz. ‘The Next Generation of Refugee Resettlement in Europe: Ambitions for the Future and How to Realise Them’. Migration Policy Institute, November 2020. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/mpie-eu-frank-resettlement-final-report_final.pdf.

Gilgan, Chloë M. ‘Exploring the Link between R2p and Refugee Protection: Arriving at Resettlement’. Global Responsibility to Protect 9, no. 4 (26 November 2017): 366–94. https://doi.org/10.1163/1875984X-00904003.

ICGLR. ‘ICGLR Overview’, 2018. http://www.icglr.org/index.php/en/background.

International Refugee Rights Initiative. ‘Two People Can’t Share the Same Pair of Shoes: Citizenship, Land and the Return of Refugees to Burundi’. Social Science Research Council, 2009. https://www.ssrc.org/publications/view/two-people-can-t-share-the-same-pair-of-shoes-citizenship-land-and-the-return-of-refugees-to-burundi/.

Isser, Deborah, and Peter Van der Auweraert. ‘Land, Property, and the Challenge of Return for Iraq’s Displaced’. United States Institute of Peace, 9 April 2009. https://www.usip.org/publications/2009/04/land-property-and-challenge-return-iraqs-displaced.

Jupp, Victor. The SAGE Dictionary of Social Research Methods. 1st edition. London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2006.

Karuhanga, James. ‘Rwanda, DR Congo Sign Three Bilateral Agreements’. The New Times | Rwanda, 26 June 2021. https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/rwanda-congo-sign-three-bilateral-agreements.

Kibreab, Gaim. ‘When Refugees Come Home: The Relationship Between Stayees and Returnees in Post-Conflict Eritrea’. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 2 August 2010. https://doi.org/10.1080/02589000120104053.

Lange, Maria. ‘Democratic Republic of Congo: Refugee Return and Root Causes of Conflict’. Forced Migration Review 36 (November 2010): 48–49.

MINEMA, and World Bank. ‘Rwanda: Economic Activity and Opportunity for Refugee Inclusion’. Kigali, Rwanda: MINEMA, 2019.

Patton, Michael Quinn. Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods: Integrating Theory and Practice. Fourth edition. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc, 2015.

Reyntjens, Filip. ‘Briefing: Democratic Republic of Congo: Political Transition and beyond. African Affairs, 106(423), 307-317.’ African Affairs 106, no. 423 (2007): 307–17. https://doi.org/doi:10.1093/afraf/adm018.

———. ‘Briefing: The Democratic Republic of Congo, from Kabila to Kabila. African Affairs, 100(399), 311-317’. Affrican Affairs 100, no. 399 (2001): 311–17. https://doi.org/doi:10.2307/3518770.

Ritchie, Jane, Jane Lewis, Carol McNaughton Nicholls, and Rachel Ormston, eds. Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers. Second edition. Los Angeles, Calif.: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2013.

Save the Children. ‘Majority of Refugees Flowing into Rwanda from DRC Volcano Are Children’. ReliefWeb, 28 May 2021. https://reliefweb.int/report/rwanda/majority-refugees-flowing-rwanda-drc-volcano-are-children-save-children.

The Republic of Rwanda. Organic Law N° 002/2021.OL of 16/07/2021 governing Rwandan nationality, § 2 (2021).

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. ‘Agenda for Protection (Third Edition)’. UNHCR, October 2003. https://www.unhcr.org/protection/globalconsult/3e637b194/agenda-protection-third-edition.html.

———. ‘Protection Policy in the Making: Third Track of the Global Consultations’. Oxford University Press, 2002.

———. ‘The 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees’, 1951. https://www.unhcr.org/4d934f5f9.pdf.

Verweijen, Judith. ‘Stable Instability: Political Settlements and Armed Groups in the Congo’. Nairobi, Kenya: Rift Valley Institute, 2016. https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/57e92e4d4.pdf.

Yonekawa, Masako, and Akiko Sugiki, eds. Repatriation, Insecurity, and Peace: A Case Study of Rwandan Refugees. Springer Singapore, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2850-7.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Publisher Information: The Intergovernmental Research and Policy Journal (IRPJ) is a unique interdisciplinary peer-reviewed and open access Journal. It operates under the authority of the only global and treaty-based intergovernmental university in the world (EUCLID), with other intergovernmental organizations in mind. Currently, there are more than 17,000 universities globally, but less than 15 are multilateral institutions, EUCLID, as IRPJ’s sponsor, is the only global and multi-disciplinary UN-registered treaty-based institution.

IRPJ authors can be assured that their research will be widely visible on account of the trusted Internet visibility of its “.int” domain which virtually guarantees first page results on matching keywords (.int domains are only assigned by IANA to vetted treaty-based organizations and are recognized as trusted authorities by search engines). In addition to its “.int” domain, IRPJ is published under an approved ISSN for intergovernmental organizations (“international publisher”) status (also used by United Nations, World Bank, European Space Agency, etc.).

 

IRPJ offers:

1. United Nations Treaty reference on your published article (PDF).
2. “Efficiency” driven and “author-focused” workflow
3. Operates the very novel author-centric metric of “Journal Efficiency Factor”
4. Minimal processing fee with the possibility of waiver
5. Dedicated editors to work with graduate and doctoral students
6. Continuous publication i.e., publication of articles immediately upon acceptance
7. The expected time frame from submission to publication is up to 40 calendar days
8. Broad thematic categories
9. Every published article will receive a DOI from Crossref and is archived by CLOCKSS.

[1]Worldometer, “Rwanda Population (2021),” 2021, https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/rwanda-population/. Accessed on 22 March 2021.

[2] Worldometer.

[3] Statistica, “Rwanda: Share of Economic Sectors in the Gross Domestic Product 2009-2019,” November 18, 2020, https://www.statista.com/statistics/452199/share-of-economic-sectors-in-the-gdp-in-rwanda/.

[4] National Institute of the Statistics of Rwanda, “GDP National Accounts” (Kigali, Rwanda: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2018), www.statistics.gov.rw/publication/gdp-national-accounts-2018.

[5] MINEMA and World Bank, “Rwanda: Economic Activity and Opportunity for Refugee Inclusion” (MINEMA, 2019).

[6] United Nations Development Programme, “Human Development Report. Work for Human Development.”

[7] MINEMA and World Bank, ‘Rwanda: Economic Activity and Opportunity for Refugee Inclusion’ (Kigali, Rwanda: MINEMA, 2019).

[8] Charlotte Edmund, “84% of Refugees Live in Developing Countries,” World Economic Forum, 2017, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/06/eighty-four-percent-of-refugees-live-in-developing-countries/.

[9] Australian Refugee Review Tribunal, Refugee Review Tribunal, RRT Reference N96/12101 (Refugee Review Tribunal 25 November 1996).

[10] F. Bidandi, F.“Geopolitics, political violence, and identity: Perspectives on the great lakes region in East Africa”. Peace Studies Journal, 11, 1(2018), 2151–2806.

[11] Core Group on Durable Solutions, ‘Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern’ (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2003), 5, https://www.unhcr.org/partners/partners/3f1408764/framework-durable-solutions-refugees-persons-concern.html.

[12] Masako Yonekawa and Akiko Sugiki, eds., Repatriation, Insecurity, and Peace: A Case Study of Rwandan Refugees (Springer Singapore, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2850-7.

[13] Ibrahim Bangura, ‘We Can’t Eat Peace: Youth, Sustainable Livelihoods and the Peacebuilding Process in Sierra Leone’, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 9 August 2016, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15423166.2016.1181003; Gaim Kibreab, ‘When Refugees Come Home: The Relationship Between Stayees and Returnees in Post-Conflict Eritrea’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 2 August 2010, https://doi.org/10.1080/02589000120104053.

[14] Kibreab, 54.

[15] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Protection Policy in the Making: Third Track of the Global Consultations’, Oxford University Press, 2002, 225.

[16] International Refugee Rights Initiative, ‘Two People Can’t Share the Same Pair of Shoes: Citizenship, Land and the Return of Refugees to Burundi’, Social Science Research Council, 2009, https://www.ssrc.org/publications/view/two-people-can-t-share-the-same-pair-of-shoes-citizenship-land-and-the-return-of-refugees-to-burundi/.

[17] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 226.

[18] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Protection Policy in the Making: Third Track of the Global Consultations’, 226.

[19] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 226.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Marion Couldrey and Jenny Peebles, eds., ‘Return: Voluntary, Safe, Dignified and Durable Return’, Forced Migration Review, no. 62 (October 2019).

[22] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Protection Policy in the Making: Third Track of the Global Consultations’, 229.

[23] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 230.

[24] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 231.

[25] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 232.

[26] Jeff Crisp, ‘No Solutions in Sight: The Problem of Protracted Refugee Situations in Africa’, Working Paper (Geneva: The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, December 2002), 3, https://ccis.ucsd.edu/_files/wp68.pdf.

[27] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Protection Policy in the Making: Third Track of the Global Consultations’.

[28] Fred Bidandi, “Understanding Refugee Durable Solutions by International Players: Does Dialogue Form a Missing Link?,” Cogent Social Science 4, no. 1510724 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2018.1510724.

[29] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘The 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees’, 1951, Article 34, https://www.unhcr.org/4d934f5f9.pdf.

[30] Crisp, ‘No Solutions in Sight: The Problem of Protracted Refugee Situations in Africa’, 2.

[31] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Protection Policy in the Making: Third Track of the Global Consultations’, 244.

[32] Crisp, ‘No Solutions in Sight: The Problem of Protracted Refugee Situations in Africa’, 2.

[33] Core Group on Durable Solutions, ‘Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern’, 5.

[34] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Agenda for Protection (Third Edition)’, UNHCR, October 2003, 78, https://www.unhcr.org/protection/globalconsult/3e637b194/agenda-protection-third-edition.html.

[35] Rosa Da Costa, ‘Rights of Refugees in the Context of Integration: Legal Standards and Recommendations’ (Geneva: UNHCR, June 2006), https://www.unhcr.org/44bb90882.pdf.

[36] Fred Bidandi, “Understanding Refugee Durable Solutions by International Players: Does Dialogue Form a Missing Link?,” Cogent Social Science 4, no. 1510724 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2018.1510724.

[37] Core Group on Durable Solutions, ‘Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern’, 6.

[38] Chloë M. Gilgan, ‘Exploring the Link between R2p and Refugee Protection: Arriving at Resettlement’, Global Responsibility to Protect 9, no. 4 (26 November 2017): 366–94, https://doi.org/10.1163/1875984X-00904003.

[39] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Protection Policy in the Making: Third Track of the Global Consultations’, 250.

[40] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 250.

[41] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 251.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Susan Fratzke and Lena Kainz, ‘The Next Generation of Refugee Resettlement in Europe: Ambitions for the Future and How to Realise Them’ (Migration Policy Institute, November 2020), 6, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/mpie-eu-frank-resettlement-final-report_final.pdf.

[44] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Agenda for Protection (Third Edition)’.

[45] United Nations Development Programme, “Human Development Report. Work for Human Development” (New York: UNDP, 2015), 2.

[46] The GCR is not legally binding, it cannot be enforceable; it does not observe the pacta sunt servanda principle. However, it represents the political will and ambition of the international community for strengthened cooperation and solidarity with refugees and affected host countries. It will be operationalised through voluntary contributions to achieve collective outcomes and progress towards its objectives. These contributions will be determined by each State and relevant stakeholder, considering their national realities, capacities and levels of development, and respecting national policies and priorities.

[47] Zina O’Leary, The Essential Guide to Doing Your Research Project, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2014).

[48] Glenn A Bowen, “Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method.,” Qualitative Research Journal 9, no. 2 (2009): 27–40.

[49] Creswell.

[50] Jupp, The SAGE Dictionary of Social Research Methods, 245.

[51] Victor Jupp, The SAGE Dictionary of Social Research Methods, 1st edition (London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2006), 244.

[52] Robert Bogdan and Sari Knopp Biklen, Qualitative Research for Education: An Introduction to Theories and Methods (Boston, Mass.: Pearson A & B, 2007), 103.

[53] Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods: Integrating Theory and Practice, Fourth edition (Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc, 2015).

[54] Jane Ritchie et al., eds., Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers, Second edition (Los Angeles, Calif.: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2013).

[55] John W Creswell and David J Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches, ed. Amy Marks, 5th ed. (Los Angeles; London: Sage Publications, Inc, 2018), 76.

[56] ICGLR, ‘ICGLR Overview’, 2018, http://www.icglr.org/index.php/en/background.

[57] Eastern Congo Initiative, ‘History of the Conflict’, Eastern Congo Initiative, accessed 9 August 2021, https://www.easterncongo.org/about-drc/history-of-the-conflict/.

[58] Judith Verweijen, ‘Stable Instability: Political Settlements and Armed Groups in the Congo’ (Nairobi, Kenya: Rift Valley Institute, 2016), 38, https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/57e92e4d4.pdf.

[59] Filip Reyntjens, ‘Briefing: The Democratic Republic of Congo, from Kabila to Kabila. African Affairs, 100(399), 311-317’, African Affairs 100, no. 399 (2001): 311–17, https://doi.org/doi:10.2307/3518770.

[60] Filip Reyntjens, ‘Briefing: Democratic Republic of Congo: Political Transition and beyond. African Affairs, 106(423), 307-317.’, African Affairs 106, no. 423 (2007): 307–17, https://doi.org/doi:10.1093/afraf/adm018.

[61] Maria Lange, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo: Refugee Return and Root Causes of Conflict’, Forced Migration Review 36 (November 2010): 48.

[62] Accord Tripartite entre le gouvernement de la république du Rwanda, le gouvernement de la République Démocratique du Congo et le Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les refugiées relative au rapatriement volontaire des refugiées Congolais vivant au Rwanda.

[63] The Tripartite Agreement signed by UNHCR and the Governments of Rwanda and DRC contains references in its preamble to the Lusaka Ceasefire and Humanitarian Protocol of 1999; the Nairobi Communiqué of November 9, 2007 (Governments of DRC and Rwanda); the decisions of the Conference on Peace, Security and Development of the provinces of North and South Kivu of 23 January 2008; and the various agreements entered into by the Government of DRC with the CNDP and armed groups in South and North Kivu of 23 March 2009.

[64] Oumar Sylla, “Land and property disputes impeding return and reintegration.” Forced Migration Review, Issue 36, November 2010.

[65] Lange, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo: Refugee Return and Root Causes of Conflict’, 49.

[66] Lange, 49.

[67] Save the Children, ‘Majority of Refugees Flowing into Rwanda from DRC Volcano Are Children’, ReliefWeb, 28 May 2021, https://reliefweb.int/report/rwanda/majority-refugees-flowing-rwanda-drc-volcano-are-children-save-children.

[68] AfricaNews, ‘Rwanda, DR Congo Presidents Strengthen Bilateral Ties’, Africanews, 26 June 2021, https://www.africanews.com/2021/06/26/rwanda-dr-congo-presidents-strengthen-bilateral-ties/.

[69] James Karuhanga, ‘Rwanda, DR Congo Sign Three Bilateral Agreements’, The New Times | Rwanda, 26 June 2021, https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/rwanda-congo-sign-three-bilateral-agreements.

[70] Oswald T Brown, ‘Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo Sign Agreement to Strengthen Bilateral Ties’, The Washington Informer, 30 June 2021, https://www.washingtoninformer.com/rwanda-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-sign-agreement-to-strengthen-bilateral-ties/.

[71] Resettlement for Burundian refugees did not happen until voluntary repatriation started, save for medical reasons. This section does not therefore discuss resettlement for the Burundian caseload.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Rwanda Constitution 2003, revised 2015, art. 25.

[74] DRC, Constitution de la République Democratique du Congo, Modifiée par la Loi n° 11/002 du 20 janvier 2011 portant révision de certains articles de la Constitution de la République Démocratique du Congo du 18 février 2006 at Chapitre 2, Article 10. “La nationalité congolaise est une et exclusive. Elle ne peut être détenue concurremment avec aucune autre”.

[75] The Republic of Rwanda, ‘Organic Law N° 002/2021.OL of 16/07/2021 Governing Rwandan Nationality’, § 2 (2021), Article 6. One does not automatically become a national by origin; the applicant must be be born to at least one Rwandan parent who is a Rwandan not through acquisition but by virtue of Rwandan ancestry; and provide at least one of the following:  testimony by the applicant or by at least one person and corroborated by evidence; a relative who has Rwandan nationality by origin; or any other proof demonstrating his or her Rwandan origin.

[76] The Republic of Rwanda, Article 3.

[77] Law No 57/2018 on immigration and Emigration, art.8.

[78] Law No 57/2018 of 13/08/2018 on immigration and emigration in Rwanda, supplemented by Ministerial Order N°06/01 of 29/05/2019 relating to Immigration and Emigration.

[79] Law No 57/2018 on immigration and Emigration, art.4(2).

[80] Ministerial Order N°06/01 of 29/05/2019 relating to Immigration and Emigration, annex II.

[81] Ministerial Order N°06/01 of 29/05/2019 relating to Immigration and Emigration, art. 20. See also https://www.migration.gov.rw/our-services/permits/permanent-resident-permits/.

[82] Law No 57/2018 on immigration and Emigration, art.24; Ministerial Order N°06/01 of 29/05/2019 relating to Immigration and Emigration, arts.23 & 33.

[83] Law No 57/2018 on immigration and Emigration, art.21.