ABSTRACT
| The Abraham Accords marked a significant shift in Middle Eastern diplomacy by establishing formal diplomatic relations between Israel and several Arab nations, including the U.A.E., Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. The accords focus on enhancing cooperation in security, technology, and economic development, with a particular emphasis on countering regional threats such as Iran. Ultimately, the hopes of the accords was, and remains today, to bring Israel closer to its Arab neighbors and act as a catalyst for improved relations and peace in the Middle East. However, the accords face several limitations, particularly the exclusion of a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has led to criticism from Palestinian leaders and Arab nations. Additionally, internal dissent within signatory countries and ongoing conflicts between Israel and groups like Hamas and Hezbollah present further challenges to the accords’ sustainability. While the Abraham Accords have successfully opened new diplomatic and economic channels, their long-term viability will depend on how well they manage regional tensions and unresolved conflicts, particularly in relation to Palestine. |
- Background
The Abraham Accords (referred here as the “Accords”) are a series of agreements brokered by the United States (U.S.) in 2020 between Israel and its Arab nations, aimed at normalizing diplomatic relations between these states and promoting peace in the Middle East.[1] These Accords marked a significant shift in the geopolitical landscape of the region, as they established formal diplomatic, economic, and security ties between Israel and countries that had previously refused to engage with it. Historically, most Arab nations refused to recognize Israel after its establishment in 1948 due to a number of factors, including antisemitic sentiment amongst Islamic cultures, the perceived colonialism of establishing a Zionist state, the displacement and arguably replacement of the Palestinian state, and the resulting conflicts between Israel and Palestine which have been the crux of tensions between Israel and the Arab states since its modern inception.[2] Since the establishment of Israel as a ‘Jewish State’ by Jewish leaders following the end of the Palestine Mandate, supported by the U.S. and Western Nations and facilitated by the United Nation’s (UN) partitioning of Israel into distinct Arab and Jewish states,[3] the region has seen war with their Arab neighbors, as seen in the Israel-Arab War of 1948.[4] What followed has been decades of animosity, embargos, violence, and regular military conflict between Israel and the Arab states.
These conflicts have routinely spilled over into global economic conflicts, such as the oil embargo imposed by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) on the U.S. and other pro-Israel countries following the Yom Kippur War of 1973.[5] Prior to the Abraham Accords, Egypt and Jordan were the only two Arab countries to have formal peace treaties with Israel, signed in 1979 and 1994, respectively.[6] [7] Though it is important to note that the Egyptian treaty followed only two years after Israel’s ground invasion of the Sinai Peninsula during the Six Day War,[8] and as such is a product of war that characterizes the region, rather than peace and diplomacy. The Abraham Accords have bucked this trend, breaking the gridlock of hatred and violence that have choked the region, pushing back against the notion that the Middle East is synonymous with war and conflict. The first of the Accords were officially signed on September 15, 2020, and are named after Abraham, a central figure in Christian, Islamic, and Jewish religious traditions; also known as Abrahamic Religions,[9] reflecting the region’s shared religious origins and values, and shared goals of achieving a lasting peace.
- Major Provisions
The primary provisions of the Accords focus on the establishment of full diplomatic ties, including the establishment of embassies and exchange of ambassadors, as well as the fostering of economic, technological, and cultural cooperation. The normalization efforts extend to sectors like tourism, industry, energy, and security; seeking to integrate Israel into the broader regional economy and reduce long-standing tensions between the Jewish state and its Arab neighbors.
2.1. Regional Security
One of the most significant elements of the Abraham Accords is the security cooperation between the signatories, particularly in countering the influence of Iran which remains the principal military rival and security threat to many Arab countries and Israel alike.[10]The provisions highlight joint efforts to enhance regional stability, combat extremism, and share intelligence regarding security threats.[11] This aspect is especially critical given the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, where Iran’s influence in proxy conflicts and its nuclear ambitions pose serious security concerns. Since signing, Israel has seen increased exports of military equipment to signatory states. The sharing of intelligence and cooperation in anti-terror programs also reflects the mutualism in security goals. Geostrategically, this also aligns Arab security and economic interest with that of the U.S. and Europe, and as such has been seen by many as a continuation of the West’s consolidation of economic and military power throughout Arabia, using Israel as a proxy for this further realignment.[12]
2.2. Capital, Culture, and Faith
With that said, it is important to highlight the benefits in combatting terrorism and Islamic extremism in the region from a cultural approach, which are also outlined in the Accords. The Accords emphasize the importance of fostering interfaith dialogue, cultural exchange, and religious tolerance. These provisions are particularly notable in the context of historical enmity between Israel and the Arab world, as the Accords explicitly encourage mutual respect and cooperation in promoting peace, as directly stated in the declaration,
“We encourage efforts to promote interfaith and intercultural dialogue to advance a culture of peace among the three Abrahamic religions and all humanity… We seek to end radicalization and conflict to provide all children a better future. We pursue a vision of peace, security, and prosperity in the Middle East and around the world.” [13]
The Accords also advocate for enhanced people-to-people exchanges, including tourism and cultural partnerships, aiming to break down the long-standing cultural and societal barriers that have ill-defined Arab-Israeli relations for decades. The opening of trade and business partnerships go hand-in-hand with these efforts, opening the door for tangible investments between institutions that can create long-standing partnerships that create incentives for mutual success and peace, not to mention the additional doors to diplomacy these partnerships have opened.[14] By addressing these foundational issues, the Abraham Accords seek to lay the groundwork for a more stable and cooperative future in the region, while maintaining an implicit focus on economic and security collaboration as its core.[15] Opening relations and minimizing tensions has allowed more access to capital and business partnerships between nations, which creates more substantial ‘objective’ economic investments between Arab states and Israel.
- SIGNATORIES AND PARTICIPANTS
3.1. United Arab Emirates
The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) was the first Arab nation to officially sign the Abraham Accords with Israel. The U.A.E.’s role was pivotal in demonstrating a willingness to normalize relations with Israel in exchange for economic, technological, and security cooperation. While the U.A.E. justified its decision to the broader Arab world by emphasizing that the agreement halted (at the time of signing) Israeli plans to annex parts of the West Bank, the deeper motivations were strategic, stating in their bilateral agreement,
“Recalling the Treaties of Peace between the State of Israel and the Arab Republic of Egypt and between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and committed to working together to realize a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that meets the legitimate needs and aspirations of both peoples, and to advance comprehensive Middle East peace, stability and prosperity.” [16]
While clearly a vital aspect to the accord, Israel’s commitment to a two-state policy between itself and Palestine has since been reversed following recent Israeli conflicts, and said commitment was likely left vague by design, but this will be discussed more thoroughly later in this paper. Regardless, by establishing full diplomatic relations, the U.A.E. positioned itself as a forward-thinking regional leader aiming to promote stability and development through pragmatic diplomacy rather than through ultimatums and violence.
3.2. Kingdom of Bahrain
Bahrain quickly followed the U.A.E. in joining the Abraham Accords, with its participation reflecting a similar alignment of interests, particularly in security matters. Bahrain is a small Gulf City-State, one of the smallest nations in the world, with a significant Shia population, and has long been a close ally to its close neighbor, the U.A.E. Its decision to normalize relations with Israel was likely influenced by its senior neighbor. Bahrain’s motivations parallel that of the U.A.E., which in their respective document emphasizes two primary goals; firstly, strengthening security ties with Israel, “…shared commitment to advancing peace and security in the Middle East.” [17] Bahrain’s diminutive size, territorily, and strategic location near Iran make the security provisions of the Accords particularly relevant for this nation. Secondly, Bahrain’s emphasis on building economic and cultural ties to Israel, underscoring its desire to enhance ties and modernize its economy by tapping into Israeli technological advancements.[18]
Like many Arab states, their economy is dominated by oil exports, and an increasing need to diversify their economy through its partnership with Israel is a step towards this direction. It should also be noted that it may not be a coincidence that the two principal signatories to the Accords are both Gulf States, sharing close maritime borders with Iran. This proximity, combined with their smaller populations as compared to their neighbors, places both the U.A.E. and Bahrain at heightened risk of conflict. Conversely, this can also be interpreted as a step to align interests in the Persian Gulf as a strategic buffer against Iran. Further, these aspects may not need be exclusive to one another.
3.3. Morocco and Sudan
Morocco and Sudan both later joined the Abraham Accords, each bringing their own unique motivations and historical contexts. The Kingdom of Morocco signed in 2020, with an emphasis on pursuing the commitments set forth in the declaration of the Accords, and building economic, cultural, and energy ties. Morocco’s decision to normalize relations with Israel was largely driven by U.S. recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara, a separatist state which Morocco has sought international validation of.[19]
The Republic of Sudan, on the other hand, sought relief from international sanctions and removal from the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, though not explicitly stated in the document. By joining the Abraham Accords, Sudan hoped to improve its international reputation, reintegrate into the global economy, and receive financial and humanitarian aid previously blocked by the status imposed by the U.S. Given Sudan’s ongoing civil conflict, any official signing has been delayed, but the de facto government is functionally a signatory.[20] As far as the document itself, we see the same language involving stronger diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties between Israel and Sudan. Both Morocco and Sudan saw their participation as a pragmatic move to achieve broader geopolitical and economic goals, while benefiting from closer ties to the U.S. and Israel. There have been further proposed members and attempts at integrations, but this, too, will be discussed later.
4. Legal Status
In general, the Abraham Accords have been largely viewed as more of a symbolic, though still pivotal, gesture between the Arab States and Israel, given the parties’ emphasis on voluntary cooperation, cultural exchange, and diplomatic partnerships. Yet the verbiage and legal status of the Accords reveals deeper implications for its real-world application and the actual obligations of its participating states. An “accord” is increasingly seen as a non-binding instrument, sometimes teetering on the edge of what we may consider a true ‘treaty’ or more finite legally binding agreement. Here, we will explore the variability between the individual agreements between the signatory nations and the range from full-throated treaty to mere memorandum. This too is an excellent demonstration of the importance of evaluating agreements on the merits of the text therein, and not the relatively arbitrary title assigned to said documents.[21]
4.1. Binding and Resistrable Agreements
For example, the only component of the Accords that can truly be seen as binding, in the legal and academic sense, is the agreement between Israel and the U.A.E., as it has been registered with the United Nations (U.N.), formally making it a Binding and Resgistrable Instrument (B.R.I.) as defined by Scully et. al.[22] This is very clear in the actual verbiage in the text, as the term “shall” is routinely used, creating legal obligation between the parties in regard to a number of topics.[23] For example, the document states, “…they shall recognize and respect each other’s sovereignty…” which places Israel’s recognition as a sovereign state into concrete terms, a primary goal of the Accords. Further, the agreement solidifies commitments to various diplomatic, economic, and security goals, mandating actions to be taken by both parties to meet or initiate these priorities. They even include the creation of bodies to engage in continued dialogue, “They shall work towards establishing a High-Level Joint Forum for Peace and Co-Existence…” Lastly, the ratification and registration of the accord with the U.N. are also mandated within the text itself. The annex of the document continues to lay out a myriad of specific areas of cooperation, as discussed in previous sections, with the routine use of “shall” throughout.[24]
In contrast, the Accords between other nations and Israel have not been registered with the U.N., leaving their legal status less clear and more subject to the participating parties’ willingness to engage. As the primary example, the agreement with Bahrain is textually more subjective, open-ended, and less detailed, creating more of a series of soft commitments. That is not to say obligations are not listed within the text, such as, “…recognizing each State’s right to sovereignty…” Here, Bahrain unequivocally recognizes Israel as a sovereign nation. Yet it also assigns Israel a responsibility in regards to Palestine, “…continuing the efforts to achieve a just, comprehensive, and enduring resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” Though there is a notable lack of binding language such as “shall”, the use of “agree” is applied to certain statements, creating some legal obligation in terms of international law. However, it should be noted that any terms of ‘agreement’ in this document are applied to subjective criteria, with the exception of the establishment of diplomatic ties. For example,
“The Kingdom of Bahrain and the State of Israel have agreed to seek agreements in the coming weeks regarding investment, tourism, direct flights, security, telecommunications, technology, energy, healthcare, culture, the environment, and other areas of mutual benefit, as well as reaching agreement on the reciprocal opening of embassies.” [25]
This reflects some concrete steps towards achieving shared goals, but stops short of obligating the nations from reaching those said goals, particularly with the placement of buffer words, such as “seek” to further weaken the sense of obligation. This ultimately leaves the agreement within a grey-zone, as there are no serious “lines in the sand”, that is, substantive responsibilities and repercussions. Furthermore, the absence of registration with the U.N. serves to keep this document in the guise of a non-treaty.[26]
4.2. Non-Binding Agreements
A more clear example of Non-Binding Instrument (N.B.I.) are perfectly demonstrated within Israel’s agreement with both Morocco and Sudan. These Accords are relatively informal, sharing many similarities with the agreement with Bahrain in lack of specificity, but lack almost entirely any binding verbiage. The agreement between Israel and Morocco does lay out the recognition of Western Sahara as its sovereign territory by Israel and the U.S. which, as mentioned before, was their primary incentive in engaging with the Accords. As with other states, Morocco emphasizes, “…the importance of preserving the special status of the sacred city of Jerusalem…” Calling into question the declaration by the U.S. recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, which served to undermine and weaken Palestinian territorial integrity, and acted as a catalyst for the continued erosion of peace in the region by supplanting the long-standing two-state policy maintained by the U.S. and indeed most of the world.[27] Beyond these acknowledgments, there exists no substantial verbiage that tethers its actions to the documents, as any other agreements are again weakened by buffer phrases such as “seeks to”, purposefully leaving the door open for adjustments and political posturing.[28]
The agreement between Israel and Sudan is even less thorough. As mentioned previously, a primary goal of Sudan’s engagement in the Accords was, in exchange for its acknowledgment of Israel, the U.S. would remove the nation from its list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. This was clearly done as an incentive independent of the accord itself, which lacks any mention of this; though placing that designation in an accord may have been more embarrassing to the Republic of Sudan than anything, framing this quid pro quo diplomacy as something separate from the accord itself, purposefully keeping in line the mirage of purely peaceful intentions and motivations. Indeed, even the U.S. statement in the removal of Sudan from its list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, and its summary on relations between the nationsm, lacks any mention of the Abraham Accords.[29] As for the text that is present, there is a noticeable lack of any terms of agreement altogether, which may not even matter given its lack of ratification in its own government, though again this is partially due to the ongoing civil war in the country.[30] Ultimately, this relegates the agreement to that status of an N.B.I, and the weakest among the Accords at that.
- Impact of the Accords
The geopolitical impact of the Abraham Accords extends beyond the immediate normalization of relations between Israel and its signatories, as it signals a realignment of regional power dynamics. By bringing Israel into formal diplomatic and economic relationships with the U.A.E., Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, the Accords shift the focus of Middle Eastern geopolitics away from the traditional conflicts between Muslim and Jews, and towards broader concerns such as economic security, and security threats posed by Iranian and related proxies.
5.1. Participating States
The agreements foster a new paradigm of cooperation in sectors such as defense, technology, and economic development, enhancing the soft power and diplomatic influence of both Israel and the Arab nations involved. Furthermore, these Accords have paved the way for increased bilateral and multilateral engagements between the signatories and other nations interested in fostering stability in the region. While the Palestinian issue remains very contentious, and continues to be a diplomatic sticking point for many countries, the signing of the Abraham Accords demonstrates that peace and normalization efforts can be achieved through pragmatic diplomacy, rather than rigid adherence to historical grievances.[31] The diplomatic thaw created by the Accords may eventually pressure other Arab nations to reconsider their positions and seek their own paths to normalization with Israel, reshaping the regional order in the process. Indeed, with the formalization of relations between some nations, this intrinsicly tightens relations between Israel and non-participating Arab states, given their diplomatic proximity to the signatories. This ‘diplomacy by proxy’ aligns the interests of the region and opens the door to direct diplomacy where it may not have been possible before; that is, if contemporary conflicts are humanitarian concerns revolving around Israel and Palestine are addressed, though this will be explored more later.
5.2. Saudi Arabia and Arab States
Although not a signatory, Saudi Arabia acts a regional hegemon of Arabia at large, acting as the premier economic and military force in the region.[32] The participation of U.A.E. and Bahrain in the Accords inadvertently brings Saudi Arabia and Israel closer diplomatically, even if ties are not formalized.[33] As discussed before, this is a byproduct of such multilateral agreements, bringing disparate countries together to lesser or greater extents, if not directly, then at least by proxy. Saudi Arabia’s heavy investments and interests in its Gulf State neighbors, particularly as part of the Gulf Cooperation Council[34] now must consider their formal, and in the U.A.E.’s case, binding ties to Israel. Areas of military and intelligence cooperation now extend to Israel to a degree, as do the economic, industrial, and institutional areas of collaboration. These considerations also apply to Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, and Yemen. Yemen in particular, in regards to the Houthi separatist state backed by Iran[35] whom hold territory neighboring Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and geostrategic choke point for global shipping and have engaged in direct military conflict with Israel.[36] These complex relationships demonstrate the impact the Accords have on non-signatory states via their deep ties with signatory states. This informs us on the global impact, as the Accords also act as a signal of power for the U.S. itself and its capabilities to broker peace in a region merred in conflict, and flex its diplomatic strength as a global leader.
5.3. Western and U.S. Interests
The U.S. holds outsized economic and military influence on the the Arab region, which can not be ignored when considering the impacts and applications of the Accords. The U.A.E. and Bahrain are major producers of oil, with the majority of their exports increasingly going to Asian markets, relying heavily on U.S. and European oil industries for related technologies and infrastructure.[37] With particular focus on the U.S., paramount in brokering of the Accords, we must analyze their interest in bringing these nations closer to one another. Firstly, the U.S. is the primary arms dealer to both Gulf States, along with holding military agreements and drills with both regularly as part of their broader security partnerships in the Arab region.[38] It is without a doubt that the Accords serve a purpose to bring these nations further under the global military and security umbrella that the U.S. and Western allies have developed. With Bahrain and the U.A.E. sharing military, security, and intelligence interests with Israel, these partnerships reduce conflicts between the signatory nations which eases the ability of the U.S. to engage with all parties on a multilateral basis with reduced conflict of interest, aligning focus on countering terrorism and Iranian influence.
5.4. Iran, Palestine, and Proxies
This realignment has further isolated Iran, as many of the signatories see Israel as a key partner in countering Iranian military and ideological expansion in the region.[39] Iran has long sought to undermine Saudi Arabia, Israel, and other Arab states through their proxies such as the Houthis, Hamas, and Hezbollah,[40] all of whom hold various degrees of territorial and / or political control in their respective regions and have posed direct military threats to Israel. One could see the Accords as diplomatic reinforcement of the geostrategic blockade of Iran, similar to the Island Chain strategy[41] or the “Necklace of Diamonds” strategy[42], employed by the U.S. and India, respectively, to counter Chinese influence and military potency in their respective regions. Iran similarly is becoming increasingly encircled to shore up U.S. and Western interests, the Abraham Accords playing a role in the continued consolidation and / or alignment of power.
On the other hand, some may view the Accords as a gateway to increased tensions by Iran to defend its proxies, and defend the sovereignty of Palestine. The tensions between Iranian and Israeli interests have been a continuous point of contention for decades, recently reaching a peak during the Israel-Hamas war, and Israel’s subsequent declaration of war against Hamas,[43] which has seen an unprecedented shift in alliances, increasingly against Israel as concerns of their human rights abuses against Palestinians in Gaza has increasingly drawn condemnation from both the U.S. and the West in general, though not always from official sources. Furthermore, far-right Israeli political and cultural groups have sought to take advantage of the situation to amplify Islamaphobic and anti-Paletinian policies,[44] as well as Arab and Muslim nations. The U.N. has even seen an overwhelming vote to condemn Israel for its occupation of Palestine, which included all of the signatories of the Abraham Accords,[45] as well as the International Criminal Courts currently hearing a case brought by South Africa to seek an arrest warrant for the Israeli Prime Minister, Netanyahu, whom some have criticized as exasperating the ongoing conflicts for political gain.[46] It should be noted that no arrest warrants have been issued yet, and apply also to the Israeli Defense Minister and Hamas leaders. Israeli leadership may, in fact, feel emboldened by the Accords to engage in conflict as no stipulation is set in stone regarding Palestine.
Likewise, members of the Fatah Central Committee, the most powerful governing body of Palestine, cited the Abraham Accords as “one of the reasons” for the October 7th terrorist attacks by Hamas, perhaps not coincidently the day after the 50th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War.[47] This culminates to Iran’s overall goal in the region is to create tension between Saudi Arabia and Israel, to prevent the normalization of relations which the Abraham Accords had establish the groundwork towards.[48]
It should be noted that when discussing ‘terrorism’ in this context, that while actions by Hamas have been largely characterized as such, Israel’s reaction and occupation of Gaza has been widely characterized as ‘terrorism’ and to a lesser extent, acts of genocide, and has been extended to the U.S. as the premier supporter of Israel.[49] Indeed, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and others in his cabinet have rejected the notion of a free and sovereign Palestine, going as far as to parrot the same language used by Muslim extremists when proclaiming anti-zionist, and some say genocidal, sentiment, “From the river to the sea.” [50] Since the end of the height of the Gaza conflict, Isreal has in fact, began the process of Zionization of Gaza, developing extensive security and surveillance corridors throughout the territory, similar to what has been done in the West Bank.[51] This again illustrates the inability of the Accords to move Israel’s stance on Palestine, although again some find these actions justified given the heightened conflicts over the last year.
6. Corruption and Criticism
No discussion about the Abraham Accords would be complete without exploring the conflicts of interest. Many have risen in reponse to the Trump family’s private business dealings with prominent leaders of some of the signatory states, particularly Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner who has personally spearheaded the Accords as a personal political, and arguably, business venture. Kushner has been party to several high-profile private partnerships with businesses in UAE, Quatar, and Saudi Arabia. Kushner’s private equity firm, Affinity, has been party to investments of billions, which is involved in financing of major projects involving solar and AI in the region.[52] Kushner has also facilitated fund investments from Arab business partners into Israeli-based insurance conglomerate, Phoenix Fianancial. For example, a UAE state funded investment into the insurance giant was denied by Israel, yet Kushner’s UAE state sourced funds was approved.[53]
One of the main causes for concern is Kushner’s business ties with Saudi Arabia and his close ties with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has given billions to Kushner in terms of business dealings and gifts.[54] These issues matter as they point to underlying goals and actions perpetrated by potentially disingenuous and undisclosed actors, the exclusion of certain businesses or organizations that could more effectively engage with such partnerships, and the allocation of funds and projects to benefit the elite.
With that said, it could be argued that these business dealings act as a tool to further integrate the economies and elites, a kind of ‘necessary evil’ required to fully engage with the diplomatic realities of these nations, which as a byproduct further the goals of aligning Israel’s and the Arab World’s economic interests, albeit among the elites.
7. Limitations and Challenges
While the Abraham Accords represent a historic breakthrough in Middle Eastern diplomacy, they face several challenges that prevent them from achieving all of their intended goals. First and foremost, the Accords have largely bypassed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a long-standing issue central to the broader Arab-Israeli relations. By normalizing relations with Israel without addressing Palestinian grievances, the Accords have drawn criticism from Palestinian leaders, who see this as a betrayal of Arab solidarity and neglect of Palestine’s sovereignty and human rights concerns.[55] Although Palestine is explicitly mentioned in the Accords, the lack of concrete steps or commitments is thought by some to undermine the broader goal of regional peace, as it fails to resolve one of the most intractable conflicts in the Middle East. This is showcased in the Bahrain agreement, stating that,
“The parties discussed their shared commitment to advancing peace and security in the Middle East stressing the importance of embracing the vision of the Abraham Accords, widening the circle of peace; recognizing each State’s right to sovereignty and to live in peace and security, and continuing the efforts to achieve a just, comprehensive, and enduring resolution of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict.” [56]
Without meaningful progress on the Palestinian issue, the Accords remain vulnerable to criticism from other Arab and Muslim-majority nations, and as many in Mulsim world view it as fundamentally flawed. This limits the potential for wider regional acceptance and collaboration and in fact undermines current agreements and partnerships when conflict flairs as has been routinely mentioned here.
Another significant challenge of the Abraham Accords is its reliance on geopolitical pragmatism rather than rooted in popular support, particularly in the face of internal dissent and regional instability. While the U.A.E. and Bahrain have largely embraced the economic and security benefits of normalization, public opinion within these countries remains largely negative towards Israel.[57] Throughout the Arab world, citizenry and organizations have voiced opposition to the agreement, including protests, reflecting broader sectarian tensions within the country and the region.[58] Moreover, while these nations seek to counter Iranian influence by allying with Israel, the shifting political landscape in the Middle East, primarily in regards to the growing criticism of Israeli’s actions in Palestinian territory, could, in fact, ‘backfire’ on the Arab signatories as an embarrassment on the countries’ and leaders’ reputation.[59]
Lastly, the economic promises of the Abraham Accords have yet to fully materialize for all parties involved. While there have been successful ventures in trade, tourism, and technology, the anticipated large-scale economic cooperation has been slower than expected. Complex bureaucratic hurdles, regional conflicts, and the global economic recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, and subsequent Russian invasion of Ukraine,[60] have impeded some of the intended collaborations and potential gains that were described in the Accords.[61] Additionally, the absence of broader regional participation, especially from key players like Saudi Arabia, limits the economic scale and scope of the Accords. As a result, while the Abraham Accords have succeeded in opening diplomatic channels and fostering security cooperation, their economic potential remains underdeveloped, raising questions about the long-term benefits for the signatory nations as things currently stand.
8. Future Viability
8.1. The Palestine Question and Failures
The future viability of the Abraham Accords is contingent upon the ability of its signatory nations to maintain diplomatic relations and expand upon the economic and security frameworks established in the initial agreements. While the Accords have laid a foundation for greater cooperation in the Middle East, increased tensions between Israel and Iranian proxies, and Palestine at large, present significant challenges to the sustainability of this framework. As hostilities flare between Israel and para-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as Israel’s October 1st ground invasion of Lebanon, the U.A.E. and Bahrain find themselves in a precarious position. While they remain committed to the Accords, they have recalled their ambassador to Israel follwoing the escalations in Gaza and Lebanon.[62]
The ensuing public and political pressures are testing the strength of the Accords and its utility, which, as the situation currently stands, appears unequivocally unclear. From the Arab perspective, the Accords failed to maintain peace and sovereignty for Palestine. Although most were non-binding, the spirit of the Accords clearly detailed an understanding that a two-state solution was to be pursued by Israel in regard to Palestine and that good faith efforts were to be made to achieve such aims and reduce conflict. The Accords demonstrate Israel’s inability to meaningfully commit to any policy regarding Palestine, just as the Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995, signed between Israel and Palestine, likewise failed to resolve tensions between the two nations. Even in the U.A.E. agreement, which is clearly a B.R.I., there exists no binding language in regard to Palestine. In countries where public opinion remains critical of Israel, prolonged conflict risks undermining the fragile diplomatic achievements of the Accords, which has caused signatories to distance themselves from Israel or even question their participation altogether.[63]
These escalating conflicts not only jeopardize the diplomatic aspects of the Accords but also undermine their broader goal of fostering long-term regional stability. The ongoing tensions with Hamas and Hezbollah, and now Iran directly, amplify the concerns of Arab states that have not yet joined the Accords. For example, Israel had intended to join Jordan and the U.A.E. in a large-scale solar power and water security project, but the Arab partners canceled participation following the Israeli-Hamas War.[64] The inability to resolve or contain the violence weakens the perception of the Accords as a viable path toward peace and integration. Moreover, these conflicts risk creating divides between signatory states and non-signatory states as to their responsibility or ‘betrayal’ of Palestine. This risks destabilizing the broader geopolitical environment and further entrenching divisions within the Middle East. If Israel’s relationships with its Arab neighbors continue to strain due to its security conflicts, the Accords may falter, reverting the geopolitical landscape to what we have seen for the last half-century. Thus, the Abraham Accords’ future remains tied to how effectively Israel and its partners can manage these regional security challenges while balancing the delicate political realities of the Middle East.
8.2. Iranian Threats and Success
It is important to note though, that even though all these tensions, the Accords have held even if the substance of the agreements have waivered or weakened, which too speaks to its success in its ability to withstand the ongoing historic conflicts. Ironically, the increased hostilities by Iran and its proxies, although possibly triggered by the Accords, may be slowly pushing the Arab states, signatories and not, towards Israel at least in regards to security, as the shared threat of Iran which has clearly demonstrated its military capabilities, and promotion of antisemitic and anti-zionist sentiment throughout the Mulsim world.[65] This reflects that even if, perhaps on the surface level, the Accords may have appeared to fail, paradoxically, these ‘failures’ may actually demonstrate the importance, resilience, and utility of the Accords. Even when faced by historic unrest and conflict, and as Israel receives unprecendented pressure and criticism for its response and actions to said conflict, the Accords have proved resilient and Arabia remains geostrategically united against Iran.
9. Summary and Conclusion
The Abraham Accords, signed in 2020, represent a significant geopolitical shift in the Middle East, aimed at normalizing diplomatic relations between Israel and Arab states. The agreements are groundbreaking not only because they establish formal ties between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, but also because they break with decades of policy in the Arab world, which previously conditioned normalization on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The provisions of the Accords focus on building cooperation in security, economy, and technology, with the secondary goal of countering Iran’s influence in the region. By bringing Arab nations into closer alignment with Israel, the Accords aim to foster a more stable and cooperative Middle East, even as they leave the Palestinian issue largely unresolved.
Despite the ambitions of the Abraham Accords, they face considerable challenges that have limited their overall impact. A major criticism is the exclusion of a comprehensive solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has led to ongoing tensions and skepticism from the Palestinian leadership and many in the Arab world who may see this as an attempt for Israel and the Western World at large to circumvent the territorial and humanitarian issues faced by Palestine. Additionally, internal dissent within signatory nations, where a significant portion of the population opposes normalization with Israel, has made it difficult for governments to fully embrace the accord’s goals without popular unrest. Furthermore, the expected economic benefits have been slower to materialize (though partially due to the Covid pandemic), and ongoing conflicts between Israel and para-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah have tested the resilience of the accords, raising concerns about their long-term sustainability.
The future of the Abraham Accords is uncertain and hinges on the ability of Israel and its Arab partners to manage both internal and external pressures while fostering broader regional cooperation. While the Accords have succeeded in opening diplomatic channels and improving security coordination, the lack of progress on the Palestinian issue and rising regional tensions threaten to derail these achievements, and have done so to some extent. To remain viable and expand, the ongoing conflicts involving Israel’s and Palestine must be resolved in a serious, long term manner. Of course, this is easier said than done.
10. Addendum: Recent Developments
Since drafting the einitial paper, many events have transpired concerning Israel, Palestine, and the Arab World. The US President Donald Trump has been re-elected for a second term, appearing committed to undermind the commitments Arab signatories outlined in the Abraham Accords to recognize the sovereignity of Palestinians. Following the decimation of Gaza, Trump brokered a deal with Israel for the US to take custodianship over Gaza and displace its entire population to neighboring Arab states: Quintessential ethnic cleanings.[66] [67] [68] The Arab world has condemned these plans as an erasure of the Palestinian people and has legitimized the core claims of Hamas and Hezbollah, who, for all intents and purposes, have been proven right by these absolutist policies.[69]
Even if we are to assume these policies are merely reckless political rhetoric, as the logistics of displacing millions of people into countries that refuse to accept potential refugees is laughable at best, the political and humanitarian repercussions have caused real turmoil in regard to the peace and cohesion the Accords are attempting to achieve. Luckily, the rhetorical hypothesis appears to be correct; As recently as March 2025, the Trump administration reversed its policy, claiming “Nobody is expelling any Palestinians from Gaza.”[70] Whether this is a legitimate reversal or another in a long line of inconsistent political messaging is yet to be seen.
As for the future of the Accords, there have been signals by the current US administration to bring in Lebanon and Syria as signatories, particularly as a peace deal to end Israel’s ongoing ground offensive against Hezbollah and their parallel operations in southwest Syria following the toppling of the Bashar al-Assad regime in December 2024.[71] Yet, in light of all this geopolitical turmoil, the Abraham Accords remain somehow intact, and signs of inclusion of Azerbaijan, which recently signed an energy deal with Israel not unlike Jordan, could bring the country into the fold as well.[72] Whether by elite interest in maintaining business ties or by a genuine desire to seek sustainable peace, or all of the above, the Abraham Accords continue to persevere even in the face of Armageddon.
11. Conflict of Interest
The author states that there is no conflict of interest.
12. Acknowledgment
I would like to acknowledge the support from Euclid University and my supervising professor and mentor, Prof. Laurent Cleenewerck, for his guidance through their outstanding Mediation & Conflict Resolution program, and his support in completing my program’s coursework, from which this paper derived. I would also like to acknowledge my best friend and wife, Student Doctor Julianna Winkler, for her compassion and encouragement as I seek to continue my academic growth. Thank you.
References
Ahmed, Shiza 2022. Abraham Accords. CISS Insight Journal 10.1
AJC Global Voice 2023. “Moroccan Foreign Minister Bourita Says Abraham Accords Provide “Incredible Momentum” for Peace in Middle East.” Tel Aviv. Accessed 22 September 2024. https://www.ajc.org/news/moroccan-foreign-minister-bourita-says-abraham-accords-provide-incredible-momentum-for-peace
Al Naimi, Sarah Muhanna 2022. Economic diversification trends in the Gulf: The case of Saudi Arabia. Circular Economy and Sustainability.
Alexander, Wesley 2025. “New Israeli-Azeri Energy Deal Signals Political Shift.” Forbes. Accesssed March 12 2025. https://www.forbes.com/sites/wesleyhill/2025/03/08/new-israeli-azeri-energy-deal-signals-political-shift/
“Bahrain recalls ambassador from Israel amid escalating assault on Gaza.” Al Jazeera. Accessed 4 October 2024. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/2/bahrain-recalls-ambassador-from-israel-amid-escalating-assault-on-gaza
Bermant, Azriel 2023. The Abraham Accords: A game changer for the region and Europe’s role in it? Central and Eastern European Online Library.
Bromberg, Gidon 2024. “COP28 – A Missed Opportunity for Regional Climate Resilience.” The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune. Accessed 4 October 2024. https://jstribune.com/bromberg-cop28-a-missed-opportunity-for-regional-climate-resilience/
Cohen, Ronen A., and Gadi P. Shamci 2022. The “proxy wars” strategy in Iranian regional foreign policy. The Journal of the Middle East and Africa 13.4.
Corbett, Michael 2013. “Oil Shock of 1973–74.” Federal Reserve History. Accessed 2 October 2024. https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/oil-shock-of-1973-74
Felsch, Maxamilian 2020. The Ascent of Saudi Arabia to a Regional Hegemon: The Role of Institutional Power in the League of Arab States. International Studies, 57.2.
France 24 Middle East 2025. “Egypt says it appreciates Trump’s remarks on not displacing Palestinians from Gaza.” France 24 with Reuters and AFP. Accessed March 12 2025. https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20250313-egypt-says-appreciates-trump-remarks-not-displacing-palestinians-gaza-strip
Gara, Antoine and James Fontanella-Khan 2025. “Jared Kushner builds a business empire off his father-in-law’s back.” Financial Review. Accessed March 12 2025. https://www.afr.com/world/north-america/jared-kushner-builds-a-business-empire-off-his-father-in-law-s-back-20250203-p5l99j
Glick, Bonnie, Yousef Al Otaiba, Shaikh Al Khalifa, “The Abraham Accords: A Pathway to Peace with Economic Prosperity.” Institute of Politics Harvard Kennedy School. Accessed 25 September 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vlxHbhOahVg
Global condemnation grows over Israel’s killing of Gaza aid seekers.” Al Jazeera. Accessed 4 October 2024. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/1/global-condemnation-grows-over-israels-killing-of-gaza-aid-seekers
Goldberg, Jeffrey 2020. “Iran and the Palestinians Lose Out in the Abraham Accords.” The Atlantic. Accessed 25 September 2024. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/09/winners-losers/616364/
Gul, Azeem, Rizwana Karim Abbasi, and Syed Arslan Haider 2021. Iran and Saudi Arabia’s strategic rivalry and the Middle Eastern security: An assessment. Liberal Arts and Social Sciences International Journal 5.2.
Guzansky, Yoel, and Sarah Feuer 2021. The Abraham Accords at one year: Achievements, challenges, and recommendations for Israel. The Іnstitute for National Security Studies.
Haass, Richard 2020. Present at the Disruption. Foreign Affairs 99.5.
Hanieh, Adam 2023. “A transition to where? The Gulf Arab states and the new ‘East-East’ axis of world oil.” Transnational Institute. Accessed 4 October 2024. https://www.tni.org/en/article/a-transition-to-where-the-gulf-arab-states-and-the-new-east-east-axis-of-world-oil
James, Jeffery F. 2023. “The Abraham Accords: A Three-Year Success Now at a Crossroads.” Wilson Center. Accessed 25 September 2024. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/abraham-accords-three-year-success-now-crossroads
Jaspal, Rusi 2015. Antisemitism and anti-Zionism in Iran: The effects of identity, threat, and political trust. Contemporary Jewry 35.
Johnson, Daniel 2024. “West Bank strikes: UN rights office condemns Israeli military escalation.” UN News. Accessed 4 October 2024. https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/08/1153656
Kampmark, B., 2025. A Thief’s Mentality: Trump, Real Estate and Dreams of Ethnic Cleansing. International Policy Digest.
Khalidi, Walid 1988. Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine. Journal of Palestine Studies 18.1.
Kelemen, Michele 2020. “Morocco Agrees To Join Trump Administration’s Abraham Accords.” NPR. Accessed 22 September 2024.
Kirkpatrick, David D. and Kate Kelly 2022. “Before Giving Billions to Jared Kushner, Saudi Investment Fund Had Big Doubts.” New York Times. Accessed March 12 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/10/us/jared-kushner-saudi-investment-fund.html
Klee, Miles 2024. “Netanyahu Says ‘From the River to the Sea,’ a Phrase Zionists Claim is Genocidal.” The Rolling Stone. Accessed 6 October 2024. https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/netanyahu-from-river-sea-israel-control-1234949408/
Knipp, Kersten 2021. “Israel’s Arab allies walk a diplomatic tightrope.” DW. Accessed 4 October 2024. https://www.dw.com/en/amid-escalation-israels-arab-allies-walk-a-diplomatic-tightrope/a-57497849
Krauss, Joseph 2024. “Why is Israel demanding control over 2 Gaza corridors in the cease-fire talks?” Associated Press. Accessed 6 October 2024. https://www.ap.org/news-highlights/spotlights/2024/why-is-israel-demanding-control-over-2-gaza-corridors-in-the-cease-fire-talks/
Krepinevich Jr, Andrew 2015. How to deter China: The case for archipelagic defense. Foreign Affairs 94.
Lawder, David and Aurora Ellis 2021. “U.S. Treasury signs loan deal to clear Sudan’s $1.2 billion World Bank arrears.” Reuters. Accessed 22 September 2024. https://www.reuters.com/article/business/us-treasury-signs-loan-deal-to-clear-sudans-12-billion-world-bank-arrears-idUSKBN29B2J2/
League of Arab States 1948. “Cablegram dated 15 may 1948 addressed to the secretary-general by the secretary-general of the League of Arab States.” United Nations. Accessed 2 October 2024. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-214183/
Levush, Ruth 2023. “Israel: Government Declares War and Special Situation on Home Front Following October 7 Hamas Attacks.” Library of Congress. Accessed 4 October 2024. https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2023-12-11/israel-government-declares-war-and-special-situation-on-home-front-following-october-7-hamas-attacks/
Lipton, Eric, Jordan Swan, and Maggie Haberman 2024. “As Kushner’s Investment Firm Steps Out, the Potential Conflicts Are Growing.” New York Times. Accessed March 12 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/09/us/politics/jared-kushner-affinity-partners.html
Livni, Ephrat 2025. “Israel Strikes Syria Hours After Country’s Leader Demands Withdrawal.” New York Times. Accessed March 12 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/25/world/middleeast/israel-strikes-syria.html
London, Douglas 2020. “The Abraham Accords plays into Iran’s hands and opens the door for al-Qaeda.” Atlantic Council. Accessed 22 September 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/the-abraham-accords-plays-into-irans-hands-and-opens-the-door-for-al-qaeda/)
Mekay, Emad 2024. “Gaza conflict: Abraham Accords survive but alternative alliances emerge.” International Bar Association. Accessed 24 September 2024. https://www.ibanet.org/Gaza-conflict-Abraham-Accords-survive-but-alternative-alliances-emerge
Mengal, Jahanzaib, and Muhammad Mirza 2022. String of Pearls and Necklace of Diamonds: Sino-Indian geo-strategic competition in the Indian Ocean. Asia-Pacific-Annual Research Journal of Far East & South East Asia 40.
Molavi, Afshin 2010. Iran and the Gulf states. The Iran Primer, Washington DC, USIP.
Nandini, Syamsul Maarif, Syamsunasir, Pujo Widodo 2024. The Red Sea Crisis: Implications of The Houthi Attack on Maritime Trade and Global Security. International Journal Of Humanities Education and Social Sciences 4.1.
Nasur, Nadir 2016. The United States and the Security of the Arab Gulf States. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 6.11.
Niu, Song, and Tongyu Wu 2021. Changes and trends in the current relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 15.2.
Norlen, Tova and Tamir Sinai 2020. “The Abraham Accords – Paradigm Shift or Realpolitik?” George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Accessed 22 September 2024. https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/abraham-accords-paradigm-shift-or-realpolitik
Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect 2025. “Definitions of Genocide and Related Crimes.” United Nations. Accessed March 12 2025. https://www.un.org/en/genocide-prevention/definition
Reed, Betsy 2024. “Extremist Israeli settlers hit by EU and US sanctions.” The Guardian. Accessed 4 October 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/19/extremist-israeli-settlers-sanctions-eu-us
Resolution 181 (II) 1947. “Resolution adopted on the report of the ad hoc committee on the Palestinian question.” United Nations.
Sadiki, L. 2010. Reframing resistance and democracy: narratives from Hamas and Hizbullah. Democratization, 17.2.
Scheer, Steven 2023. “Bahrain aims to use closer ties to tap Israel’s tech expertise.” Reuters. Accessed 20 September 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/bahrain-aims-use-closer-ties-tap-israels-tech-expertise-2023-09-07/
Scully, Mark, Roberto Rodriguez, and Laurent Cleenewerck 2011. 40-46 “Binding and Non-Binding Instruments in Intergovernmental Relations: Legal Foundations and Practical Recommendations.” EUCLID International Law and Treaty Law Series. University of Bangui.
Sened, Itai 2021. “Covid-19, the Abraham Accords and the 2021 Elections – Israel’s Politics in an Uncertain World.” Weidenbaum Center at WashU. Accessed 25 September 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=27UZc1xm4CQ
Singer, Joel 2021. The Abraham Accords: Normalization agreements signed by Israel with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. International Legal Materials 60.3.
Skordas, Achilles 2022. The Abraham Accords and the Economic Dimension of Peace in the Middle East. Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 82.1.
Stanley-Becker, Isaac 2024. “How Trump advanced Arab-Israeli peace but fueled Palestinian rage.” The Washington Post. Accessed 4 October, 2024. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/02/10/trump- israel-gaza-war/
Tetteh, Bright and Enoch Ntsiful 2023. A comparative analysis of the performances of macroeconomic indicators during the Global Financial Crisis, COVID-19 Pandemic, and the Russia-Ukraine War: The Ghanaian case. Research in Globalization 7.
United Nations 1994. “Treaty of peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.” United Nations Treaty Series, signed 1994.
United Nations 1978. “Israel and Egypt: Framework for peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David.” United Nations Treaty Series, signed 1978.
U.S. Mission Israel 2020. “Statement by Former President Trump on Jerusalem.” U.S. Embassy to Israel. Accessed 2 October 2024. https://il.usembassy.gov/statement-by-president-trump-on-jerusalem/
U.S. State Department 2020. “Abraham Accords: Declaration of peace, cooperation, and constructive diplomatic and friendly relations.” U.S. Department of State, signed 2020. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Bahrain_Israel-Agreement-signed-FINAL-15-Sept-2020-508.pdf
U.S. State Department 2020. “Abraham Accords Peace Agreement: Treaty of peace, diplomatic relations and full normalization between the United Arab Emirates and the State of Israel.” U.S. Department of State, signed 2020. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/UAE_Israel-treaty-signed-FINAL-15-Sept-2020-508.pdf U.S. State Department 2021. “Joint Declaration – The Kingdom of Morocco, the United States of America and the State of Israel.”
U.S. Department of State, signed 2020. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Joint-Declaration-US-Morrocco-Israel.pdf
U.S. State Department 2024. “The Abraham Accords” U.S. Department of State. Accessed 2 October 2024. https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/
U.S. State Department 2020. “The Abraham Accords Declaration.” U.S. Department of State, signed 2020. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Sudan-AA.pdf
U.S. State Department 2020. “The Abraham Accords Declaration.” U.S. Department of State, signed 2020. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Abraham-Accords-signed-FINAL-15-Sept-2020-508-1.pdf
U.S. State Department 2022. “U.S. Relations with Sudan.” U.S. Department of State. Accessed 2 October 2024. https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-sudan/#:~:text=On%20December%2014%2C%202020%2C%20Sudan,support%20for%20Sudan’s%20democratic%20transition
Valeri, Marc 2015. The Gulf monarchies and Iran: Between confrontation and geostrategic realities. European University Institute.
Venkat, Mia 2025. “Trump says the U.S. will ‘own’ Gaza — what that could mean for the Middle East.” NPR. Accessed March 12 2025. https://www.npr.org/2025/02/12/1230862336/trump-says-the-us-will-own-gaza-what-that-could-mean-for-the-middle-east
Vock, Ido and James Gregory 2024. “ICC chief prosecutor defends Netanyahu arrest warrant in BBC interview.” British Broadcasting Company. Accessed 4 October 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c303y5m1p19o
Publisher Information: The Intergovernmental Research and Policy Journal (IRPJ) is a unique interdisciplinary peer-reviewed and open access Journal. It operates under the authority of the only global and treaty-based intergovernmental university in the world (EUCLID), with other intergovernmental organizations in mind. Currently, there are more than 17,000 universities globally, but less than 15 are multilateral institutions, EUCLID, as IRPJ’s sponsor, is the only global and multi-disciplinary UN-registered treaty-based institution.
IRPJ authors can be assured that their research will be widely visible on account of the trusted Internet visibility of its “.int” domain which virtually guarantees first page results on matching keywords (.int domains are only assigned by IANA to vetted treaty-based organizations and are recognized as trusted authorities by search engines). In addition to its “.int” domain, IRPJ is published under an approved ISSN for intergovernmental organizations (“international publisher”) status (also used by United Nations, World Bank, European Space Agency, etc.).
IRPJ offers:
- United Nations Treaty reference on your published article (PDF).
- “Efficiency” driven and “author-focused” workflow
- Operates the very novel author-centric metric of “Journal Efficiency Factor”
- Minimal processing fee with the possibility of waiver
- Dedicated editors to work with graduate and doctoral students
- Continuous publication i.e., publication of articles immediately upon acceptance
- The expected time frame from submission to publication is up to 40 calendar days
- Broad thematic categories
- Every published article will receive a DOI from Crossref and is archived by CLOCKSS.
[1] “The Abraham Accords” U.S. Department of State. Accessed 2 October 2024. https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/.
[2] League of Arab States 1948. “Cablegram dated 15 may 1948 addressed to the secretary-general by the secretary-general of the League of Arab States.” United Nations. Accessed 2 October 2024. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-214183/
[3] Resolution 181 (II) 1947. “Resolution adopted on the report of the ad hoc committee on the Palestinian question.” United Nations.
[4] Khalidi, Walid 1988. Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine. Journal of Palestine Studies 18.1.
[5] Corbett, Michael 2013. “Oil Shock of 1973–74.” Federal Reserve History. Accessed 2 October 2024. https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/oil-shock-of-1973-74.
[6] “Israel and Egypt: Framework for peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David.” United Nations Treaty Series, signed 1978.
[7] “Treaty of peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.” United Nations Treaty Series, signed 1994.
[8] “Israel and Egypt: Framework for peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David.” United Nations Treaty Series, signed 1978.
[9] AJC Global Voice 2023. “Moroccan Foreign Minister Bourita Says Abraham Accords Provide “Incredible Momentum” for Peace in Middle East.” Tel Aviv. Accessed 22 September 2024. https://www.ajc.org/news/moroccan-foreign-minister-bourita-says-abraham-accords-provide-incredible-momentum-for-peace
[10] Molavi, Afshin 2010. Iran and the Gulf states. The Iran Primer, Washington DC, USIP.
[11] James, Jeffery F. 2023. “The Abraham Accords: A Three-Year Success Now at a Crossroads.” Wilson Center. Accessed 25 September 2024. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/abraham-accords-three-year-success-now-crossroads
[12] Norlen, Tova and Tamir Sinai 2020. “The Abraham Accords – Paradigm Shift or Realpolitik?” George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Accessed 22 September 2024. https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/abraham-accords-paradigm-shift-or-realpolitik
[13] “The Abraham Accords Declaration.” U.S. Department of State, signed 2020. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Abraham-Accords-signed-FINAL-15-Sept-2020-508-1.pdf
[14] Singer, Joel 2021. The Abraham Accords: Normalization agreements signed by Israel with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. International Legal Materials 60.3.
[15] Ahmed, Shiza 2022. Abraham Accords. CISS Insight Journal 10.1.
[16] “Abraham Accords Peace Agreement: Treaty of peace, diplomatic relations and full normalization between the United Arab Emirates and the State of Israel.” U.S. Department of State, signed 2020. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/UAE_Israel-treaty-signed-FINAL-15-Sept-2020-508.pdf
[17] “Abraham Accords: Declaration of peace, cooperation, and constructive diplomatic and friendly relations.” U.S. Department of State, signed 2020. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Bahrain_Israel-Agreement-signed-FINAL-15-Sept-2020-508.pdf
[18] Scheer, Steven 2023. “Bahrain aims to use closer ties to tap Israel’s tech expertise.” Reuters. Accessed 20 September 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/bahrain-aims-use-closer-ties-tap-israels-tech-expertise-2023-09-07/
[19] Kelemen, Michele 2020. “Morocco Agrees To Join Trump Administration’s Abraham Accords.” NPR. Accessed 22 September 2024.
[20] Lawder, David and Aurora Ellis 2021. “U.S. Treasury signs loan deal to clear Sudan’s $1.2 billion World Bank arrears.” Reuters. Accessed 22 September 2024. https://www.reuters.com/article/business/us-treasury-signs-loan-deal-to-clear-sudans-12-billion-world-bank-arrears-idUSKBN29B2J2/
[21] Scully, Mark, Roberto Rodriguez, and Laurent Cleenewerck 2011. 78-80 “Binding and Non-Binding Instruments in Intergovernmental Relations: Legal Foundations and Practical Recommendations.” EUCLID International Law and Treaty Law Series. University of Bangui.
[22] Scully, Mark, Roberto Rodriguez, and Laurent Cleenewerck 2011, 23-27. “Binding and Non-Binding Instruments in Intergovernmental Relations: Legal Foundations and Practical Recommendations.” EUCLID International Law and Treaty Law Series. University of Bangui.
[23] Scully, Mark, Roberto Rodriguez, and Laurent Cleenewerck 2011, 29-30. “Binding and Non-Binding Instruments in Intergovernmental Relations: Legal Foundations and Practical Recommendations.” EUCLID International Law and Treaty Law Series. University of Bangui.
[24] Skordas, Achilles 2022. The Abraham Accords and the Economic Dimension of Peace in the Middle East. Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 82.1.
[25] “Abraham Accords: Declaration of peace, cooperation, and constructive diplomatic and friendly relations.” U.S. Department of State, signed 2020. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Bahrain_Israel-Agreement-signed-FINAL-15-Sept-2020-508.pdf
[26] Scully, Mark, Roberto Rodriguez, and Laurent Cleenewerck 2011. 40-46 “Binding and Non-Binding Instruments in Intergovernmental Relations: Legal Foundations and Practical Recommendations.” EUCLID International Law and Treaty Law Series. University of Bangui.
[27] Haass, Richard 2020. Present at the Disruption. Foreign Affairs 99.5.
[28] “Joint Declaration – The Kingdom of Morocco, the United States of America and the State of Israel.” U.S. Department of State, signed 2020. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Joint-Declaration-US-Morrocco-Israel.pdf
[29] “U.S. Relations with Sudan.” U.S. Department of State. Accessed 2 October 2024. https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-sudan/#:~:text=On%20December%2014%2C%202020%2C%20Sudan,support%20for%20Sudan’s%20democratic%20transition
[30] “The Abraham Accords Declaration.” U.S. Department of State, signed 2020. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Sudan-AA.pdf
[31] Glick, Bonnie, Yousef Al Otaiba, Shaikh Al Khalifa, “The Abraham Accords: A Pathway to Peace with Economic Prosperity.” Institute of Politics Harvard Kennedy School. Accessed 25 September 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vlxHbhOahVg
[32] Gul, Azeem, Rizwana Karim Abbasi, and Syed Arslan Haider 2021. Iran and Saudi Arabia’s strategic rivalry and the Middle Eastern security: An assessment. Liberal Arts and Social Sciences International Journal 5.2.
[33] Felsch, Maxamilian 2020. The Ascent of Saudi Arabia to a Regional Hegemon: The Role of Institutional Power in the League of Arab States. International Studies, 57.2.
[34] Al Naimi, Sarah Muhanna 2022. Economic diversification trends in the Gulf: The case of Saudi Arabia. Circular Economy and Sustainability.
[35] Valeri, Marc 2015. The Gulf monarchies and Iran: Between confrontation and geostrategic realities. European University Institute.
[36] Nandini, Syamsul Maarif, Syamsunasir, Pujo Widodo 2024. The Red Sea Crisis: Implications of The Houthi Attack on Maritime Trade and Global Security. International Journal Of Humanities Education and Social Sciences 4.1.
[37] Hanieh, Adam 2023. “A transition to where? The Gulf Arab states and the new ‘East-East’ axis of world oil.” Transnational Institute. Accessed 4 October 2024. https://www.tni.org/en/article/a-transition-to-where-the-gulf-arab-states-and-the-new-east-east-axis-of-world-oil
[38] Nasur, Nadir 2016. The United States and the Security of the Arab Gulf States. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 6.11.
[39] Goldberg, Jeffrey 2020. “Iran and the Palestinians Lose Out in the Abraham Accords.” The Atlantic. Accessed 25 September 2024. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/09/winners-losers/616364/
[40] Cohen, Ronen A., and Gadi P. Shamci 2022. The “proxy wars” strategy in Iranian regional foreign policy. The Journal of the Middle East and Africa 13.4.
[41] Krepinevich Jr, Andrew 2015. How to deter China: The case for archipelagic defense. Foreign Affairs 94.
[42] Mengal, Jahanzaib, and Muhammad Mirza 2022. String of Pearls and Necklace of Diamonds: Sino-Indian geo-strategic competition in the Indian Ocean. Asia-Pacific-Annual Research Journal of Far East & South East Asia 40.
[43] Levush, Ruth 2023. “Israel: Government Declares War and Special Situation on Home Front Following October 7 Hamas Attacks.” Library of Congress. Accessed 4 October 2024. https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2023-12-11/israel-government-declares-war-and-special-situation-on-home-front-following-october-7-hamas-attacks/
[44] Reed, Betsy 2024. “Extremist Israeli settlers hit by EU and US sanctions.” The Guardian. Accessed 4 October 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/19/extremist-israeli-settlers-sanctions-eu-us
[45] Johnson, Daniel 2024. “West Bank strikes: UN rights office condemns Israeli military escalation.” UN News. Accessed 4 October 2024. https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/08/1153656
[46] Vock, Ido and James Gregory 2024. “ICC chief prosecutor defends Netanyahu arrest warrant in BBC interview.” British Broadcasting Company. Accessed 4 October 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c303y5m1p19o
[47] Stanley-Becker, Isaac 2024. “How Trump advanced Arab-Israeli peace but fueled Palestinian rage.” The Washington Post. Accessed 4 October, 2024. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/02/10/trump- israel-gaza-war/
[48] Niu, Song, and Tongyu Wu 2021. Changes and trends in the current relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 15.2.
[49] “Global condemnation grows over Israel’s killing of Gaza aid seekers.” Al Jazeera. Accessed 4 October 2024. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/1/global-condemnation-grows-over-israels-killing-of-gaza-aid-seekers
[50] Klee, Miles 2024. “Netanyahu Says ‘From the River to the Sea,’ a Phrase Zionists Claim is Genocidal.” The Rolling Stone. Accessed 6 October 2024. https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/netanyahu-from-river-sea-israel-control-1234949408/
[51] Krauss, Joseph 2024. “Why is Israel demanding control over 2 Gaza corridors in the cease-fire talks?” Associated Press. Accessed 6 October 2024. https://www.ap.org/news-highlights/spotlights/2024/why-is-israel-demanding-control-over-2-gaza-corridors-in-the-cease-fire-talks/
[52] Lipton, Eric, Jordan Swan, and Maggie Haberman 2024. “As Kushner’s Investment Firm Steps Out, the Potential Conflicts Are Growing.” New York Times. Accessed March 12 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/09/us/politics/jared-kushner-affinity-partners.html
[53] Gara, Antoine and James Fontanella-Khan 2025. “Jared Kushner builds a business empire off his father-in-law’s back.” Financial Review. Accessed March 12 2025. https://www.afr.com/world/north-america/jared-kushner-builds-a-business-empire-off-his-father-in-law-s-back-20250203-p5l99j
[54] Kirkpatrick, David D. and Kate Kelly 2022. “Before Giving Billions to Jared Kushner, Saudi Investment Fund Had Big Doubts.” New York Times. Accessed March 12 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/10/us/jared-kushner-saudi-investment-fund.html
[55] Bermant, Azriel 2023. The Abraham Accords: A game changer for the region and Europe’s role in it? Central and Eastern European Online Library.
[56] “Abraham Accords: Declaration of peace, cooperation, and constructive diplomatic and friendly relations.” U.S. Department of State, signed 2020. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Bahrain_Israel-Agreement-signed-FINAL-15-Sept-2020-508.pdf
[57] Guzansky, Yoel, and Sarah Feuer 2021. The Abraham Accords at one year: Achievements, challenges, and recommendations for Israel. The Іnstitute for National Security Studies.
[58] Knipp, Kersten 2021. “Israel’s Arab allies walk a diplomatic tightrope.” DW. Accessed 4 October 2024. https://www.dw.com/en/amid-escalation-israels-arab-allies-walk-a-diplomatic-tightrope/a-57497849
[59] London, Douglas 2020. “The Abraham Accords plays into Iran’s hands and opens the door for al-Qaeda.” Atlantic Council. Accessed 22 September 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/the-abraham-accords-plays-into-irans-hands-and-opens-the-door-for-al-qaeda/
[60] Tetteh, Bright and Enoch Ntsiful 2023. A comparative analysis of the performances of macroeconomic indicators during the Global Financial Crisis, COVID-19 Pandemic, and the Russia-Ukraine War: The Ghanaian case. Research in Globalization 7.
[61] Sened, Itai 2021. “Covid-19, the Abraham Accords and the 2021 Elections – Israel’s Politics in an Uncertain World.” Weidenbaum Center at WashU. Accessed 25 September 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=27UZc1xm4CQ
[62] “Bahrain recalls ambassador from Israel amid escalating assault on Gaza.” Al Jazeera. Accessed 4 October 2024. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/2/bahrain-recalls-ambassador-from-israel-amid-escalating-assault-on-gaza
[63] Mekay, Emad 2024. “Gaza conflict: Abraham Accords survive but alternative alliances emerge.” International Bar Association. Accessed 24 September 2024. https://www.ibanet.org/Gaza-conflict-Abraham-Accords-survive-but-alternative-alliances-emerge
[64] Bromberg, Gidon 2024. “COP28 – A Missed Opportunity for Regional Climate Resilience.” The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune. Accessed 4 October 2024. https://jstribune.com/bromberg-cop28-a-missed-opportunity-for-regional-climate-resilience/
[65] Jaspal, Rusi 2015. Antisemitism and anti-Zionism in Iran: The effects of identity, threat, and political trust. Contemporary Jewry 35.
[66] Venkat, Mia 2025. “Trump says the U.S. will ‘own’ Gaza — what that could mean for the Middle East.” NPR. Accessed March 12 2025. https://www.npr.org/2025/02/12/1230862336/trump-says-the-us-will-own-gaza-what-that-could-mean-for-the-middle-east
[67] Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect 2025. “Definitions of Genocide and Related Crimes.” United Nations. Accessed March 12 2025. https://www.un.org/en/genocide-prevention/definition
[68] Kampmark, B., 2025. A Thief’s Mentality: Trump, Real Estate and Dreams of Ethnic Cleansing. International Policy Digest.
[69] Sadiki, L. 2010. Reframing resistance and democracy: narratives from Hamas and Hizbullah. Democratization, 17.2.
[70] France 24 Middle East 2025. “Egypt says it appreciates Trump’s remarks on not displacing Palestinians from Gaza.” France 24 with Reuters and AFP. Accessed March 12 2025. https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20250313-egypt-says-appreciates-trump-remarks-not-displacing-palestinians-gaza-strip
[71] Livni, Ephrat 2025. “Israel Strikes Syria Hours After Country’s Leader Demands Withdrawal.” New York Times. Accessed March 12 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/25/world/middleeast/israel-strikes-syria.html
[72] Alexander, Wesley 2025. “New Israeli-Azeri Energy Deal Signals Political Shift.” Forbes. Accesssed March 12 2025. https://www.forbes.com/sites/wesleyhill/2025/03/08/new-israeli-azeri-energy-deal-signals-political-shift/
