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| Preventive diplomacy is a crucial instrument for addressing political instability and violent conflict throughout Africa, especially in fragile states like South Sudan. This study critically examines the recurrence of conflict in South Sudan, with a particular focus on the role of preventive diplomacy in mitigating tensions and averting the resurgence of violence. Using a qualitative research approach that involves key informant interviews and document analysis, the study explores gaps in early warning systems, institutional response capacity, and intergovernmental coordination. The study finds that the protracted nature of violence in South Sudan is significantly related to elite fragmentation, governance failures, and marginalization of local actors from peace processes. In addition, regional and continental organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have shown that they are more willing to use proactive forms of diplomacy, including appointing special envoys and mediating peace processes. Still, they are being held back by apparent institutional weaknesses and a limited ability to respond quickly. However, the study concludes that tardy interventions, lack of political commitment, and the inadequate incorporation of local peacebuilding actors frequently compromise the efficacy of preventive diplomacy. The paper makes a case for a re-orientation of preventive diplomacy to a locally driven, inclusive, and regionally coordinated approach. Priority is given to institutional resilience, enhancing response speed, and creating sustained dialogue among political actors. The study’s findings have direct policy implications for intergovernmental organizations, especially those in the Horn of Africa and Eastern Africa region, to ensure that robust diplomatic infrastructure is strengthened and long-term investment in conflict prevention modality is the order of the day. The study is valuable to the growing literature on preventive diplomacy in Africa. It provides valuable lessons for policymakers, regional organizations, and academic institutions involved in peacebuilding and conflict prevention in complex and fluid contexts.
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- Introduction
1.1. Background and Context
South Sudan has experienced periodic violent conflicts since it gained independence in 2011, significantly undermining peacebuilding efforts and state-building. The fact that the country plunged back into civil war in December 2013 and to renewed fighting in 2016 while the peace talks were conducted is a glaring reminder of how difficult it can be to implement peace agreements and craft replicable solutions to conflict permanently. These are all symptomatic episodes of serious structural fragilities – elite competition, flimsy institutions, and ethnic-tribal fragmentation that still conspire to frustrate the prospects of a lasting peaceful settlement.
1.2. Historical Roots of Conflict
The conflicts in South Sudan have their background in boundaries of the colonial era that ignored the ethnolinguistic and cultural composition of the area. Such arbitrary lines of separation paved the way for identity fragmentation and negotiations between political power and territorial authority over disputed boundaries.[1, p. 45] The state inherited these fragmentary legacies post-independence, which are stored up, along with struggle over resources, marginalization, and uneven development.[2, p. 112] The combination of historical grievances and current political battles has created a combustible national atmosphere.
1.3. Theoretical Foundation: Conflict Transformation and Preventive Diplomacy
Classical political philosophers have much to teach us about both the sources of conflict and peace. Thomas Hobbes imagined the “state of nature” as one of constant fear and violent struggle, hence issued a powerful Sovereign to enforce the peace and ensure our security.[3, p. 89] Instead, as it is known, Immanuel Kant anticipated the possibility of “perpetual peace” with the assistance of republican constitutions, the rule of law, and multilateral cooperation between states.[4] These divergent views reflect two longstanding logics in peace and security studies—the Hobbesian desire for centralized authority and coercive stability and the Kantian vision of diplomacy, legal norms, and cooperative governance. These theoretical lineages still influence contemporary conflict prevention and peacebuilding models, most notably those that address nonviolent interventions and structural change in conflict dynamics.
Expanding on these underpinnings, Galtung’s conflict transformation theory differentiates between negative peace – the absence of direct violence – and positive peace (characterized by justice, equality, and conciliatory social relationships.[5]. Galtung again insists that we cannot follow projects that stop violent acts of killing but have to address the systems and relations that cause war to continue.[6, pp. 70–95] Through sustained engagement, dialogue, and societal change, his strategy challenges the underlying causes of violence, including historical injustice, marginalization, and structural inequality .
In a similar vein but accentuated with an even stronger focus on structure in peacebuilding than we see in Galtung, Michael Lund proposes the idea of preventive diplomacy, referring to the proactive use of non-coercive strategy whose aim is to prevent the condition of violent conflict emerging from latent tensions.[7, p. 38] Preventive diplomacy encompasses steps like early warning, confidence building, or third-party mediation to grapple with developing threats before they rip a political system apart. Galtung’s transformative model and Lund’s preventive model represent a comprehensive methodology for conflict resolution: Galtung challenges long-term peacebuilding and reconciliation. At the same time, Lund focuses on particular, short-term tools that can be used to prevent violence. These theories provide useful conceptual lenses for understanding a conflict setting like South Sudan, where latent grievances and political instability necessitate long-term structural transformation and the immediate achievement of a diplomatic bargain.
1.4. Preventive Diplomacy and Early Intervention
As elaborated by Boutros-Ghali, preventive diplomacy is essential for mitigating the political situation and avoiding violent conflict, particularly in unstable states like South Sudan.[8] This term refers to diplomacy that proactively carries out “new concepts and techniques, ranging from early warning to fact-finding and various forms of mediation to prevent disputes from arising between states or from escalating into armed conflict or to limit the spread of armed conflict.” Generally, preventive diplomacy is practiced in cases where the root causes lodge within the structural system and cannot be eliminated rapidly. Lund explains preventive diplomacy as “the sustained engagement of the regional and international actors to help diffuse the country-level tensions shifting from concept of operations (CONOPs) onto war footing.” [9] Preventive diplomacy is naturally anticipatory and collaborative, allowing for strategic decisions that target particular triggers or root causes of instability that may cause escalation. Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM), in doing so, embodies the spirit of preventive diplomacy and serves as an example of how this concept can be implemented through independent verification and monitoring systems. The body contributes to early warning by providing up-to-date, neutral information on any ceasefire violations that take place daily. It instills confidence among warring sides by revealing reality without preconceived conclusions or ideas and acting as a transparent and immediate communication channel with the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and national stakeholders.
1.5. Preventive Diplomacy in the South Sudan Context
Preventive diplomacy in the South Sudanese context has been crucial in preventing recurrent waves of violence and political instability. Since the outbreak of the civil war in 2013, the early diplomatic interventions by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development facilitated by the African Union and other international partners have made it possible to open and maintain negotiation and conflict alleviation channels. A powerful example of preventive diplomacy was the mediation that resulted in the agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan in 2015 and the Revitalized Agreement in 2018. These were not merely the outcome of the formal negotiation but an achievement of quiet diplomacy, shuttle mediation, and the regional pressure to sanction the parties to agree on a compromise. Preventive diplomacy in this setting included tools such as ceasefire monitoring, support for the political dialogue, and targeted sanctions, all aimed at preventing the resumption of violence and maintaining minimal political cooperation. However, the South Sudanese case exhibits preventive diplomacy’s structural and operational limitations. Although the signing of the peace agreements can be partially attributed to the strong diplomatic drive, the slow and scattered implementation of the R-ARCSS proves that the success of an early diplomatic drive does not mean long-term stability.[10] The weak state institutions, power competition among various factions of the Government of National Unity (TGONU), and the continued militarization have undermined successful peacebuilding and stretched diplomatic leverage. In addition, the lack of continuous follow-up and enforcement mechanisms and the changing political will among the regional players exposed the impotence of diplomacy as a strategy for stability in the absence of structural transformation.
The central questions guiding this study are:
- What are the drivers of Conflict recurrence in South Sudan?
- How effective have existing resolution mechanisms been?
- What prospects exist for preventive diplomacy and early intervention?
This study seeks to contribute to academic and policy debates on African conflict resolution by demonstrating preventive diplomacy’s critical value. It examines current tools’ structural and operational limitations and suggests more coordinated, inclusive, and active diplomatic engagement, using South Sudan as a case study. The results have implications for multilateral donors, diplomats, and peacebuilding practitioners who want to contribute to lasting peace via early action and strategic presence.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Conceptual Foundations of Preventive Diplomacy
Preventive diplomacy was a concept developed by Secretary-General Hammarskjold in the mid-1950s, re-emphasized by Secretary-General Butros Butros-Ghali in the 1990s, and since has been incorporated in the United Nations approach to peacekeeping.[11] In recent years, there has been increasing interest in using preventive tools that help prevent outbreaks and escalation of violent conflicts before they occur. Preventive diplomacy is broadly understood as a series of political activities to avoid escalating disputes into a violent confrontation, specifically in fragile or post-conflict states. This generally comprises early warning, third-party mediation, fact-finding missions, and confidence and security-building measures.[7, p. 38] Indeed, “ripe moments”—when both parties perceive the situation as a mutually hurting stalemate ripe for negotiation—have emerged as a cornerstone of such intervention’s strategic timing.[12] Yet the implementation of preventive diplomacy has been criticized for failing to possess teeth and enforcement authority, as well as for its relatively low political willingness and blurred mandates, particularly in organizations with a multilateral nature.[13, p. 14]
In a South Sudanese situation, preventive diplomacy lacks appropriate theorization and practice. Antecedents to the internal conflicts of 2013 and 2016: Warning signals about the 2013 and 2016 internal conflicts were ignored. This raises important questions about how preventive diplomacy frameworks are designed and implemented in complex intra-state contexts characterized by weak governance and intense elite competition.
2.2. Historical Legacies and Institutional Deficits
To assess the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy, it is therefore critical to understand the structural basis of the trajectory of conflict in South Sudan. Political instability has its roots in state dissolution and the 1955 mutiny of Southern Sudanese soldiers—metaphorical gangrene that paved the way for the negotiation of Southern Sudanese army units to the North before Sudan’s independence in 1956.[14, p. 13] This rebellion inaugurated a tradition of Southern resistance based on Southern dis-embedding and the failure of British colonial administrators and Northern Sudanese elites to deliver on federalism pledges.[15]
After independence, swift Northern integration of civil, military, and economic authority further, in Southern eyes, marginalized the South. Johnson (2003) calls it a regime of internal colonization where the Southern bourgeoisie were systematically barred from the rule.[14, p. 24] This exclusionary political design was not dealt with by the Addis Ababa Agreement (1972), which had given regional autonomy without linking power-sharing institutions with mechanisms of coercion. The Southern Constitution in 1973 even enshrined ambiguities such as customary law alongside the introduction of Islamic law, an arrangement which estranged Southern citizens.[14, p. 58]
A second civil war erupted in 1983 in the wake of President Nimeiri’s imposition of Sharia law and stripping the South of its autonomy, leading to the establishment of the SPLM/A under John Garang. It was initially fragmented but united various resistance organizations, such as Anyanya II and exiled intellectuals, and grew into a powerful military and political force.[16, p. 67] The peace agreement, known as the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), ended the 21-year civil war between the country’s North and South, resulting in South Sudan’s independence in 2011. The CPA did not address national identity, governance, and institutional legitimacy questions, as the AUCISS pointed out.[15, p. 47]
These historical dynamics underscore the structural deficits — thin institutions, fragmented elites, and exclusionary politics — that preventive diplomacy must address in South Sudan. Not building conflict resolution mechanisms into state structures, especially after the CPA, was a peacebuilding opportunity lost.
2.3. Regional Mediation and the Limits of Elite-Centric Diplomacy
In the lack of strong national institutions, efforts to prevent and mitigate conflict in South Sudan have relied heavily on the region and intergovernmental Organizations and mechanisms. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has led this effort, having mediated both the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) and the 2018 Revitalized Agreement (R-ARCSS). IGAD’s participation, on the one hand, mirrors regional ownership of peace processes but has also been denounced for its poor enforcement power.[17]
Even with protracted diplomatic efforts, the regional players have failed to avert recurrent relapse of conflict, thereby calling attention to strategy formulation and implementation of preventive diplomacy in dynamic and conflict-prone conditions. According to Rolandsen (2015), the peace agreements were pushed by external timelines and donor wish lists, with scant attention to internal political drivers and questions of local legitimacy.[17] However, the personalization of power among political elites, especially in the feud between President Salva Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar, has made many externally imposed deals delicate and short-lived.
As a result, preventive diplomacy in South Sudan now has a conceptual and operational disconnect. While prevention and mediation will always be important, they are futile if they do not deal with the core drivers of conflict or do not include broader societal participation. Continuous breakdowns of deals and the enduring violence call for a genuinely recalibrated set of prevention strategies—one that triangulates between elite mediation, inclusive governance reforms, and institutional resilience.
Despite the large volume of academic work on peace agreements and post-conflict reconstruction, there is still limited comprehension of why preventive action does not prevent conflict recurrence and how early action can better work in those contexts.
3. Methodology
This study adopts a qualitative, descriptive approach to provide a case-oriented analysis of the reoccurrence of conflict and preventive diplomacy in South Sudan. The methodological perspective is in dialogue with elite discourse to trace the political and socio-cultural differences supporting the country’s instability. The study design is based on applied, descriptive research principles, which, in turn, permits a nuanced understanding of historical and current peacebuilding endeavors and constraints. As Selltiz et al. note, “a descriptive survey provides a structure of data collection that is balanced in relevance and means efficiency and thus becomes particularly appropriate for complex social and political inquiries such as this one.” [18, p. 50]
Source of Data: The data were collected from primary and secondary sources. Primary information was collected through interviews and focus group discussions with actors from the South Sudan peace process, including government officials, representatives of IGAD, diplomatic envoys, and civil society members who were directly involved. Interviews were semi-structured to allow for depth and flexibility and were conducted face-to-face and remotely to optimize access and participation. This was supported by documentary secondary data, such as academic papers, policy documents, official reports, press releases, and other pertinent literature accessed in libraries, archives , and online databases. Document review was conducted using established qualitative methods, including critically assessing the sources’ authorship, purpose, and credibility.[19]
The data was analyzed using thematic content analysis, which involved NVivo software to mark recurring points and knowledge concerning the triggers for conflict, the dynamics of the peace process, and the involvement of regional and international players. This method enabled the systematic organization and interpretation of textual data. Ethical considerations were informed consent, confidentiality, and adherence to the regional research standards in qualitative research, which were considered. The lack of a control group and potential subjectivity are limitations of this study, which were countered by triangulation and cautious sampling to enhance confidence in the trustworthiness of our observations. Purposive sampling provided various perspectives in the tradition of best qualitative research practices.
4. Findings
4.1. Structural and Political Drivers of Conflict Recurrence in South Sudan
The nature of recurrent violence in South Sudan is multifaceted, involving a myriad of political, ethnic, and structural/procedural determinants. The personalization of power and institutional incompetence, symbolized by the power struggle between President Salva Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar, are the root causes of the political crisis. This sentiment was echoed by senior diplomats interviewed in Juba that their power struggle has time and again brought violence and transformed political disputes into ethnic conflicts. In his writing, Jok states that this fragmentation of the elite is compounded by the manipulation of ethnic identities, particularly involving the Dinka and the Nuer, to deepen societal cleavages and weaken social cohesiveness.[20, pp. 10–12] Moreover, the centralization of political and economic power in Juba, accompanied by the systematic exclusion of marginalized areas, has aggravated inequity and generated grievances.
South Sudan has a turbulent history that helps feed its current instability. Launched in 1983 seeking a unified and inclusive Sudan, the rebel movement, known as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), quickly disintegrated, fighting among themselves and with other groups in Sudan. The movement’s abandonment of revolutionary principles for a military autocracy divided the Just Party and created conditions for future infighting. In his writings, Johnson adds that these dynamics were exacerbated by the colonial inheritance of artificial boundaries that disregarded ethnic facts on the ground and reinforced regional inequality. This historical exclusion added to long-running resentment that helped bring about the First and Second Sudanese Civil Wars.[21, p. 101]
Interviews emphasized how Oil had worsened the conflict since independence, with Resource competition generally adding to it. Oil and the national economy have also been a locus for elite rivalry and corruption. Disputes over oil revenue sharing with Sudan have heightened enmities, and the contest for oil rents has ignited factionalism within the SPLM and undermined attempts at national cohesion. Such fragile governing institutions, proved by high levels of corruption, low service delivery, and the illegitimacy of the establishment, helped deepen public disenchantment and revolution. Schomerus contends in his work that the SPLM has been unable to transform itself from a liberation movement into a well-known, coherent government, which has opened a space to govern in a static pattern of violence.[22]
The study noted that regional and international factors complicate these dynamics. Even neighboring states have chosen sides in South Sudan’s internal battles, with Uganda supporting Kiir, while Sudan, led by President Bashir, lined up behind Machar. Despite the international mediation led by IGAD, peace agreements have been made. Still, there has never been true peace, and the future democratic elections remain a dream without political will from the ruling elites. Recent peace agreements, such as the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan, also have faced challenges. Ethnically based militias, widespread arms circulation, and bitter inter-party rivalry still make implementation a considerable challenge.
In Conclusion, the return of violent conflict in South Sudan is path-dependent, as historical grievances haunt the behavior of the current generation of political elites. Such leaders frequently use historical grievances for exclusionary behavior, contributing to cycles of retaliation and instability. To break this cycle, it is not enough to have elite power-sharing arrangements; what is needed is a transformative approach that addresses the underlying causes of the conflicts. Johan Galtung’s model of conflict transformation serves as a valuable body of theory for such an attempt. His model is also consistent with South Sudan’s current issues by calling for structural changes, fair sharing, and the change from an adversarial to a cooperative approach to the relationship.[6, p. 70] Surface interventions that do not address these underlying problems risk simply kicking the subsequent outbreak of violence down the road. Accordingly, a holistic approach of power-sharing, institutional remodeling, and historical justice is required to create sustainable peace in South Sudan.
4.2. Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Mechanisms in South Sudan
There have been several attempts to reconcile conflicts in South Sudan with varying degrees of success. The following are significant: (a) the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, (b) the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and (c) R-ARCSS, which, relative to other agreements, succeeded in ending violence and creating governance structures. The CPA was a turning point that terminated two decades of civil war and led to the independence of South Sudan in 2011. Johnson, in his work, argues that Although the Addis Ababa Agreement later collapsed by 1983, for the period of its presence, it generated stability through negotiated autonomy.[21, p. 86] The interviews observed that the R-ARCSS had triggered a decline in violence and delayed the establishment of a transitional government. This evidence suggests that when peace agreements come with genuine commitment and follow-through, they are effective preventive diplomacy.
The study showcases that international mediation and regional engagement are vital to successful conflict management. The CPA was achieved thanks to the sustained assistance from IGAD and global actors such as the Troika (US, UK, and Norway), proving the worth of multilateral diplomacy. As an extension, the R-ARCSS was signed to a greater extent because of coordinated efforts by Sudan and Uganda facilitated by IGAD. These instances highlight how early, persistent diplomatic intervention can prevent further conflict. As a strategic prevention, diplomacy should create the right incentives, obtain regional buy-in, and make credible commitments.
Another fundamental contradiction, the monitoring and oversight role, comes from the research on sustaining peace agreements. The CPA and R-ARCSS contained mechanisms such as the CTSAMVM and the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JMEC) that have served necessary de-escalation and compliance-monitoring functions. In his texts, De Waal also maintains that these institutions play a role in preventive diplomacy by offering an early warning, promoting transparency, and keeping the parties on track to honor their obligations.[23, p. 26] The analysis also resonates with the fact that their expressions emphasize the value of reactive and embedded in the ongoing architecture of peacebuilding.
The inclusiveness of peace processes is another factor. The interviews observed that the CPA contained power-sharing and opposition force integration clauses and R-ARCSS dispersed government roles among warring factions, mitigating immediate threats of civil war resumption. However, Paffenholz, in his narrative , claims that both peace accords were flawed by being elitist brief and little grassroots promoted.[24, p. 24] The findings showcase that if preventive diplomacy is to be successful in creating sustainable peace, it will have to develop Inclusive frameworks for capturing voices and civic participation at lower levels of the communities and addressing underlying social and Political grievances.
In this sense, South Sudan’s experience highlights the importance of preventive diplomacy as part of a broader peace architecture. The CPA and R-ARCSS demonstrate that agreements supported by broad-based negotiations, international and regional diplomacy, and robust monitoring can help mitigate conflict and support political transitions. Preventive diplomacy in conflict-affected and fragile states should be designed to stop violence immediately and seek to build longer-term frameworks for peace implementation, regional cooperation, and inclusive governance. Lessons learned will need to be tapped by future interventions to increase the resiliency of communities and make a repeat of conflict less likely.
4.3. The Prospects for Preventive Diplomacy and Early Intervention
This research highlights the importance of inclusive engagement in successful preventive diplomacy. Conflict prevention frameworks must enshrine participatory mechanisms that foreground historically excluded groups – particularly women, youth, and distinct ethnic formations. Such inclusivity is not only normative but also strategic and scientific, and it has been shown that peace agreements that include women are, historically, 35% more likely to last over time.[25, p. 6] It is, therefore, necessary to move from elite-based diplomacy to participatory processes based on local legitimacy.
Summit diplomacy is one of the instruments of preventive diplomacy in South Sudan. The study highlights the High-level convening of the IGAD Nairobi Summit in December 2013 and subsequent meetings in Addis Ababa, which served as “rapid response platforms” that gathered regional and international stakeholders to apply diplomatic pressure, broker ceasefire agreements, and support peace negotiations. The study also adds that these summits were key in ensuring concerted multilateral efforts, consolidating regional coherence, and maintaining international focus on the crisis. Accordingly, summit diplomacy is now a keystone of the preventive diplomacy structure, helping to give peace processes both legitimacy and impetus.
Furthermore, the study underscores the growing importance of multi-track diplomacy in creating entry points for early action. Combining Track One with Track Two and Three (informal) diplomacy, including civil society, religious and business communities, results in “a multifaceted and flexible preventive diplomacy mechanism. Whilst Track Two diplomacy has been criticized as conceptually loose[26], this research suggests that its multiplicity helps flexibility and sustained engagement across conflict stages, particularly where there is political will and strategic coordination.
The study also uncovered serious deficiencies in using Early Warning Systems (EWS). In his writing, Johnson emphasizes that despite warnings in advance, the EWS could not prevent the 2013 crisis in South Sudan, primarily due to poor inter-agency collaboration and belated political action.[21, p. 118] Furthermore, In their writing about this, Raleigh & Kniveton contend that advancements in technology, using artificial intelligence, geospatial analytics, and big data are emerging to enhance predictive accuracy and preparedness for response. [27] The research findings demonstrate that Regional platforms like the IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) explain that when well-managed, locally based information networks can become a valuable base for conflict anticipation and mitigations.
Finally, the study concludes that the future holds integrated, inclusive, and innovation-driven preventive diplomacy. Though the shining possibility of early intervention twinkles in the distance, it is clouded by insurmountable obstacles such as inadequate funding, decentralized coordination, and resistance from embedded political elites. What is needed is a systemic shift: preventive diplomacy should be institutionalized throughout multilateral, intergovernmental, regional, and community vehicles. Timely action is most effective when it is inclusive, politically backed, and adapted to the particular conflict setting.
5. Discussion
This study argues that peace processes in South Sudan, particularly the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), have been mostly unsuccessful because they were designed as a process of elites and failed to receive popular consent. South Sudan peace accords, most notably the R-ARCSS, have, for the most part, other than the last one, failed because they are elite-driven and are not popular with the masses. The South Sudan peace processes, in contrast to models of preventative diplomacy that prioritize inclusive process and local ownership, have been reactive and externally imposed with scant regard to bottom-up inclusion and sustainability of implementation. The research highlights the role of just and inclusive dialogue in reconciling political and social divides during elections. Peace efforts will likely prove to be shallow and unsustainable if they do not come to terms with deep-seated problems such as colonial-era ethnic divisions.
Underlying the ongoing conflict in South Sudan is structural inequality and ethnic polarization, especially between the Dinka and Nuer – the legacy of British colonial rule by proxy. The study says extensive governance, oil rivalry, and elite power competition, such as the one pitting President Salva Kiir against Vice-President Riek Machar, have exacerbated the economic gap and political turmoil. Building on Galtung’s model, solving systemic causes is the bedrock of turning violent-prone societies around.[6, p. 71] Peacebuilding in South Sudan should focus on structural transformation rather than short-term political fixes.
Actions of regional and superpowers, with the likes of IGAD and the United Nations, have been constructive. IGAD brokered ceasefires and tried to direct the peace train, but competing diplomatic interests between member states sabotaged the marking station. Likewise, while the UN offered support and protection, its influence was limited by inconsistent global support and political division. These findings provide backing to Lund, who argued that preventive diplomacy that works should enhance rather than overshadow local ownership.[9, p. 15] The examples of Colombia and Northern Ireland offer critical case studies for the adaptive peace process in South Sudan.
The marginalization of women, youth, and civil society has led to repeated violence and delegitimized the peace process. The research recommends multi-track diplomacy and digital innovations, including early warning systems, to facilitate all participation and reduce the risk of violence. Track-two diplomacy fosters personal relationships among communities and is appropriate for South Sudan, where social cohesion has been eroded by years of distrust.
Global sanctions, frequently seen as instruments of preventive diplomacy, have brought few results in South Sudan. As Woodward has written, sanctions work under some conditions.[28] However, this study shows that given the lack of a domestic political will, the political elites in South Sudan were unresponsive primarily to external pressures. These results contradict traditional paradigms and support promoting structures where international support conforms to local ownership and accountability.
This study suggests that preventive diplomacy’s central principles- timely intervention, inclusive dialogue, and structural reform – still hold good and that efforts at short-term, elite-focused peace are insufficient for sustainable peace. The South Sudan example highlights the necessity of continued, multi-level adaptation based on lessons learned from the ground. The implications of the findings also extend beyond Ethiopia to the broader African peacebuilding discourses that transformation, rather than mere cessation of violence, should be the goal of diplomacy. Limitations, including a limited geographic scope and potential bias of respondents notwithstanding, the study offers valuable insights into other similar fragile settings on the continent.
6. Implications for Policy and Practice
International government organizations (IGOs) must go beyond reacting to humanitarian disasters and implement structural peacebuilding programs that are more focused on the long term. South Sudan shows us that if we concentrate only on ceasefires and sharing power between elites, we’ll miss the underlying issues like historical marginalization, land disputes, and ethnic exclusion that cause conflict to erupt time and time again. Policy can promote inclusive state construction, fair resource sharing, and accountability for past wrongs. This entails that international governmental organizations must invest in conflict analysis of the context and thus design interventions instead of fitting the local context into a global template of peace.
Peace efforts must be co-created with local actors, including women, youth, religious and traditional leaders. IGOs frequently favor elite-led, national-level dialogues, but these have repeatedly foundered in South Sudan because they exclude or are not trusted by many. IGAD, for example, can institutionalize multi-track diplomacy that formally includes civil society in peace efforts. The AU and UN must promote community dialogue platforms, local mediation networks, and civic education programs that will strengthen the hands of stakeholders at the grassroots and affirm the credibility of peace dividends.
Regional International Government Organizations should have early warning and rapid response capacity to intervene before the situation grows violent. IGAD’s Mediation Support Unit and the AU’s CEWS require significant investment in data infrastructure, field-based monitoring, and political backing to provide prompt warnings and underpin proactive diplomacy. International government organizations must also be provided with definite legal mandates and political autonomy to act preventively and protect from states’ competing interests, such as those preventing effective responses to South Sudan’s conflict.
Lack of coordinated efforts among International Government organizations and donor governments frequently results in duplications, policy inconsistencies, and diffuse peace efforts. There is a need for a division of labor based on each one’s comparative advantage. For instance, IGAD can lead political mediation, the AU can focus on regional diplomacy and security, and the UN can focus on humanitarian response and transitional justice. A common coordination mechanism, including the analysis, planning, and communication procedures, would increase consistency and guarantee a typical preventive diplomacy response.
Sanctions frameworks must be a subset of a comprehensive strategy incorporating positive incentives, focused accountability, and institutional assistance. The case of South Sudan is a case in point, and it does not work just to put blanket sanctions where there is no local political will. International Government organizations must invest in political dialogue processes with spoilers, provide incremental inducements for compliance, and encourage capacity building for democratic governance. The AU Peace and Security Council would also take into consideration the sending of peer review missions or hybrid courts as part of an overall accountability framework.
International Governmental Organizations, finally, have to introduce learning and evaluation mechanisms for evidence-based policy adaptation. Peace processes like the one currently underway in South Sudan often return to failed tactics because institutional inertia gives them a sense of authority. Intergovernmental government organizations must facilitate independent reviews, incentivize knowledge sharing across regions , and mainstream adaptive programming that permits mid-course corrections. Initiatives such as the AU Mediation Support Handbook and the UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review must be built upon and periodically reviewed in light of the practical context and practitioner feedback.
7. Recommendations
In light of the findings and prospects revealed by the study, the following four broad recommendations are proposed for advancing Preventive Diplomacy in Africa, especially the Horn of Africa.
Intergovernmental organizations need to institutionalize processes to guarantee women, youth, civil society, and other marginalized actors are included in peace negotiations. Inclusive conversations have enhanced legitimacy and can contribute to long-term stability.
Regional institutions like IGAD should invest in modern early warning systems like CEWARN to stop this violence from deepening. Incorporating digital tools such as big data analytics and community reporting can help forewarn about conflict triggers and better coordinate rapid response.
Peacebuilding approaches must marry formal diplomacy with the grassroots, fostering dialogue through religious leaders, youth associations, and traditional rulers. Such multi-track strategies are more conducive to engendering trust and addressing local grievances.
Sustainable peace will entail more local ownership rather than externally driven solutions. International actors such as the AU and UN need to support, rather than command, these peace initiatives, facilitating the national actors to co-lead and respond to dynamic conflict changes.
And, of course, durable peace must also address the underlying drivers of conflict, such as governance deficits, historical injustices, and economic marginalization. Inter-state bodies must back transitional justice processes and measures that foster equity, reconciliation, and nation-building.
8. Conclusion
The South Sudan example illustrates preventive diplomacy’s complex hurdles in vulnerable post-conflict environments. This study highlights that sustained conflict recurrence in South Sudan is not so much a product of peace agreements gone awry as it is entrenched in structural determinants, including historical dispossession of peripheral populations, an interminable culture of ethnicized politics, and ongoing governance failures. These influences, formed by colonial inheritances and post-independence power dynamics, still undermine national cohesiveness and peace consolidation.
The study shows that the traditional, elitist diplomacy in agreements like the R-ARCSS favors the quick political deal over more sustainable and inclusive conflict resolution frameworks. To the extent that such accords marginalize local stakeholders, especially women, youth, and civil society, they do not take on board the root causes of successive rounds of violence. In contrast, comparative cases from Northern Ireland and Colombia confirm that inclusive, locally owned peace processes offer a greater opportunity for both durability and legitimacy.
Based on Johan Galtung’s Conflict Transformation Theory, this study posits that sustainable peace cannot be achieved through merely temporary ceasefires, as it requires systemic changes to institutions, relationships, and narratives of society. Therefore, premature diplomacy in South Sudan will have to elevate preventative rather than crisis management interventions as the means, bringing about early inclusion, local capacity, and context-driven reform as the ends.
Regional actors, including IGAD, played leading roles, albeit limited by geopolitics and lackluster enforcement. Preventive diplomacy is useful only if it is part of a strong and impartial regional and international mechanism for both early warning and response.
It also demonstrates the failures of sanctions and outside pressures to alter ingrained political behavior. Such a set would be symbolic without genuine domestic political determination and solid institutional reform. Moving forward, any viable peace plan must address the need for transformative justice, participatory governance, fair distribution of resources, and building a shared national identity.
In Conclusion, South Sudan is an instructive, tragic example of the practice of preventive diplomacy in Africa. Durable peace in those settings is less about promoting inclusive, locally-led, and strategically coordinated investments that address the root causes of conflict. For the country’s regional and international stakeholders, the message is unambiguous: transition from crisis management to sustained, preventive engagement in support of a much-needed, structural, longer-term transformation.
