ABSTRACT

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the most powerful body in the international system, mandated to maintain global peace and security, promote cooperation among states, and uphold international law and human rights. Its authority derives from its binding decisions and its central role in diplomacy, peacekeeping, and conflict resolution. Despite this power, the UNSC has long been criticized for its ineffectiveness in achieving its core objectives. Structural rigidity, procedural constraints, and political interests particularly the veto power held by the five Permanent Members (P5): China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have significantly limited its ability to respond to contemporary global challenges. While UNSC reform has remained on the agenda for decades, little substantive progress has been achieved. This study examines the long-term consequences of the UNSC veto power exercised by the P5, focusing on its impact on global governance, collective security, humanitarian intervention, and the legitimacy of international law. Through an analysis of veto use between 2014 and 2024, the research demonstrates how the veto, originally intended to prevent great-power conflict after World War II, has often deepened geopolitical divisions, produced policy deadlock, and weakened multilateral conflict-resolution efforts. The findings suggest that repeated veto use has contributed to the erosion of trust in the UNSC and to the gradual shift toward a more multipolar global order. The research further analyzes the strategic behavior of the P5 by examining their veto and non-veto actions across key security agenda items over the past decade. It identifies historical legacies, geopolitical interests, and power calculations shaping P5 decision-making. To measure the broader impact of veto power, the study develops eight indicators and integrates them into a composite measure the Global Governance and Regional Power Shift Index (GGRPSI). One indicator, Global Trust in the UNSC (GTU), is assessed using a mixed-methods approach combining survey data (70% weight) and quantitative analysis (30% weight). Finally, the study explores how evolving global power dynamics and the rise of new actors may influence future P5 behavior, offering recommendations to enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of the UNSC in the 21st century.

Disclaimer: The opinions and views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the official ideas, attitudes, or policies of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) or the United Nations.

1. Introduction

In today’s increasingly globalized and interdependent world, some issues are too intertwined to advance independently. States need to work together collaboratively to achieve favorable results for all. To accomplish these objectives, they need a political platform for discussion that facilitates cooperation and encourages diplomatic solutions to global problems. Therefore, multilateral diplomacy has become an established and diverse feature of modern diplomacy.

Multilateral diplomacy is performed through international institutions, permanent conferences, and regional and pan-regional institutions. Individual states have varying levels of involvement at a multilateral or regional level, but several general factors influence the growth of multilateralism. Multilateral international institutions provide a global arena for states and other actors, in which participation demonstrates their sovereign equality, masking but not removing economic disparities and additional power.

International organizations make decisions through unanimity, veto, weighted voting, majority rule, and consensus. Consensus decision-making has been a popular mode in international organizations since the 1970s due to increasing participation by independent states. Most organizations operate based on the rule, “one state, one vote,” but some have a distribution of votes. For instance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF),  World Bank,  and International Fund for Agricultural Development have allocated votes based on financial contributions from each member state.

The growth of consensus decision-making is one of the developments in multilateral diplomatic methods. As per the UN, decision-making by consensus governed the 19th regular Session (1964-1965) and has since this time played a substantial role in the practice of the UN General Assembly. The interests and positions of Member States have become more diverse as a result of the increase in the number of Member States. It is desirable to reach the broadest possible agreement among the States as decisions of the General Assembly express the opinion or will of the organ as a whole.  For example, there is a strong consensus among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members on the importance of multilateralism in addressing today’s global challenges, highlighting the need for more effective and inclusive global development systems. Furthermore, the G20 Bali Leaders’ Declaration emphasizes the importance of embedding a multisectoral One Health approach in decision-making, further highlighting the significance of consensus in multilateral diplomacy. China has also proposed reforms to keep development at the forefront of the global agenda and to ensure consensus on development in multilateral negotiations and decision-making. The G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué recognizes the importance of quality care in decision-making processes at all levels, indicating the need for consensus in addressing global issues. Additionally, cultural diplomacy has emerged as a cornerstone of national development policies, emphasizing the importance of consensus in multilateral decision-making.  Overall, consensus decision-making is a significant aspect of multilateral diplomacy, as various documents highlight the need for effective and inclusive global development systems and the importance of embedding a multisectoral approach in decision-making processes.

Consensus decision-making has advantages for the great powers in that lengthy decision-making provides opportunities for advancing and protecting their policies through lobbying, supporting draft proposals, and forming support groups without the threat of being frequently voted down. However, the consensus method may break down, and voting occurs. Other reasons for voting include testing the legitimacy of a consensus or pressure from displeased states that wish to place on record their position, knowing that crucial states are unlikely to support the declaration or resolution. One of the significant disadvantages of consensus decision-making in international institutions and conferences is the prolonged nature of the process.

One of the world’s most prominent international organizations is the United Nations (UN). As membership in the UN is growing day by day and most developing countries are becoming part of the global organization, most of the agenda items of the UN assembly are focused on the issues of developing nations. The UNSC is the UN’s highest decision-making body and is primarily responsible for maintaining international peace and security. Under the Charter of the United Nations, all member states are obliged to comply with the unanimous decisions of the UNSC. The decision-making process in the UNSC is based on the UN Charter. Article 23 of the UN Charter describes the composition of the UNSC. Five permanent members, also known as P5, names are mentioned in the UN Charter. By Article 27 (3), it is evident that one of the P5 can block the UNSC proceedings on any non-procedural significant matters, irrespective of the criticality of the matter. However, a positive thing is that veto power cannot be used on procedural issues, and a party of dispute will abstain during non-procedural matters. Nevertheless, deciding the procedural and non-procedural nature of matter is complex. If the President of the Council determines that the particular matter is procedural, it can be changed into non-procedural if the veto power is exercised on the decision of the President.  There have been cases when veto power has been used to force a matter into a non-procedural category and again take advantage of veto because the matter is non-procedural. It is called double veto power.  All these clauses can be adjusted legally so that any action against P5 is impossible for the UNSC.

Another issue is that any changes in membership and voting procedures require modifications in the UN charter. According to Article 108 of the UN Charter on amendments to the Charter:

Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council. 

This article’s execution itself is an issue because it also requires the consent of P5 of the UNSC.

When the Charter was developed and the UNSC was formed, it was believed that the P5 would continue to play essential roles in maintaining international peace and security, and cooperation of all the big powers was mandatory for the world’s peace. In addition, P5 was the critical founder of the UN and a significant contributor to UN charter preparation. When P5 was granted the special status of Permanent Member States at the UNSC, along with a unique voting power known as the “right to veto,” it was arranged by the drafters that the resolution or decision would not be approved if any of the five permanent members cast a negative vote.

Since the formation of the UNSC in 1945, there has not been a change in the restructuring of UNSC P5hip along with the decision-making process related explicitly to veto power. The initial UNSC P5 included the Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America when the UNSC was formed in 1945. In a letter dated Dec 24, 1991, Boris Yeltsin, the President of the Russian Federation, informed the UN Secretary-General that the membership of the Soviet Union in the Security Council and all other United Nations organs was being continued by the Russian Federation with the support of the 11 member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States.  The People’s Republic of China ( PRC) joined the UN in 1971, replacing the Republic of China as the representative State of China. The GA Resolution 2758 provided that the GA “restores all its rights to the People’s Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations.” Thus, even after drastic changes in the political situation, the P5hip and its power did not change. In addition, from 1945 till today, world power and politics changed from bipolar to unipolar after the Cold War, and today’s historic shift of power away from the West toward Asia is observed, for which consequences are increasingly being felt in global politics.  It has been argued that the United Kingdom and France are no longer the world powers as they were in 1945.

Nonetheless, to ensure Europe’s commitment to the UN, the European Union should be given a permanent seat on the UNSC (Caroll, 2024). Such a situation has created dissatisfaction among the 193 UN Member States for a long time. According to the African Union, UN membership is not reflected in the current arrangements of the Council, and it calls for equitable representation and involvement as per its proposal. Some African countries have said that the African position obstructs the reform process.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, elected UN Secretary-General in 1992, launched reform discussions of the UNSC. Security Council reform was added to the General Assembly’s 48th Session agenda by Assembly resolution A/RES/47/62 dated Dec 11, 1992. Since then, the discussion has continued without any significant outcomes.

This paper thoroughly examined the historical cases from 2014-2024, theoretical frameworks, empirical evidence, and policy implications of the utilization of veto power within the UNSC. Through rigorous analysis and critical analysis, the study offered insights into the complexities of international decision-making and the potential for enhancing the effectiveness and inclusivity of the UNSC in the quest for global peace and security.

2. Theoretical Frameworks

Traditionally, realism and liberalism have been the central theories of international relations. However, this impact has been analyzed through the lens of realist, liberal, and constructivist theories. The underlying preferences in decision-making processes are generally represented by some institutionalized political process that skews, which is a crucial concept in liberal theories of international law. These significant theories have been used to describe the motives and choices of international actors in the context of UNSC decision-making and the impact of the veto on UNSC decision-making, with each offering some explanation for the veto against any UNSC resolution along with offering some justification for the irregularities in decision-making processes.

Additionally, neoclassical realism has been used to understand the impact, particularly in the context of Russia’s role in global affairs. To maintain a balance of power, States prioritize the stability of the alliance system to counter a common enemy or threat. Supporting an ally, even when they are wrong, is often seen as necessary to maintain a power equilibrium in the international system. Realism also explains that states prioritize their survival and security in an anarchic international system. This often leads them to support allies to avoid the breakdown of relationships that might expose them to greater risks, even if the ally’s actions are questionable. Lastly, the veto’s influence has also been analyzed through the lenses of realism, constructivism, and liberalism, with the theory of liberal internationalism possessing the most extraordinary explanatory power for Israel and the European Union’s relationship.

Several authors have used different theories to understand the veto’s impact on the UNSC. Some have used path dependency, veto player analysis, and social choice theory. Path dependency examines how past decisions and actions influence current outcomes, while veto player analysis focuses on the role of key decision-makers in the process. Social choice theory explores how individual preferences and decisions impact collective outcomes. These frameworks can provide insights into why change within the Security Council may be slow and the implications of veto power on global peace and security.

By examining these theoretical perspectives, a comprehensive understanding of the veto’s impact on Security Council decisions can be achieved. Another theory used by some researchers is the veto player theory. This theory focuses on the role of individual actors in decision-making processes, particularly in situations where their agreement is necessary for action to be taken.

In the context of the UNSC, the P5 holds veto power, giving them significant influence over resolutions and decisions. Understanding how these veto players interact and the impact of their decisions on the Council’s outcomes can provide valuable insights into the dynamics of the Security Council. Besides these, Realism and Power Politics can be used to explore how the distribution of power among the permanent members shapes the dynamics of the Security Council, influencing their decision-making and the use of veto power.

Institutionalism and Norms can be used to investigate how institutional norms within the UNSC, such as sovereignty, humanitarian intervention, and collective security, influence the use of the veto and decision-making processes. Game theory models can be applied to analyze the strategic calculations of Security Council members when deciding whether to use the veto, considering factors such as relative gains, credibility, and reputation.  Constructivism can examine how ideas, identities, and perceptions shape the interpretation and application of veto power within the Security Council, including the influence of diplomatic norms, values, and narratives. By critical theory, we can analyze the implications of the veto on global governance, considering issues of equity, justice, and legitimacy and exploring alternative mechanisms for decision-making within the UNSC. Lastly, constitutional theory redefines the place of the Charter in contemporary international law.

For the theoretical framework of this research, I integrated veto player theory and realism along with historical analysis to investigate past instances where the use of the veto impacted Security Council decision-making, drawing lessons for understanding contemporary challenges and prospects for reform.

Veto player theory is a prominent approach in comparative politics that focuses on the impact of the number of veto players in a political system on policy outcomes. Veto player theory, developed by George Tsebelis, concentrates on political actors who have the ability to stop a change from the status quo. These actors can be institutional, such as branches of government, or partisan, like groups within a coalition government. The theory posits that policy change becomes more complex with more veto players, significant ideological differences, and higher internal coherence among them. The theory hypothesizes that the number of veto players, ideological distance, and cohesion shape policy stability and adaptability. Systems with divergent veto players tend to experience high policy stability. Still, they are prone to gridlock, while systems with fewer veto players are more flexible but less resistant to abrupt change. This framework helps explain governance, policy innovation, and variations in institutional effectiveness across political systems.

Veto-player theory can be applied to various political systems, allowing for comparisons between different systems. The theory is crucial in understanding policy stability and change in other countries. For example, countries like Italy and the United States, with many veto players, tend to have stable policies. In contrast, those with fewer veto players, like Greece and the United Kingdom, have more unstable policies. Veto players can be institutional or partisan, with the ability to block policy changes.

3. UNSC Decision Making Process

3.1. Introduction

The UNSC was established with the founding of the United Nations itself. The United Nations Charter was drafted during the United Nations Conference on International Organization, which was held from April to June 1945 in San Francisco, California. Representatives of 50 countries drafted the charter, establishing the structure and principles of the United Nations. Key figures involved in the drafting process included diplomats, legal experts, and representatives from various nations, all working together o create a framework to maintain international peace and security. The UN Charter, the foundational treaty of the United Nations, was signed on June 26, 1945, in San Francisco after the United Nations Conference on International Organization. The Charter came into effect on October 24, 1945, when it was ratified by the required number of countries (The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, as well as a majority of the other signatories). Therefore, the UNSC was formed on October 24, 1945, along with the establishment of the United Nations. It was designed to be one of the principal organs of the UN responsible for maintaining international peace and security.

3.2. Composition of UNSC

The principal organs of the United Nations are a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat (charter). The UNSC is one of the principal organs of the UN and is responsible for maintaining international peace and security. It has 15 members, including five permanent members with veto power (The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America) and ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly.

Initially, when the UNSC was established under the UN Charter, there were six non-permanent members. The General Assembly elected these non-permanent members for two-year terms. The number of non-permanent members has since increased to 10, while the P5 has remained unchanged. These non-permanent members rotate based on a regional basis to ensure representation from different parts of the world. Article 31 allows any Member of the UN who is not a member of the Security Council to participate, without a vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are especially affected. Similarly, as per Article 32, any Member of the United Nations that is not a member of the Security Council or any state that is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without a vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute.

As per Article 27 of the UN charter, each member of the Security Council shall have one representative and one vote. Procedural matters in the UNSC, such as setting the agenda or determining the order of debate, are decided by an affirmative vote of at least nine of the 15 Council members, including P5. A negative vote (veto) by any P5 does not apply to procedural matters.

Decisions of the Security Council on all other Substantive matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members, provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. Substantive matters include resolutions on issues such as imposing sanctions, authorizing military action, or issuing statements condemning the actions of states. However, if any P5 members cast a negative vote (veto), the resolution is blocked from adoption regardless of other Council members’ support level. Decisions of the Security Council require affirmative votes from at least nine of its members, including all five permanent members. A negative vote (veto) from any P5 blocks the passage of a resolution, which gives these nations significant influence over the Council’s decisions.

3.3. General Assembly vs UNSC

As per Article 9 of the UN charter, the General Assembly shall consist of all the members of the United Nations, and each Member shall have no more than five representatives. According to Article 10 of the charter, the General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

Article 11 gives power to the General Assembly to intervene in the UNSC process. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in maintaining international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments. It may make recommendations concerning such principles to the Members, the Security Council, or both.

The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations following Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations about any such questions to the state or states concerned or the Security Council or both. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting (Article 18). A Member of the United Nations that is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member (Article 19).

Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly before or after discussion. The General Assembly may call the Security Council’s attention to situations that are likely to endanger international peace and security. The powers of the General Assembly outlined in this Article shall not limit the general scope of Article 10.

Article 12 says that while the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation concerning that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.

As per Article 20, the General Assembly shall meet in regular annual sessions and special sessions as occasion may require. However,  special sessions shall be convened by the Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council or a majority of the Members of the United Nations.

If the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is not satisfied with a decision made by the UNSC, it has a few courses of action, such as a request for a special session, passing non-binding resolutions, reform proposals, etc.

3.4. Why was Veto Power introduced?

The veto power in the UNSC was initiated to ensure that the primary founding members, the P5, had significant control over the Council’s decisions, reflecting their crucial roles and interests in maintaining international peace and security. This power allows any permanent members to block any substantive resolution, thereby preventing the UN from taking actions that go against the strategic interests of these major powers and ensuring their continued participation and cooperation in the UN framework. The veto power in the UNSC was initiated primarily to address concerns about the sovereignty and interests of the major powers involved in its formation after World War II.

3.5. Concern over the Misuse of Veto Power

The extensive use of veto power by P5 and its disturbing impact has been a concern in the UNSC. In the Seventy-Eighth Session of the General Assembly, 36th Meeting (PM), GA/12563, dated 17 November 2023, Ukraine referred to veto as a weapon of hatred and war. At the time of the formation of the UN, the major powers were hesitant to join due to a fear of a hostile majority in the Council. Since the international community considered that without them, the UN was doomed to fail in its mission, a compromise was accepted in the form of a veto power for the five permanent members.

3.6. Conclusion

UNSC was not the first organization to have veto power.  The League of Nations, established in 1919, aimed to prevent conflicts and maintain peace among nations. However, its structure, including providing an effective veto to every member of the League Council, ultimately led to its failure. The onset of World War II in 1939 highlighted the League’s inability to fulfill its primary purpose, resulting in its inactivity until its abolition. While in theory, any member could veto a decision, in practice, this was rare, and it became customary for those who held power to exercise the veto. The issue of veto power continues to be a significant factor in international relations, as seen in the Security Council’s failure to adopt a draft resolution on Syria due to the veto by the Russian Federation and China. 

The question of veto power has been central to debates within the General Assembly, with calls for reform to prevent the United Nations from facing a fate similar to that of the League of Nations. The United States’ veto on specific resolutions has also been a point of contention, highlighting the need for changes in the current system. The failure of the League of Nations to prevent war and maintain peace has been a lesson for subsequent international organizations, such as the United Nations. Despite efforts to learn from past mistakes, challenges related to veto power and decision-making processes persist. The main organs of the League of Nations, including the Assembly and the Council, were designed to promote equality among member states, but the presence of veto power created imbalances in decision-making.

In conclusion, the issue of veto power has played a significant role in the failure of the League of Nations. It continued to be a point of contention within the United Nations. Efforts to reform the current system and address the challenges associated with veto power are essential to ensure the effectiveness and relevance of international organizations in maintaining peace and security worldwide.

4. Veto Power and Non-Veto Behavior of the UNSC

4.1. Introduction to Agenda Items

UNSC conducts its regular meetings under various agenda items. The number of meetings varies from year to year. However, an average of 250-plus meetings are performed every year. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of meetings was reduced. However, it can be considered an exceptional situation.

UNSC meetings’ agenda typically includes discussions and decisions on issues critical to maintaining international peace and security. Global developments and requests from member states, regional organizations, or the UN Secretary-General shape the agenda items. Our interdisciplinary research, supported by the quantitative research in the target group, confirms the importance of trust in the complex issue of vaccine hesitancy and, conversely, the phenomenon of distrust in major societal institutions.

UNSC meetings’ agenda typically includes discussions and decisions on issues critical to maintaining international peace and security. Global developments and requests from member states, regional organizations, or the UN Secretary-General shape the agenda items. Below are common agenda categories for UNSC meetings:

i. Conflict Resolution and Mediation

Ongoing conflicts and disputes, Peace agreements and ceasefire monitoring, Mediation and negotiation efforts in conflict zones.

ii. Peacekeeping Operations

Establishment or renewal of mandates for UN peacekeeping missions. Review of peacekeeping mission performance and effectiveness, as well as budget and resource allocation for peacekeeping efforts.

iii. Humanitarian Crises

Responses to famine, natural disasters, or widespread displacement, access to humanitarian aid in conflict zones, protection of civilians, including women, children, and vulnerable groups, etc.

iv. Terrorism and Extremism

Combating international terrorism, preventing violent extremism, and implementing sanctions on terrorist organizations and individuals.

v. Non-Proliferation of Weapons

Preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and monitoring compliance with treaties such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

vi. Sanctions and Embargoes

Imposing or lifting sanctions on countries, entities, or individuals and reviewing the effectiveness of existing sanctions regimes.

vii. Regional Stability

Updates on specific regions of concern and supporting regional organizations (e.g., African Union, EU, ASEAN) in peace initiatives.

viii. Climate and Security

The impact of climate change on global security.

ix. Accountability and Rule of Law

Ensuring accountability for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Referrals to the International Criminal Court (ICC) or ad hoc tribunals.

x. Other Emerging Issues

• Cybersecurity threats and their implications for peace and security.
• Pandemics and global health security.
• Maritime disputes and the protection of international waterways.

The specific items on the agenda vary depending on the current global situation, and the President of the Security Council (a role that rotates monthly among member states) has a significant role in shaping the agenda.

4.2. Key Agenda Items from 2014 to 2024

After studying agenda items and meetings conducted from 2014-2024, I have categorized topics under each agenda item provided in Appendix A.

From 2014 to 2024, the UNSC addressed numerous global crises and thematic concerns. These discussions can be categorized broadly into regional conflicts, global threats, and thematic priorities. In addition, several other agenda items were discussed, as provided in Appendix A.

The following section briefly describes each agenda item’s key aspects and motivation in the UNSC discussion and its prominence.

i) Regional Conflicts

1. Africa:

The Council extensively debated conflicts in Mali, Sudan (including Darfur and South Sudan), the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic. Issues included armed violence, humanitarian crises, and peacekeeping operations under items such as “Peace and Security in Africa.” ​

2. Middle East

The UNSC prioritizes addressing regional conflicts in the Middle East because of its strategic importance, impact on international peace and security, and the complexity of its crises. Key topics included the Syrian civil war, the situation in Yemen, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and stabilization efforts in Iraq and Libya. Counterterrorism was central to discussions on ISIS and related threats​. ​

 

3. Europe:

The UNSC is highly engaged in regional conflicts in Europe due to the region’s geopolitical importance and the potential for such disputes to escalate into broader international crises. 

4. Asia:

The UNSC focuses on regional conflicts in Asia because of their significant implications for global peace, security, and economic stability. Asia’s geopolitical, economic, and cultural importance is central to the Council’s mandate to maintain international peace and security.

ii) Global and Thematic Concerns

Some of the critical agenda items related to global and thematic concerns are described in the following sections.

1. Non-proliferation

The UNSC discusses non-proliferation because the spread of WMDs—nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons poses a grave threat to international peace and security.

2. Terrorism

The UNSC prioritizes terrorism as a central agenda item because of the significant threat it poses to global peace, security, and human rights. 

3. Climate Security

The UNSC discusses climate security because climate change increasingly acts as a “threat multiplier,” exacerbating existing conflicts, creating new security risks, and destabilizing vulnerable regions. 

4. Human Rights and Humanitarian Crises

The Council protected civilians in armed conflicts, addressed refugee crises, and responded to pandemic-related security threats (e.g., during COVID-19)​. The UNSC prioritizes human rights and humanitarian crises because of their profound impact on international peace and security, which falls under the Council’s core mandate.  These issues are intrinsically linked to global stability, governance, and protecting vulnerable populations.

5. Peacekeeping

UNSC reviews and restructures peacekeeping mandates for missions worldwide to adapt to evolving conflicts. These discussions reflect the Council’s mandate to address threats to international peace and security while navigating geopolitical tensions among member states. Peacekeeping is essential to the UNSC because it helps maintain international peace and security, which is the Council’s primary mandate under the UN Charter.

iii) UNSC Governance 

The UNSC governance agenda is typically concerned with how the Council operates, its decision-making processes, and the broader role of the UNSC in maintaining international peace and security. Discussions around UNSC governance often revolve around several core issues:

1. Reform of the Security Council

• Expansion of Membership: Discussions focus on increasing the number of permanent and non-permanent members to better reflect the current global political landscape, particularly with growing economies like Brazil, India, Germany, and Japan calling for permanent seats.
• Veto Power: One of the most contentious areas of reform is the veto power held by P5. Many countries argue that this power leads to gridlock and prevents meaningful action on global issues like human rights abuse, climate change, and regional conflicts, as well as effectiveness and accountability.
• Decision-Making Processes: The UNSC’s ability to make decisions effectively and promptly has been challenged in recent years, particularly regarding conflicts where P5 members have conflicting interests.
• Transparency and Accountability: There are calls for greater transparency in the Council’s decisions, with some arguing that more open discussions and more explicit criteria for decisions would make the UNSC more accountable to the broader UN membership.

2. Addition of Developing Countries

The governance of the UNSC has been criticized for not reflecting the geopolitical realities of the 21st century, with developing nations and emerging economies underrepresented. Many have called for more inclusive decision-making processes that better reflect the diversity of the global community.

3. The Regional Arrangements and UNSC

As conflicts become increasingly regional, there is a focus on enhancing coordination between the UNSC and regional organizations, such as the African Union, the European Union, and ASEAN. The UNSC often depends on these bodies for peacekeeping missions and conflict resolution, and improving this relationship is part of ongoing governance discussions.

4. Addressing New Challenges

The UNSC’s governance must evolve to address non-traditional security threats, including terrorism, climate change, cyber threats, and pandemics.

5. Improving Peacekeeping and effectiveness

Discussions often revolve around improving the mandates given to peacekeeping operations, enhancing their ability to protect civilians, and ensuring they are better equipped to handle the evolving nature of conflicts.

6. Regional Security Council Proposals

Some have suggested the creation of regional security councils or frameworks that work in conjunction with the UNSC to address regional issues more effectively. This could help reduce the burden on the UNSC and allow for more tailored approaches to regional challenges.

In summary, the agenda for UNSC governance is focused on ensuring the Council remains relevant and effective in addressing current global challenges. Key concerns are replacing its structure and decision-making processes and expanding its representation.

iv) Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries

The UNSC meeting with troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) is an essential annual or semi-annual event where the Council engages directly with countries that provide personnel for UN peacekeeping missions. These meetings serve as a platform to discuss issues related to peacekeeping operations and improve collaboration between the UNSC, contributing nations, and the UN Secretariat.

v) Report of the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General’s report to the UNSC is critically important for several reasons. It is a vital tool for the UNSC to assess and guide its actions in maintaining international peace and security. Below are the critical aspects of why these reports are crucial:

1. Informing the UNSC’s Decision-Making

The Secretary-General’s report provides a detailed and up-to-date analysis of ongoing conflicts, humanitarian crises, and peacekeeping operations. It synthesizes information from various sources, including UN peacekeepers, field offices, and other actors. This allows the UNSC to make informed decisions on responding to crises or adjusting peacekeeping mandates. For example, the Secretary-General’s report on the situation in Syria often guides discussions on the UNSC’s potential actions, such as sanctions, peace talks, or humanitarian aid access.

2. Providing Strategic Guidance

The report includes recommendations for action, allowing the UNSC to discuss and evaluate potential responses to a particular situation. These recommendations may range from military interventions to diplomatic measures or humanitarian assistance.

3. Monitoring and Accountability

The report serves as an accountability mechanism, ensuring the UNSC remains updated on implementing its resolutions and the progress or setbacks in peace operations. It also provides transparency on the effectiveness of UN missions and peacekeeping operations.

4. Reflection of International Consensus

The Secretary-General’s reports represent a global perspective on crises, integrating the views of various UN agencies, regional organizations, and other stakeholders. They reflect the consensus or lack thereof on addressing a particular conflict or issue.

5. Facilitating Dialogue and Negotiation

The reports lay the groundwork for discussions within the UNSC, often acting as a catalyst for diplomatic efforts. They highlight areas where dialogue between conflicting parties, peace talks, or external mediation might be required.

6. Focus on Humanitarian and Human Rights Issues

In many conflict zones, the Secretary-General’s report outlines the humanitarian situation, bringing attention to human rights abuses, displacement, or access to aid. This is crucial for the UNSC, as human rights violations often trigger international action, including sanctions or interventions.

7. Reinforcing the UN’s Credibility

Regular reporting from the Secretary-General reinforces the role of the United Nations as a neutral and informed body in global peace and security matters. It allows the UNSC to take proactive measures based on expert input, strengthening UN actions’ legitimacy and relevance.

vi) Briefings by Security Council Missions

Security Council Missions refer to trips or field visits organized by members of the UNSC (UNSC) to conflict zones or areas of concern to gain firsthand insight into the situation on the ground. These missions are typically led by a delegation of UNSC members or Council representatives who travel to countries or regions where the UNSC is involved or where international peace and security are at risk. These missions help the Council to make more informed decisions regarding conflicts, peacekeeping operations, and diplomatic efforts.

vii) Sanctions

Sanctions are a crucial tool used by the UNSC to maintain international peace and security, and discussions on sanctions typically address a wide range of complex issues. These discussions are often based on the effectiveness, fairness, and humanitarian impacts of sanctions, as well as the broader political context. Here are some of the general issues relating to sanctions that are frequently discussed in the UNSC:

1. Effectiveness of Sanctions

The UNSC frequently debates whether sanctions are achieving their intended goals, such as pressuring a country to stop aggressive behavior, comply with international law, or halt human rights violations.

Another recurring issue is the effectiveness of enforcement. The UNSC debates how to close loopholes that allow sanctioned states or entities to evade restrictions through third-party actors or illegal markets.

2. Humanitarian Impact of Sanctions

A major issue discussed in the UNSC is the potential humanitarian impact of sanctions on civilian populations. While sanctions are intended to pressure governments or specific entities, they may inadvertently cause suffering to vulnerable populations.

The UNSC often debates the merits of imposing targeted sanctions against individuals, entities, or specific sectors versus broad economic sanctions, which can have more widespread negative impacts on civilians.

3. Legality and Compliance with International Law

Sanctions must align with the principles of the UN Charter and international law. Discussions in the UNSC often focus on whether the sanctions comply with legal standards and whether they respect the sovereignty of states while addressing violations of global peace and security.

4. Unilateral Sanctions vs. Multilateral Sanctions

The UNSC often discusses the challenges posed by unilateral sanctions imposed by individual countries outside of the UN framework. These are often seen as undermining the UN’s authority and reducing the effectiveness of multilateral sanctions.

5. Sanctions Evasion and Monitoring

A major issue in sanctions discussions is the ability to effectively monitor and enforce sanctions. The UNSC often debates ways to improve mechanisms for tracking violations and ensuring that sanctions are enforced. Non-state actors, such as arms traders, criminal organizations, and illicit networks, often play a role in sanction evasion. The UNSC discusses measures to increase international cooperation and enhance regulatory frameworks to curb these activities.

6. Sanctions Relief and Conditionality

Another critical point of discussion in the UNSC is the conditions under which sanctions should be lifted. The UNSC also discusses whether sanctions should be periodically reviewed and adjusted based on the evolving situation in the target country or region.

7. Impact on Diplomatic Solutions

Sanctions discussions often raise questions about their role in diplomatic efforts. In summary, the discussion of sanctions in the UNSC is multifaceted, covering a range of issues from effectiveness and humanitarian impact to compliance with international law and the coordination of sanctions among member states. These debates are crucial for ensuring that sanctions remain a legitimate, effective tool for maintaining international peace and security while minimizing their negative consequences on populations.

viii) Letters from Permanent Representatives 

Letters from Permanent Representatives to the UNSC (UNSC) serve several vital purposes in diplomatic communication and the functioning of the Council. These letters are typically sent by the Permanent Representatives of UN Member States to formally communicate information, requests, or concerns related to specific issues relevant to international peace and security.

ix) International Tribunal

International Tribunal discussions in the UNSC are crucial to the Council’s efforts to uphold international law and justice. These discussions are focused on the creation, operations, and decisions of international tribunals tasked with prosecuting war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and other violations of international law.

x) UN Secretary-General selection

The UNSC plays an essential role in the election of the UN Secretary-General, though it does not have a direct vote in the election process itself. The process is as follows:

1. Recommendation by the Security Council

The Security Council is responsible for recommending a candidate for the position of Secretary-General to the General Assembly. The recommendation is based on the Security Council’s discussions and deliberations, where members of the Council consider various factors such as the candidate’s qualifications, the geopolitical balance, and the need for a candidate who can garner broad international support.

2. Veto Power of the Permanent Members

A candidate can only be recommended to the General Assembly if no permanent member objects to their candidacy. If any P5 members veto a candidate, the process is stalled, and a new selection must be made.

3. Security Council Discussions and Straw Polls

The Security Council conducts informal discussions and straw polls to gauge support for various candidates. These are non-binding and allow members to indicate their preferences or concerns about potential candidates. The process is intended to narrow the field to one or a few candidates most likely acceptable to all members.

4. General Assembly Approval

Once the Security Council reaches a consensus and recommends a candidate, the General Assembly votes. The General Assembly’s decision is usually a formality, as it typically follows the Security Council’s recommendation, but it is still necessary for the appointment.

In summary, while the UNSC does not directly elect the Secretary-General, its recommendation and the veto power of the permanent members play a crucial role in determining the candidate that will be presented to the General Assembly for final approval.

xi) International Court of Justice (ICJ) members election 

The UNSC plays a role in the election of judges to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), primarily by participating in the nomination and election process. Following are the breakdown of the Security Council’s role in the election of ICJ judges:

1. Nomination and Election of Judges

The ICJ is composed of 15 judges who serve nine-year terms. Candidates are nominated by the UN General Assembly and the Security Council to elect a judge. The Security Council nominates five of the 15 judges. These nominees are chosen by the 15 members of the Security Council, and the selection process is conducted through votes within the Council. The General Assembly nominates the other ten judges, who are then elected through votes in the General Assembly.

2. Voting Process

The process requires two-thirds majority votes in the General Assembly and the Security Council to elect a judge. For the Security Council, a candidate must receive a majority vote from the members, but no P5 member can veto the nominations.

3. Representation and Regional Balance

The Security Council’s nominations typically aim to maintain regional balance and ensure representation from different legal systems and cultures. The Council and the General Assembly work to reflect a geopolitical balance when electing ICJ judges.

4. Influence on the Election Process

Although the Security Council’s influence on the actual election of ICJ judges is limited compared to the General Assembly’s, its nominations can significantly impact the selection process due to the Council’s political weight and the support it can offer to certain candidates.

xii) Identical Letters dated from the Permanent Representative of Colombia 

Identical letters in the context of the UNSC are formal communications addressed to the UN Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council. These letters, often sent by the Permanent Representative of a Member State (e.g., Colombia), usually contain information or requests regarding specific issues of concern.The “identical” nature of the letters means that they are sent in the same form to both the Secretary-General and the Security Council, often ensuring that all relevant UN bodies are equally informed of developments or actions taken by the country concerned.

 

4.3. Veto and its effect on UNSC Proceedings 

Under various agenda items discussed in previous sections, the veto has been used occasionally for a few agenda items on multiple occasions. After analyzing all meetings of various years, the number of meetings conducted each year is mentioned in Table 1.

Year	No. of Meetings of the UNSC
2014	268
2015	268
2016	256
2017	296
2018	288
2019	258
2020	130
2021	194
2022	292
2023	290
2024	256

Table 1-No. of Meetings conducted by UNSC

To understand how veto power has positively or negatively affected the UNSC’s decision-making on its responsibility to maintain peace and security, the case study of each veto case was done in the following sections.

i) Current Situation of States- Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

1. Introduction 

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has been a topic of significant discussion in the UNSC, primarily due to the political, economic, and humanitarian crises that have plagued the country over the last decade. The situation of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was first discussed in 2019 in UNSC on 26 January by meeting record S/PV.8452. The same year, UNSC addressed this topic in three more meetings on 26 February, 28 February, and 10 April 2019.

Venezuela’s economy faced severe contraction, hyperinflation, and resource shortages, leading to widespread poverty and food insecurity. Millions of Venezuelans fled, creating one of Latin America’s most significant migration crises. Neighboring countries, such as Colombia, Brazil, and others, struggled to manage the influx of refugees. Discussions in the UNSC often included appeals to strengthen humanitarian aid and provide support through UN agencies like the World Food Programme (WFP) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Since 2019, the political legitimacy of Nicolás Maduro’s presidency has been a contentious topic. Some UNSC member states, led by the US and its allies, recognize Juan Guaidó as the interim president, while others, including Russia and China, supported Maduro. UNSC discussions occasionally focused on encouraging dialogue between the government and the opposition, often with mediation efforts led by Norway or other neutral parties.

Reports of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, and suppression of political dissent drew international concern. The UN’s fact-finding missions and reports highlighted these issues, prompting debates on accountability and justice. The UNSC debates on Venezuela often reflect broader geopolitical divisions. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France criticized Maduro’s government for undermining democracy and violating human rights. While Russia and China argued against foreign interference, citing sovereignty and criticizing sanctions imposed by Western countries.

Discussions sometimes focus on the impact of sanctions, with some members arguing they worsen the humanitarian situation, while others view them as a tool to pressure Maduro’s government. The crisis had regional implications, straining resources in neighboring countries and threatening regional stability. Bodies like the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Lima Group were active in addressing the Venezuelan situation, often in collaboration with UNSC initiatives. In recent years, there has been a shift towards negotiations between the Maduro government and the opposition, facilitated by international actors.

2. Summary of UNSC Proceedings

A summary of the discussion of the four meetings is as follows:

1) January 26, 2019 (8452nd meeting)

The UNSC held a session addressing Venezuela’s political crisis and the growing humanitarian emergency. The meeting was convened amid significant international attention, as several countries recognized opposition leader Juan Guaidó as interim president, challenging Nicolás Maduro’s government. UN officials highlighted the dire conditions in Venezuela, including widespread food shortages, hyperinflation, and deteriorating healthcare, forcing millions of Venezuelans to flee the country. The situation was described as a severe humanitarian crisis requiring immediate international attention. The discussion followed significant events, including Juan Guaidó’s self-declaration as interim president, challenging Maduro’s legitimacy. The UNSC debated the constitutional and democratic implications of this move amidst widespread protests and allegations of political oppression under Maduro.

The US, UK and some other nations called for recognizing Guaidó as Venezuela’s legitimate leader and urged free and fair elections. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo emphasized the importance of international unity in supporting democratic aspirations in Venezuela. Russia and China defended Maduro’s presidency, criticizing international intervention as a violation of sovereignty and accusing Western powers of economic sabotage aimed at regime change.

UN officials urged all parties to exercise maximum restraint to prevent further escalation and called for inclusive dialogue. They stressed the need for respect for human rights and humanitarian law while addressing Venezuela’s internal challenges. Reports of violence during protests and the suppression of political opposition were brought to light. Countries like Peru emphasized the need for international investigations into alleged crimes against humanity. The council was divided, with some nations supporting dialogue and Maduro, while others advocated for political change to address the crisis​.

2) February 26, 2019 (8472nd meeting)

Discussions continued regarding the deteriorating situation. The meeting highlighted the need for a peaceful resolution, with members expressing opposing views on resolving the crisis, reflecting the global divide over Venezuela’s leadership and governance issues​. Countries like the United States and several European nations criticized the Maduro government for exacerbating the crisis and called for immediate access to humanitarian aid. Western nations, including the US, UK, and France, supported Juan Guaidó as the interim president and called for new, free, and fair elections. They accused the Maduro administration of corruption, repression, and human rights abuses.

Russia, China, and other nations defended Maduro’s government, arguing that external interference violated Venezuela’s sovereignty. They emphasized dialogue and opposed foreign-imposed regime change or military interventions. The debate underscored the lack of consensus among Council members, with disagreements over the legitimacy of Venezuela’s leadership and the best approach to resolving the crisis peacefully and effectively. The session concluded with no unified resolution, reflecting the deep geopolitical rifts over Venezuela’s situation.

3) February 28, 2019 (8476th meeting)

The council debated two competing draft resolutions, one proposed by the United States and the other by the Russian Federation, but neither was adopted.

1. US Draft Resolution (S/2019/186):

• The US resolution called for fair and free presidential elections in Venezuela under international supervision and the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid.
• It received nine votes in favor, three against (China, Russia, and South Africa), and three abstentions, but it was vetoed by Russia and China, both permanent members of the Council.
  2. Russian Draft Resolution (S/2019/190):
• The Russian resolution emphasized non-interference in Venezuela’s internal affairs and opposed external intervention, including military action.
• It received only four votes in favor (Russia, China, South Africa, and Equatorial Guinea), seven votes against, and four abstentions, failing to achieve the necessary majority for adoption.

The lack of consensus highlighted the geopolitical tensions surrounding the Venezuelan crisis and left the UNSC unable to take coordinated action ​​.

4) April 10, 2019 (8506th meeting)

On April 10, 2019, the UNSC convened to address the severe humanitarian crisis in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, marking the escalating international concern over the country’s deteriorating conditions. The meeting, requested by the United States, focused on the urgent need to respond to Venezuela’s deepening shortages of food, medicine, and essential health supplies, compounded by political instability. Expert briefers highlighted the collapse of Venezuela’s health system, citing skyrocketing rates of diseases like malaria and tuberculosis, widespread malnutrition, and a resurgence of previously controlled epidemics such as measles. These conditions, exacerbated by economic mismanagement and recent nationwide blackouts, have created what experts described as a “complex humanitarian emergency” requiring immediate and large-scale international intervention.

Vice President Mike Pence of the United States called for the Council to support interim President Juan Guaidó, describing Nicolás Maduro’s administration as repressive and a threat to regional peace and stability. Pence advocated for Maduro’s removal and urged member states to support UN-led humanitarian aid efforts and political transition. Russia and China opposed external interference, emphasizing Venezuela’s sovereignty and warning against actions they viewed as politicizing the humanitarian crisis. They called for dialogue without imposing external solutions, reflecting the UNSC members’ divisions regarding the best approach to address the situation.

The session underscored the global urgency of Venezuela’s plight while exposing geopolitical rifts within the Council. The call for international humanitarian aid and political solutions remains an ongoing challenge as the situation continues to impact the region and beyond.

 

3. Explanation of behaviors of P5

Given its significance in global politics and resources, the United States, China, and Russia have strategic, economic, and geopolitical reasons for their respective interests in Venezuela.

Venezuela holds the largest proven oil reserves globally. The US historically relied on Venezuelan oil, though this dependency has declined with domestic shale production. Control over or influence in Venezuela’s energy sector remained a fundamental interest of the US. The US often frames its involvement as supporting democracy and opposing authoritarian regimes. The US viewed Maduro as an authoritarian leader who had undermined democracy in Venezuela. Maduro was accused of eroding democratic institutions, dissolving the opposition-controlled National Assembly in 2017, and manipulating elections to stay in power. Maduro’s government was also accused of systematic human rights abuses, including violent crackdowns on protests, arbitrary detentions, and extrajudicial killings. The US condemned these actions as violations of fundamental freedoms. Therefore, the US recognized opposition leader Juan Guaidó as the interim president and imposed sanctions on Nicolás Maduro’s government to pressure political change. In addition, Venezuela’s alliances with US adversaries like Russia, China, and Iran posed a strategic concern for the US. Lastly, the crisis caused a massive migration wave, affecting neighboring countries and creating regional instability. The US wanted to address this humanitarian issue while leveraging it as a reason for intervention to display its superiority and importance to the world.

China often aligned with Russia on matters involving opposition to US policies. As a significant energy consumer, China heavily invested in Venezuela’s oil industry to secure a steady supply of crude oil, making Venezuela a vital part of its broader energy strategy. China provided significant loans and investments in Venezuela as part of its wider economic engagement in Latin America under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Supporting Maduro aligned with China’s principle of non-interference and its resistance to US-led regime change efforts. In addition, China adhered to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign nations. Supporting Guaidó, who declared himself interim president without an election, would contradict this principle. Additionally, Venezuela was a crucial ally in China’s global strategy to counterbalance US influence, especially in Latin America. Lastly, China had significant financial exposure in Venezuela, with billions in loans and infrastructure projects. It supported Maduro to safeguard its economic interests and recover debts. China’s position reflects a combination of protecting its economic interests, adhering to its political doctrines, and countering Western influence globally.

Russia opposed US-led interventions in sovereign countries, particularly those that involve regime change. Russia considered such actions to undermine international law and threaten the global balance of power. Russia often aligned itself with countries resisting US hegemony, portraying itself as a defender of a multipolar world order. In addition, Russia has been a key ally of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and provided significant economic, military, and political support to Venezuela, making Maduro’s government an important partner. Venezuela owes billions of dollars to Russia through loans and investments, especially in the oil and gas sector. Russian companies, like Rosneft, have major stakes in Venezuelan energy resources. Maintaining Maduro’s government ensured that Russia retains influence in Latin America, a region historically dominated by the US. Like China, Russia frequently cited the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. In short, Russia’s stance was driven by a combination of ideological opposition to US interventionism, economic stakes, and its strategic alliance with Venezuela under Maduro’s government.

Venezuela became a proxy battleground for broader US-China and US-Russia rivalries. The key factors that shaped the behaviors of P5 were 1) self-interest (strategic, economic, and geopolitical reasons), 2) ideology (maintaining democracy vs non-interference in the internal affairs of states), 3) supporting allies, 4) opposing rivalry, and 5) willingness to take action for resolving the issue. Out of five factors, the behavior of P5 was mainly influenced by the first to fourth factors, which is against the mandate of the UNSC.

ii) Current Situation of States- Bosnia and Herzegovina 

1. Introduction 

Bosnia and Herzegovina have been key discussion points in UNSC from 2014-2024.  Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is frequently discussed in the United Nations due to ongoing challenges related to its political stability, governance, and implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the Bosnian War in 1995. BiH remains a fragile post-conflict state with deep ethnic and political divisions among its three main groups (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs). The Dayton Agreement, formally known as the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP), was signed in December 1995 in Dayton, Ohio, to end the Bosnian War from 1992 to 1995. This agreement, brokered by the United States and supported by the international community, was critical in stabilizing the region and setting the foundation for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political structure. The agreement formally ended the conflict between Bosnia’s three primary ethnic groups: Bosniaks (Muslims), Croats, and Serbs.

Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided into two autonomous entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, dominated by Bosniaks and Croats (51% of the territory) and the Republika Srpska, predominantly Serb (49% of the territory). The UN monitors the country’s adherence to the Dayton Agreement, establishing its complex political structure.

2. UNSC Proceedings in Bosnia and Herzegovina 

By resolution S/RES/713 on 25 September 1991, the UNSC marked the start of the UN’s involvement in the former Yugoslavia. It imposed sanctions and their enforcement in the context of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and by resolution S/RES/743 a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was formed.UNSC authorized the reinforcement of UNPROFOR in 1993 by resolution S/RES/844. After several events, S/RES/1575 established the European Union Stabilization Force (EUFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 22 November 2004. Recently, UNSC renewed the One Year Mandate of EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina by unanimously Adopting Resolution 2757 (2024) on 1 November 2024.

The UN plays a role in supervising the High Representative for BiH, an international official tasked with ensuring the civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement. Debates over the High Representative’s authority and effectiveness have sparked differing opinions among Security Council members. BiH has made some progress toward EU membership, receiving approval to start accession negotiations earlier in 2024. However, the path ahead requires significant reforms, especially in governance, judiciary independence, and adherence to EU standards. BiH’s aspirations to join the European Union have brought focus on its need for political, economic, and judicial reforms. The UN discussed these efforts to support BiH’s path towards integration and lasting stability. Issues such as the underrepresentation of women, challenges to free speech, and human rights violations are also topics of concern that are being discussed in the UN. These are being addressed within the framework of building a democratic and inclusive society.

Several resolutions to BiH issues have been adopted unanimously by the UNSC. However, one draft resolution, S/2015/508, was vetoed by the Russian Federation on July 8, 2015.

Draft Resolution S/2015/508 was a UNSC resolution proposed by the United Kingdom to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre and to formally recognize it as genocide, in line with rulings from international courts along with supporting the Dayton Peace Agreement. It emphasized that recognizing the genocide and other crimes against humanity was essential for reconciliation among ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina and for broader regional stability. The resolution was intended to promote reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and prevent future atrocities by addressing the consequences of denial and fostering accountability.The resolution reiterated the international community’s commitment to preventing genocide, learning from past failures, and taking timely action against threats to peace.

3. Explanation of behaviors of P5

The UK mainly drafted this resolution, which other members supported. Chad, Chile, France, Jordan, Lithuania, Malaysia, New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the US supported the resolution. Angola, China, Nigeria, and Venezuela (the Bolivarian Republic of) abstained, and the Russian Federation vetoed.

Russia argued that the resolution was politically motivated and would exacerbate ethnic and political divisions in the Balkans rather than promote reconciliation. Russian UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin criticized the resolution as unconstructive, claiming it unfairly targeted Bosnian Serbs and risked prolonging tensions in the region. Instead of using the word “genocide,” Russia proposed that the members condemn “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community.”The veto reflected Russia’s alignment with Serbia, which had lobbied against the resolution. Serbian leaders expressed concerns that labeling the massacre as genocide would stigmatize the Serbian nation. This stance resonated with Russian leadership, which emphasized the importance of maintaining regional stability and avoiding language that could alienate Serbian communities.

After analyzing the reasons for the veto by Russia, it can be concluded that one main reason for this veto may be lobbying by Serbia, as Serbia and Republika Srpska strongly opposed the resolution. By vetoing the resolution, Russia underscored its role as a counterweight to Western influence in the UNSC. It was not found that Russia had any self-interest in vetoing this resolution. Another point to note was that China abstained from the veto process instead of supporting Russia, which is a usual trend for China.

iii) Current Situation of States-Mali

1. Introduction 

Mali has been a key point of discussion in UNSC during 2014-2024 due to its ongoing security, political, and humanitarian crises, which have significant regional and international implications. Mali faces a severe security threat from extremist groups like Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), linked to Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). These groups intensified attacks against civilians, military forces, and international entities, destabilizing Mali and the broader Sahel region. Mali experienced two military coups in 2020 and 2021, leading to the establishment of a transitional government that has strained relations with international partners.

Armed conflict and violence have displaced hundreds of thousands of Malians, both internally and across borders. Mali suffers from severe food shortages, exacerbated by climate change, conflict, and disruptions to agricultural production. Basic services like healthcare and education are limited in many areas, further deepening the humanitarian crisis. Because of all these issues, Mali has been a key topic of discussion in UNSC.

2. UNSC Proceedings in Mali 

The UNSC first discussed Mali in earnest following the 2012 crisis when a military coup, Tuareg rebellion, and jihadist insurgencies destabilized the country. In the same year UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 2085 (2012), which, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorized the deployment of an international force under African leadership to help Mali’s military and police forces restore State sovereignty and territorial integrity in the areas of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal, controlled by the terrorists and extremists of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) and affiliated groups.

Furthermore, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established in April 2013 through Resolution S/RES/2100 (2013).MINUSMA’s mandate was to stabilize Mali, protect civilians, assist with re-establishing state authority, and support the implementation of the 2015 Peace Agreement.

The Council has since held numerous discussions about Mali, addressing its challenges, including security threats from extremist groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS-affiliated organizations, political instability, humanitarian crises, and the role of external actors like the Wagner Group.  Mali’s government increasingly aligned itself with Russia, including security collaborations with the Wagner Group, a private military contractor. This shift alienated traditional allies like France and the European Union.

In June 2023, the Security Council adopted a resolution to terminate MINUSMA’s mandate at the request of Mali’s transitional government. MINUSMA’s withdrawal raised concerns about a potential security vacuum, as MINUSMA played a crucial role in monitoring ceasefires and protecting civilians. UNSC adopted several UNSC resolutions for Mali without any issues. However, one resolution, S/2023/638, was vetoed by the Russian Federation in 2023.

France and the UAE presented UNSC Draft Resolution S/2023/638 in August 2023 to renew Mali’s sanctions regime, including travel bans and asset freezes, along with the mandate of the Panel of Experts monitoring its implementation. The resolution sought to maintain international oversight amidst rising instability in Mali following the government’s request to end the UN peacekeeping mission, MINUSMA, and withdraw UN forces. The resolution aimed to address challenges such as terrorist threats, humanitarian crises, and regional insecurity linked to the deteriorating situation in Mali. However, Russia vetoed the resolution.

3. Explanation of behaviors of P5

Albania, Brazil, Ecuador, France, Gabon, Ghana, Japan, Malta, Mozambique, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America supported Draft Resolution S/2023/638. Russian Federation vetoed while China remained abstained.

Russia argued that the sanctions regime and the Panel of Experts no longer reflected Mali’s realities. Russia also cited Mali’s demand to withdraw international interventions, which they viewed as infringing on national sovereignty. Russia argued that the sanctions regime was outdated and counterproductive, claiming it failed to reflect the current realities on the ground. Russia’s veto reflected its growing influence in Africa, particularly Mali, where it strengthened ties with the transitional government. This included security cooperation through the Wagner Group. Opposing Western-backed resolutions aligns with Russia’s broader effort to position itself as a defender of sovereign governments against perceived Western overreach. The veto continued Russia’s pattern of opposing resolutions sponsored by Western countries, particularly France, with whom relations have been strained. Russia often critiques such resolutions as being biased or as tools of neo-colonialism in Africa.

During the same session, Russia proposed another draft resolution, S/2023/639, to the Council on August 30, 2023, seeking to dissolve the Mali Panel of Experts, established under the sanctions regime in Resolution 2374 (2017). This resolution was introduced following the Transitional Government of Mali’s formal request to lift the sanctions and its dissatisfaction with the Panel of Experts’ findings. The resolution failed to gain sufficient support in the Security Council. It received only one affirmative vote—from Russia—highlighting the lack of consensus on addressing Mali’s ongoing instability and the sanctions framework. Other members opposed it due to concerns over weakening accountability mechanisms and undermining efforts to ensure compliance with peace agreements and international obligations. At the same time, Japan voted against it, and the remaining 13 members abstained.

In this case, it can be observed that Russia did not use veto for similar resolutions in the past for the Mali situation. However, in this case, due to lobbying by the transitional government of Mali, Russia supported Mali than P5. As a standard practice, China kept itself abstaining from voting.

iv) Current Situation of States- Middle East including Palestine Question

1. Introduction

Over the past decade (2014–2024), the UNSC has extensively addressed various aspects of the Middle East situation, focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, regional stability, and humanitarian concerns. The key topics discussed under this agenda item included the situation of Egypt, Israel, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine question, and Yemen.

There are several ongoing issues in Middle East region. The Middle East is home to many of the world’s oil and gas reserves, making its stability crucial for the global economy. Rivalries between key players like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, and Israel often influence or exacerbate conflicts in the region. Major powers, including the United States, Russia, and China, have strategic interests in the Middle East, leading to proxy conflicts and differing approaches in the UNSC.

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict is a decades-long issue, central to regional tensions, involving disputed territories, the status of JerUSlem, and the aspirations of both Israelis and Palestinians for statehood and security. Ongoing conflicts in countries like Syria, Yemen, and Iraq lead to humanitarian crises, destabilization, and the proliferation of extremist groups. Groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda have emerged or operated in the region, posing threats beyond the Middle East through global terror networks. The region’s conflicts have spurred concerns about the spread of conventional and unconventional weapons, including chemical weapons, in Syria.

Decades of wars and conflicts have led to millions of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), creating immense humanitarian needs and straining neighboring countries and international resources. The Middle East’s interconnected conflicts, humanitarian crises, and strategic importance make it a persistent topic on the UNSC agenda. The Council’s discussions aim to mitigate violence, provide humanitarian aid, and seek lasting political solutions to stabilize the region.

2. UNSC Proceedings on the Middle East  

Since 2014, every year, several meetings of the UNSC have been held on Middle East agenda items. The UNSC adopted numerous resolutions addressing various conflicts and issues in the Middle East since its inception in 1946. It is estimated that the UNSC has passed over 200 resolutions pertaining to the Middle East. These resolutions cover a wide range of subjects, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the situations in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, and broader regional stability concerns.

For instance, as of 2023, the UNSC had adopted several resolutions specifically addressing the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question. Notable among these is Resolution 2334 (2016), which condemned Israeli settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territories. Additionally, the UNSC has addressed other regional issues, such as the conflict in Syria, through resolutions like 2254 (2015), which endorsed a road map for a peace process in Syria. Some of the other key resolutions included Resolution 2728 (2024) and  Resolution 2334 (2016) on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Resolution 2735 (2024) and Resolution 1701 (2006) on Lebanon-Israel Relations, Resolution 2401 (2018) and Resolution 2254 (2015) on Syria, Resolution 2451 (2018) and Resolution 2216 (2015) on Yemen, Resolution 2510 (2020) and Resolution 2174 (2014) on Libya, Resolution 2379 (2017) and Resolution 2170 (2014) on Iraq, Resolution 2720 (2023) and Resolution 2712 (2023) for Gaza and Resolution 2524 (2020) and Resolution 2428 (2018) on Sudan and South Sudan and many more.

There were 23 occurrences from 2014 to 2024, for which one or more P5 members made vetoes. Another interesting fact is that 18 out of 23 were vetoed by Russia, five by the US, and 8 times by China with Russia. It is to be noted that China has vetoed eight resolutions, which Russia vetoed under this agenda item.

3. Explanation of behaviors of P5

To understand the behavior of P5, specifically on the occasion when the veto was made, I classified 23 vetoes for each Middle Eastern state with the key message of proposed draft resolutions. Three key agendas for which frequent veto is made are Israel, Syria, and Yemen. Another interesting observation is that Russia continuously vetoed many resolutions for Syria and the US for Israel.

1. Syria

It is to be noted that S/RES/2254 was the first resolution focused exclusively on a political solution to the Syrian crisis that was adopted unanimously on 18 December 2015.S/RES/2268 (2016) resolution endorsed the cessation of hostilities and called for the resumption of political talks on 26 February 2016.Two resolutions, S/RES/2319 and S/RES/2314, renewed or extended the UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism mandate and S/RES/2332 renewed the authorisation for cross-border aid delivery until 10 January 2018.On 31 December 2016, by resolution S/RES/2336, the UNSC welcomed and supported the efforts by Russia and Turkey to end violence in Syria and jumpstart a political process. On 24 February 2018, Resolution S/RES/2401 demanding a cessation of hostilities in Syria was adopted unanimously. Resolution S/RES/2672 extended the authorization for the Syria cross-border aid mechanism for six months until 10 July 2023. All these resolutions were on a similar topic, which Russia later vetoed. One key reason for this behavior by Russia is the involvement of Russia in Syria conflicts from 2015. It is also claimed that anti-government rebel groups were backed by the US and a rotating number of US allies, including France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Russia has been a staunch ally of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and viewed his government as a critical partner in the Middle East. Resolutions perceived as undermining Assad’s regime or calling for his removal are consistently vetoed. Therefore, the key factor that contributed to Russia’s veto of genuine resolutions was to support the Syrian government, which Russia supported.

Syria and Russia have robust political relations. Syria hosts Russia’s only naval base in the Mediterranean (Tartus) and the Khmeimim Air Base, making Syria strategically indispensable for Russia’s military presence in the region. Russia has vetoed resolutions aimed at investigating or imposing accountability for chemical weapons attacks in Syria. It has argued that such resolutions pre-judge the Assad government’s guilt or rely on flawed investigations. As usual, Russia used its veto power as a tool to counterbalance US and European influence in the UNSC, asserting itself as a key global power. Russia opposed and vetoed resolutions renewing cross-border aid mechanisms that bypass the Syrian government, arguing that such mechanisms violate Syrian sovereignty and must be conducted with Damascus’s approval. Russia’s vetoes reflect its broader strategic goals of maintaining influence in the Middle East, protecting its ally Assad, and countering Western initiatives it perceives as undermining sovereignty or facilitating regime change. While Russia frames its actions as defending international law and sovereignty, critics argue these vetoes enable human rights abuses and hinder humanitarian efforts in Syria. The vetoes also highlight deep divisions within the UNSC, preventing unified action on one of the world’s most protracted conflicts.

China vetoed with Russia for some proposed draft resolutions as China consistently emphasized the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, and China often aligned with Russia on international issues, including the Syrian conflict. This partnership reflected shared strategic interests and a mutual stance against what they perceived as Western dominance in global affairs. . It can be concluded that China vetoed UNSC resolutions of its commitment to sovereignty, opposition to unilateral sanctions, strategic alignment with Russia, and disbelief toward interventions under humanitarian grounds. These positions underscored China’s broader foreign policy principles and approach to international conflicts.

2. Israel

During 2014-2024 period, the US exercised its veto power in the UNSC on several resolutions concerning the Gaza-Israel conflict. It also drafted one resolution, S/2023/792, that called for “humanitarian pauses” and Israel’s right to defend itself, which China and Russia vetoed. Resolution S/2023/970 on 8 December 2023 was put forward by the United Arab Emirates and backed by over 90 Member States. There were 13 votes in favor, and the United Kingdom abstained, stating that they could not vote in favor of a resolution that failed to condemn the atrocities Hamas committed on innocent Israeli civilians on 7 October. The US vetoed the UNSC resolution as it did not explicitly mention Israel’s right to self-defense.  For some proposed resolutions, the US claimed that they were one-sided or disproportionately critical of Israel without acknowledging provocations or attacks from groups such as Hamas. In the past, the US had historically used its veto power to block any resolutions that might be critical of Israel or call for Palestinian statehood.

 

Veto by the US for draft resolutions S/2024/173 and S/2024/239 demanding an immediate cease-fire in Gaza was controversial. The US was the only P5 against the measure, with 13 countries of the 15-member panel voting yes and the UK abstaining. The US shared that it vetoed the resolutions, believing they could lead to unintended consequences or fail to contribute constructively to resolving the conflict. Overall, the main reason for the US to veto resolutions that may have helped to reduce the impact of the Israel- Gaza conflict was to support its strategic ally.

3. Yemen

Russia consistently called for a political, inclusive, and peaceful resolution to the Yemen conflict. It opposed military solutions, emphasizing dialogue among Yemeni parties. Russia has maintained a neutral stance, engaging with both the Saudi-led coalition and the Iran-aligned Houthi rebels. Russia had emphasized respect for Yemen’s sovereignty and opposed resolutions that could be seen as endorsing regime change or external domination. Russia has strategic ties with Iran, a key backer of the Houthi rebels. This shaped its opposition to UNSC resolutions that explicitly targeted Iran in S/2018/156. The draft resolution, S/2018/156, submitted by the United Kingdom, sought to extend sanctions on Yemen and included a provision to condemn Iran for allegedly violating the arms embargo by supplying weapons to Houthi rebels. Russia proposed an alternative draft resolution that omitted specific references to Iran but extended sanctions and arms embargo measures. This version was ultimately adopted as Resolution 2402 (2018).

v) Maintenance of international peace and Security 

1. Introduction

Under this agenda item, Russia has vetoed two resolutions: S/2021/990 and S/2022/720. One resolution was drafted for the security implications of climate change, and another was for Ukraine. No other draft resolutions were vetoed under this agenda item from 2014-2024.

2. UNSC Proceedings on Maintenance of International Peace and Security 

The resolution S/2021/990 aimed to integrate climate-related security risks into the Council’s conflict prevention strategies and to enhance the UN’s capacity to respond to climate-induced security threats. Historically co-sponsored by 113 member states, this draft resolution received 12 votes in favor. The resolution was vetoed by Russia, with India also voting against it and China abstaining.

S/2022/720 was a draft resolution submitted to the UNSC on September 30, 2022, by Albania and the US. The resolution addressed the Russian Federation’s actions in Ukraine, explicitly condemning the annexation of Ukrainian territories and calling for the immediate withdrawal of Russian forces. Ten countries supported the resolution, including three P5, France, the UK, and the US. Russia voted against the resolution, and four countries, including Brazil, China, India, and UAE, abstained.

3. Explanation of behaviors of P5

As per the council report, Russia’s veto for S/2021/990 was based on its position that climate change should be addressed through existing frameworks, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), rather than the Security Council. Russian representatives argued that involving the Security Council in climate issues could lead to the politicization of climate change and might overextend the Council’s mandate. They emphasized that climate change is primarily an environmental and developmental issue, not a direct threat to international peace and security. India, aligning with Russia’s perspective, expressed concerns that the proposed resolution could shift the focus from the UNFCCC and other specialized agencies better equipped to handle climate-related matters. India’s representative highlighted the need to avoid duplicating efforts and to respect the distinct roles of various UN bodies. China’s abstention was because, in their view, the draft resolution did not address important ongoing relevant issues and its position on not expanding the Security Council’s mandate to include climate change. While acknowledging the significance of climate issues, China advocated for addressing them through existing mechanisms and emphasized the importance of consensus among member states. Although China’s position aligned with India’s and Russia’s, it decided to abstain rather than veto.

Russia used its veto power not to adopt draft resolution S/2022/720 because the draft resolution sought to condemn Russia’s organization of “illegal so-called referendums” in the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia and demanded the immediate withdrawal of Russian military forces from Ukraine. Four countries – China, India, Gabon, and Brazil – abstained during the vote. The remaining ten members of the Security Council supported the resolution prepared by the United States and Albania. Russia contended that the resolution was politically motivated and failed to acknowledge the situation’s complexities on the ground. Following the veto, the General Assembly convened and adopted Resolution ES-11/4 by an overwhelming majority of 143 Member States of the United Nations, which condemned the referendums and called for the non-recognition of any alterations to Ukraine’s borders.

In summary, the UNSC could not take any stance on the Russia- Ukraine war as one of the P5 members was involved in the conflict.

vi) Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts

1. Introduction 

UNSC has adopted many resolutions under this agenda item from time to time. However, only one resolution on this matter has been vetoed by one of the P5 Members.

2. UNSC Proceedings on Threats to international peace and security

The UNSC document S/2020/852 pertains to a draft resolution submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee during its presidency in August 2020. The resolution focused on developing and implementing comprehensive and tailored prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration measures for persons who are engaged in terrorism-related activity, including Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) and their families, along with ensuring that all actions follow applicable international law, in particular, international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and international refugee law. It was also aimed at strengthening member states’ frameworks to combat terrorism while adhering to human rights and international law. The resolution was vetoed by the United States on August 31, 2020, despite broad support from other members of the Security Council. The draft resolution received 14 votes in favor, one against (the United States of America) and no abstentions.

3. Explanation of behaviors of P5

The main reason for the veto by the US was key disagreements over its provisions related to the repatriation of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). The US criticized the draft for not adequately emphasizing the mandatory repatriation of FTFs and their families to their countries of origin. The US believed that failing to repatriate and prosecute these individuals in their home countries created risks of further radicalization in detention camps and left the burden on a few affected regions (e.g., Syria and Iraq). The US sought stronger language obligating States to take responsibility for their citizens who had joined terrorist organizations abroad. The draft resolution was perceived as placing too much focus on multilateral rehabilitation and reintegration efforts, which the US viewed as inadequate without direct state-level accountability. The US is already struggling with illegal immigrant issues. Therefore, it wanted to amend the content to place overall responsibilities with States of origin.

• Non-proliferation – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)

1. Introduction

Since 2006, resolutions targeting the DPRK’s missile and nuclear programs have been passed unanimously. Non-proliferation for DPRK has been an agenda item for UNSC for several decades. Since 2014, several resolutions have been passed to discover solutions to this matter. However, no significant progress has been made. From 2014 till 2024, there have been three resolutions, S/2024/302, S/2024/255, and S/2022/431, vetoed by one or more of the P5 members on this topic.

2. UNSC Proceedings on Non-proliferation- DPRK

UNSC draft resolution S/2022/431, proposed by the United States on May 26, 2022, aimed to strengthen sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in response to its ballistic missile launches, including an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test on March 24, 2022. The draft resolution sought to update and enhance the existing sanctions regime established under Resolution 1718 (2006). Key provisions included reducing the annual cap on DPRK’s imports of crude oil, refined petroleum products, as well as banning exports of tobacco to the DPRK. In addition, it asked DPRK to cease the export of mineral fuels, mineral oils, and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes and clocks and watches and parts thereof and prohibited all Member States from procuring these items from DPRK. The draft resolution received support from 13 of the 15 Council members. However, China and Russia exercised their veto powers, preventing its adoption.China and Russia justified their vetoes by arguing that additional sanctions would not effectively address the situation and could exacerbate humanitarian conditions in the DPRK. They emphasized the need for dialogue and diplomatic engagement over punitive measures.

UNSC’s first-ever draft resolution S/2024/302, introduced on April 24, 2024, by Japan and the United States, aimed to reaffirm and strengthen commitments under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. The resolution sought to prevent the placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in outer space, emphasizing the necessity of further measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. The draft reaffirmed the obligations of all States parties to fully comply with the Outer Space Treaty, including not placing in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other WMD, and not installing such weapons on celestial bodies or stationing them in outer space in any other manner. The Security Council voted on the draft resolution on April 24, 2024. The resolution received support from 13 of the 15 Council members. However, Russia exercised its veto power, preventing the adoption of the resolution. China abstained from the vote.

On March 28, 2024, the UNSC considered draft resolution S/2024/255, introduced by the United States, which aimed to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts established under Resolution 1874 (2009) concerning the DPRK until April 30, 2025. The extension was intended to assist the Security Council in ensuring compliance with sanctions aimed at curbing the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The draft resolution received 13 votes in favor. However, Russia exercised its veto power, and China abstained, leading to the resolution’s failure to be adopted.

3. Explanation of behaviors of P5

Based on various justifications analyzed by various sources, it can be said that China and Russia vetoed S/2022/431 as they were concerned with the potential humanitarian impact of reducing the DPRK’s imports of crude oil and refined petroleum products, which were part of the resolution’s proposed measures. They also believed that the US contributed to the escalation of tensions through its military activities in the region, and the US is reluctant to engage in meaningful negotiations with North Korea. They viewed the US-led resolution as reflecting a one-sided approach that ignored the broader security dynamics in Northeast Asia. The vetoes also reflected broader geopolitical rivalries between China, Russia, and Western powers, particularly the US.

For S/2024/302, Russia argued that the draft resolution, introduced by the United States and Japan, was a “cynical ploy” aimed at advancing their own strategic interests in outer space rather than genuinely addressing the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Russian officials criticized the resolution as one-sided, asserting that it focused disproportionately on banning nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in space while ignoring other potential militarization threats posed by US-led space initiatives. Russia’s statement clearly indicated its objection to the proposal:

At first glance, it looks harmless and even positive because officially it is devoted to a topic of great importance to the international community, namely, the non-deployment of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in outer space. However, behind that screen is our Western colleagues’ cunning plan, which has nothing to do with that noble task. I would like to remind members that the ban on deploying WMDs in outer space is already enshrined in the Outer Space Treaty and has been in force for 57 years, since 1967. What, then, is the real reason behind the American Japanese idea of reaffirming that ban in 2024? By separating WMDs from all other types of weapons, Washington, Tokyo and their allies are trying to camouflage their disinterest in not deploying all types of weapons in outer space, on which Russia and China have been insisting since at least 2008 .

Russia and China proposed an amendment contained in document S/2024/323 to the text of the draft resolution contained in document S/2024/302. to the resolution that sought to prevent the placement of weapons of any kind in space. The amendment was rejected, with seven nations voting in favor of it, seven opposed it, and Switzerland abstaining. Russian representatives also stressed the need for a legally binding international treaty to address all aspects of space militarization, including the placement of non-nuclear weapons in space. While not a veto, China abstained from the vote.

Russia’s veto of draft resolution S/2024/255 was based on concerns about the Panel of Experts’ impartiality and effectiveness. Russian representatives argued that the Panel’s reports lacked objectivity and often contained unverified information, which could undermine the credibility of the Security Council’s decisions. They also expressed dissatisfaction with the Panel’s methodology and called for reforms to enhance its transparency and accountability. Russian officials claimed that the Panel often relied on unverified information, leading to biased conclusions that aligned more with the interests of certain countries, particularly the United States and its allies, than with neutral fact-finding. Russia expressed skepticism about the effectiveness of extending sanctions enforcement mechanisms, arguing that sanctions alone had not succeeded in addressing the DPRK’s nuclear and missile activities.

• Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)

1. Introduction 

The document S/2014/136, dated 28 February 2014, is a letter from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. This letter was submitted during the unfolding crisis in Ukraine, particularly in Crimea, following Russia’s military intervention and the controversial political developments in the region. This letter has been submitted to the UNSC continuously since 2014. Russian Federation has vetoed this letter three times since 2014.

2. UNSC Proceedings on the Ukraine Letter

The letter was submitted shortly after Russia began military operations in Crimea in February 2014. In this letter in 2014, Ukraine formally requested an urgent meeting of the UNSC to address the situation in Crimea and the broader implications for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The letter accused Russia of violating Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as breaching international agreements. The letter expressed concern that Russia’s actions could lead to further destabilization in the region, potentially threatening international peace and security. The UNSC held several emergency meetings regarding the crisis, but resolutions condemning Russia’s actions were blocked by Russia’s veto.

Draft Resolution S/2022/155, authored by Albania and the US and co-sponsored by 81 member states, aimed to deplore Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, reaffirm Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and demand an immediate cessation of hostilities. The draft resolution failed to be adopted due to a veto cast by Russia. Eleven members voted in favor, one against (Russia), and three abstained (China, India, and the United Arab Emirates).

Draft Resolution S/2015/562 was a draft resolution presented by Malaysia to establish a tribunal for the prosecution of those responsible for the downing of flight MH17. Russia vetoed the draft resolution, preventing the establishment of the tribunal. 11 States, including three P5, voted in favor, three States, Angola, China, and Venezuela, abstained, and Russia vetoed it.

Draft Resolution S/2014/189 aimed to reaffirm Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity in response to the crisis in Crimea. It called for all states to refrain from actions that would disrupt Ukraine’s unity and political independence. The draft resolution was vetoed by Russia. Thirteen members voted in favor, one against (Russia), and one abstained (China).

3. Explanation of behaviors of P5

The reason for the veto by Russia for two resolutions in which it was the direct party involved is self-explanatory. Russia vetoed it to justify its action.

Russia opposed the creation of an international tribunal by Draft Resolution S/2015/562 as the mechanism for addressing the MH17 incident, arguing that such a tribunal was unnecessary and premature. Russian representatives suggested that the ongoing investigation by the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) should first be completed and any findings thoroughly analyzed before determining the appropriate course of action.  Russia claimed the investigation into the MH17 tragedy lacked transparency and impartiality. In addition, Russian officials accused the JIT of excluding Russia from the investigative process while including Ukraine, which they viewed as a party to the conflict and potentially biased. Russia proposed alternative approaches to handle the MH17 case, including national investigations and judicial processes through existing frameworks. Russia asserted that creating a tribunal under UN auspices would undermine national sovereignty and set a precedent for internationalizing the resolution of similar cases.

The key reason for the veto by Russia was that it was accused of being the responsible body for this accident, and it wished to keep the matter at the national level.

1. Admission of new Members

1. Introduction 

Admission of new member agenda items was the first time discussed in UNSC meetings in 2024. In the same year, the US vetoed one draft conclusion.

2. UNSC Proceedings on Addition of New Members

On April 18, 2024, Algeria introduced draft resolution S/2024/312 to the UNSC, proposing the admission of the State of Palestine as a full member of the United Nations. The resolution aimed to recommend to the General Assembly that the State of Palestine be admitted to UN membership, recognizing its sovereignty and statehood. The proposal, submitted by Algeria, received 12 votes in favor, with the US casting a negative vote and Switzerland and the United Kingdom abstaining. The voting reflected broad international support for Palestine’s bid.

3. Explanation of behaviors of P5

The US representative supported Palestinian statehood within a comprehensive peace agreement but opposed the resolution, citing concerns over the timing and potential implications for the peace process. The UK representative reiterated support for a two-state solution but emphasized that Palestinian membership should result from direct negotiations between Israel and Palestine. Due to the veto, Palestine remains a non-member observer state at the UN, a status granted in 2012. The veto highlighted ongoing divisions within the international community regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the path to Palestinian statehood. Many countries expressed disappointment over the outcome, emphasizing the need for renewed efforts toward a peaceful resolution.

5. Long-Term Consequences of the Use of Veto Power

5.1. Introduction 

After analyzing various cases of vetoes from 2014-2024 in the previous chapter, it can be concluded that several key factors contributed to the behavior of P5 States. These factors include but are not limited to as follows:

1. Political Factors

1. Domestic Political Pressures

Domestic political considerations, such as public opinion, political party pressures, or influential domestic groups’ lobbying, often influence veto decisions.

2. Projection of Global Leadership

Vetoing a resolution can serve as a way for a permanent member to demonstrate its authority and assert itself as a dominant global player.

3. Avoiding Unwanted Precedents

Permanent members may veto resolutions that establish precedents they fear could later apply to themselves. For instance, Russia and China often veto resolutions promoting interventions that could later justify similar actions against them.

1. Geopolitical Factors

4. Rivalry Between Major Powers

Geopolitical rivalries, particularly between the US and Russia or the US and China, often lead to vetoes. For example, the US and Russia frequently oppose each other’s positions on conflicts like Syria or Ukraine. Similarly, Russia and China mostly backed each other.

5. Control Over Global Governance

Permanent members may veto resolutions to maintain their control over the Security Council’s agenda or to counterbalance the influence of other global powers.

6. Regional Influence

Permanent members often protect their spheres of influence by vetoing resolutions threatening their strategic foothold in a region. For instance, Russia’s vetoes in Syria aim to preserve its influence in the Middle East.

7. Energy and Economic Interests

Resolutions affecting access to critical resources or energy routes can provoke vetoes, as seen in disputes over Middle Eastern conflicts or sanctions affecting oil and gas exports.

8. Balancing Alliances and Multilateral Commitments

A veto may reflect an attempt to balance relations between competing allies or strategic blocs. For example, China may veto resolutions that alienate its allies in Africa or Asia.

• Ideological and Humanitarian Factors (Secondary Motivations)

9. Opposition to Western-Led Norms

Russia and China often veto resolutions they perceive as promoting “Western-centric” values like liberal democracy or regime change.

10. Perceived Bias or Double Standards:

Permanent members may veto resolutions they view as biased, such as those focusing on human rights violations in their allies while ignoring similar issues elsewhere.

11. Humanitarian Pretexts

In some cases, permanent members justify vetoes by claiming that proposed actions would worsen humanitarian conditions, even if underlying motivations are strategic.

A further section of this chapter analyzed various statistics collected from different sources, along with an analysis of responses to the survey. It formulated some key parameters that can be used to measure the long-term consequences of the veto power of P5. While collecting data, case studies described in the previous chapter are considered.

5.2. Key Parameters for measurement of veto power implication for the duration of 2014-2024

The key parameters for long-term consequences of veto power usage can be analyzed and measured for various categories of objectives for which the UNSC was formed by the world.

1. Impact on International Peace and Security 

Two parameters can support measurements of the impact of long-term usage of veto power on the global world order.

1. Veto Rate (VR)

One of the key parameters that can support measuring the impact of veto on International Peace and Security is the number of times resolutions related to active conflicts are vetoed by UNSC permanent members. This parameter is known as the “Veto Rate.”  In addition to considering active conflicts, I have also taken other case studies in the previous chapter for this calculation. The veto rate is calculated as follows:

Veto Rate= (No of resolutions vetoed/Total number of resolutions) *100

 

I first computed the veto rate for each year from 2014-2024 and averaged them together. The breakdown of the overall percentage of vetoes for each year from 2014 to 2024 is provided in Appendix B. From 2014 through 2024, the veto rate for each agenda item is as follows:

Agenda	No of Resolution adopted	No of Vetoes	Veto Rate Percentage
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela	0	1	100%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	11	1	8%
Mali	20	1	5%
Syria	29	15	34%
Yemen	24	1	4%
Middle East, including the Palestinian Question	4	8	67%
Maintenance of international peace and security in Ukraine	3	5	63%
Non-proliferation – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea	16	3	16%
Admission of new members	0	1	100%

Table 2-Veto Rate for active conflicts and issues for 2014-2024

2. Conflicts Resolution Rate (CRR)

Another parameter that can measure the impact of a veto on International Peace and Security is the Conflicts Resolution Rate. This parameter is defined as the ratio of the number of conflicts or crises resolved due to the total active conflicts. Two conflicts started between 2014 and 2024: the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Palestine war. UNSC is unable to resolve or progress on both conflicts due to a veto by one of the P5 members.

 

Agenda	Conflict Started	Number of times Veto done by China	Number of times Veto done by Russia	Number of times Veto done by US
Syria	2011	7	15	0
Yemen	2015	0	1	0
Middle East, including the Palestinian Question	2014 (escalation in 2021)	2	2	6
Maintenance of international peace and security in Ukraine	2022	0	5	0
Non-proliferation – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea	2006	1	3	0
Admission of new members	Related to Palestine	0	0	1

Table 3-List of Conflicts not resolved due to veto between 2014-2024

This table explains that no significant progress has been made in any conflict resolution, mainly because of the veto by P5 members. Therefore, the number of resolved conflicts for 2014-2024 is zero.

1. Diplomatic and Institutional Credibility

3. Global Trust Index (GTI)

Another factor that can support the description of the impact of veto behavior is to know Global trust in the UNSC by the public or other experts to measure the credibility of the UNSC in the world. One quantitative and another qualitative measurement methods were used to quantify this influence.

 

For the first method (qualitative), a survey was conducted. The questionnaire prepared for the study is provided in Appendix C. A total of 93 responses were received for this survey. The respondents were a mix of the general public, UN diplomats, state diplomats, and experts such as professors and researchers. Further details about survey outcomes are provided in a separate chapter.

 

Another way to measure global trust quantitively was to quantify changes in member states’ engagement in UN peacekeeping missions and other diplomatic processes. If more states supported UNSC peacekeeping operations or other initiatives or if states that provided their support continued to provide support, it would display more trust in the UNSC. A list of UN member’s contributions to UN initiatives that were measured to gauge the State’s interest in UNSC and, hence, global trust is provided in Appendix D.

The data collected was budget-sanctioned for peacekeeping operations, the number of volunteers to the missions, budget allocation, countries participating, and the number of personnel from 2014-2024.

To measure GTI, responses to the survey were given a weight of 70% and data for peacekeeping operations for 30%. This is because public opinion is a key consideration for measuring the global trust of the UNSC.

• P5 alignment shifts

P5 is given immense responsibility because it was believed that collectively, they could make decisions for the world’s welfare and maintain international peace and security. In other words, they are supposed to work together. If we can measure P5 alignments in handling UNSC proceedings, it displays that the purpose of establishing the UNSC and giving veto power to P5 is being met. The P5 alignment factor was formulated to measure the alignment among P5 members.

 

Various statistics were collected to analyze and measure the P5 alignment factor. For each veto, several States that supported the proposed draft resolutions were gathered. In addition, the abstain pattern was also recorded for each veto. These statistics resulted in a trend.

 

The analysis showed a frequency of vetoes reflecting growing tensions or alliances among P5 members. For instance, on all occasions of veto done by Russia, China either vetoed with Russia or abstained.

Agenda	No of times veto done by China	No of times veto done by Russia
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela	1 (together with Russia)	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	1	China abstained
Mali	0	1	China abstained
Syria	7 (together with Russia)	15	China abstained in 8
Yemen	0	1	China abstained
Middle East, including the Palestinian Question	2 (together with Russia)	2
Maintenance of international peace and security in Ukraine	0	5	China abstained
Non-proliferation – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea	1 (together with Russia)	3	China abstained in 2
Admission of new members	0	0

Table 4-Pattern of Russia and China vetoed together or supported each other.

In addition, there was no occasion when any P5 other than China and Russia vetoed together. It also demonstrated that China and Russia had made an alliance to make collective decisions on any matter.

Similarly, by analyzing the table in Appendix E, it can be observed that for most instances, when the resolution was proposed by France, the US, and the UK, China and Russia either vetoed them or abstained. Further analysis is provided in the next chapter.

1. Humanitarian Impact

To measure the humanitarian impact of the decision of P5, we need to measure the accountability of P5 and understand the real-world effects of international policymaking. The indicators chosen for this impact included civilian displacement from 2014 to 2024 for all critical ongoing conflicts and conflicts that started during these timelines. This is known as Internally Displaced People.

Data was taken from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), and the indicator chosen was internal displacement. IDMC is the world’s leading data source for the analysis of internal displacement. As per the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, the definition of internally displaced persons is as follows:

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are “Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border” (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998).

There was a provision on IDP calculators to choose the reason for migration. For all statistics provided in Appendix F, data is the number of internally displaced people because of conflict only.  This displacement directly relates to vetoes as refugee flows and IDPs from regions are affected by vetoes for each conflict.

1. Trends in Regional Power Balances

In recent years, there has been a trend of alliance formation in the form of regional or subregional organizations. Regional organizations can act more swiftly and avoid geopolitical deadlocks. Many regions seek to reduce dependence on external powers, promoting localized solutions to conflicts and governance challenges. In addition, there has been significant growth in the economy and power of several States other than those with global power after World War II. As global power becomes more distributed, regions want to assert themselves as influential blocs in a multipolar world. Another critical factor is that regional organizations are often better equipped to address conflicts and challenges due to shared cultural, historical, and political contexts and faster mobilization and intervention. Lastly, conflicts or issues in one State affect the region specifically. Therefore, regional organizations are more interested due to personal involvement.

To measure regional power balances, I measured growth in regional and interregional organizations or alliances in the last decades to address conflicts outside the UNSC framework. These organizations often leverage regional expertise, proximity, and shared cultural or political contexts to resolve or mitigate conflicts.

The list of organizations and associated data are provided in Appendix G.

 

1. Legal and Ethical Consequences

To measure the legal consequences of veto by P5, an indicator, ICJ proceedings due to P5 Veto, was formulated. I compiled several cases brought to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) citing UNSC inaction due to vetoes. Articles 92 to 96 of UN Charter Chapter XIV: The International Court of Justice (ICJ) added relevant clauses related to ICJ. As per UN Charter Article 94, each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.

After searching for cases on the ICJ website using the keywords UNSC and veto, I found 393 cases as of 30 November 2024. I chose the starting date of 1 January 2014 to shortlist them, which resulted in 113 results. All of these results were analyzed, and it was observed that most were focused on two topics: Russia vs Ukraine and Israel vs Palestine. Both cases have been heard several times in ICJ, and various documents were issued in the form of applications, advice, press statements, written proceedings, reports, judgments, orders, summaries, oral proceedings, etc. All of them reflected on the veto as a misuse of power. The summary of cases is compiled in Appendix H.

 

• Ignorance of Common Voice

Another important factor in measuring the impact of the P5 veto is to understand the criticality of the proposed draft conclusion. For this, the Draft Resolutions’ criticality factor was formulated and calculated.

Proposed resolutions are critically important in the United Nations because they reflect member states’ priorities, concerns, and aspirations and serve as key tools for decision-making and international governance. Proposed resolutions highlight pressing global challenges and provide a mechanism for member states to bring their specific concerns and priorities to the global stage. Proposed Resolutions also reflect the collective will of the international community. Resolutions, especially those adopted unanimously or by large majorities, carry significant moral and political weight.

The resolution process underscores the value of collective decision-making and multilateral solutions to global challenges. The ability to propose, debate, and adopt resolutions showcases the UN’s role as a central platform for global governance. Proposed resolutions are central to the UN’s mission of maintaining international peace and security, promoting development, and upholding human rights. They are the backbone of its legislative, normative, and operational functions. To measure the Draft Resolution’s criticality factor, data was collected for a detailed analysis of each veto, and another column was added to record the number of states that proposed a draft resolution.

5.3. Conclusion 

Various data were collected to formulate and measure the long-term consequences of the veto power of P5 and if the world is turning towards multipolar. All eight indicators were analyzed further in the chapter under research findings to conclude the thesis and provide recommendations.

6. Overall Conclusions and Recommendations

6.1. Introduction

This chapter comprised the analysis of indicators measured in the last chapter, a summary of research findings, and the concluding highlights of the study’s summary of the significant deductions. After that, it outlined the recommendations before suggesting areas that require further studies.

6.2. Research Findings

The research found that one or more P5 had a total of 47 vetoes from 2014 to 2024. Out of 47, 29 vetoes were done by Russia alone, which is 62% of total vetoes. In addition, 11 vetoes were made by China, and seven were made by the USA.

Agenda	No of Vetoes done by
	China	France	Russia	UK	US
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela	1	0	1	0	0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	0	1	0	0
Mali	0	0	1	0	0
Syria	7	0	15	0	0
Yemen	0	0	1	0	0
Middle East, including the Palestinian Question	2	0	2	0	6
Maintenance of international peace and security in Ukraine	0	0	5	0	0
Non-proliferation – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea	1	0	3	0	0
Admission of new members	0	0	0	0	1

Table 5-Breakdown of Vetoes done by P5

The first indicator, the veto rate, is more than 60% for the Palestine and Ukraine cases, and for the Syria case, it is 34%. Notably, for all three cases, vetoes are continuously made by a specific P5 member: for Syria and Ukraine by Russia and Palestine-Israel by the US. It is evident that as time progressed, the escalation of wars created a more severe humanitarian impact and instability in the world. However, it does not change the position of P5 States.

 

The second indicator, the Conflict Resolution Rate, was zero for 2014-2024, which indicates the UNSC’s inability to shoulder its responsibilities and meet UN Charter requirements.

Based on the analysis of responses to the survey presented in chapter eight, global trust in the UNSC is terrible. Therefore, the Global Trust Index, the third indicator, is at a minimum level. Based on statistics provided in Appendix D, there has been consistent support of Member States to UNSC for peacekeeping operations in terms of manpower and finance. It shows that Member States still keep their faith in peacekeeping operations and its impact. Therefore, based on these statistics, GTI is high.

For the fourth indicator, the P5 alignment factor, there has been a significant P5 alignment shift based on the data analysis provided in Appendix E. Russia and China seem to be in the same alliance each time by joining, vetoing, or abstaining from the voting procedure. Out of 11 vetoes done by China, all 11 are done with Russia. Out of 29 vetoes done by Russia, 11 were done with China, and China remained abstained in the remaining 18 instances. Similarly, Russia has vetoed all draft resolutions proposed by France, the UK, and/or the US. Clearly, P5 of the council has divided itself into two evident groups.

Ongoing conflicts have had significant impacts on human lives. Based on statistics provided in Appendix F, it is evident that internally displaced people have been forced to migrate because of conflicts in the last 11 years. In the last few years, these figures have worsened when conflicts escalated, and it did not affect P5 to change their position. It measures our fifth indicator, Internally Displaced People.

Based on statistics provided in Appendix G, although no new regional organization was formed in 2014-2024, a significant number of States have joined existing regional organizations. The highest membership gained for this period was for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. The expansion of membership in SCO has been explained as follows:

the inclusion of these major regional powers reflects a deliberate effort to create a more robust alliance capable of challenging Western dominance in global affairs.

The SCO Secretary-General recently said the organization has received membership applications from countries beyond the region, including from the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia, although did not specify which. This interest from the Global South demonstrates the growing appeal of the “SCO family” and signals the organization’s future expansion in multiple directions .

Similarly, many experts have explained that the expansion of BRICS membership is due to the ineffectiveness of global forums.

But many Global South countries also believe the current order disadvantages their interests and privileges wealthy Western countries’. They saw inequities in the COVID response, and believed rich countries hoarded lifesaving vaccines. Global South countries have also accused the U.S. of hypocrisy over its positions on the wars in Ukraine and Gaza and suggest that the West only applies international law and norms when it suites their interests, rendering the need for what they perceive as a more fair international order.

Therefore, the sixth indicator, Regional Power Influence, was measured with these collected statistics.

 

The seventh indicator, ICJ proceedings due to P5 Veto, was used to measure legal and ethical consequences. It was measured using statistics collected from the ICJ website. A number of applications and cases filed with ICJ indicate that the world is not happy with the decisions of the UNSC, which have been ineffective mainly due to vetoes done by P5.

Lastly, a detailed analysis of each resolution was done to measure the eighth indicator, the Draft Resolutions criticality factor. It was found that from 2014 to 2024, 38 draft resolutions were proposed, which needed to be adopted but could not due to P5 vetoes. Two draft resolutions were supported by 10-20 States, one by 26 States, four by 40-50 States, one by 60-70 States, two by 80-90 States, and two by 100+ States. When a resolution is proposed by 100+ states, it is shown that the UN General Assembly has made unanimous decisions. When such resolutions are not adopted due to veto by one P5 member, it clearly indicates that the UNSC is not working for global peace and security but for self-interest.  To measure the draft resolution criticality index, the number of draft resolutions with the support of more than ten member states was divided by the total number of draft resolutions proposed.

All the abovementioned indicators were analyzed using reference data collected, and a range was allocated to them to measure their ideal and worst value. The value of indicators and their weightage to measure the overall index is as follows:

SN	Indicators	Value-based on Analysis	Weightage	Score	Score range
1	Veto Rate (VR)	55% for three active conflicts	20%	+1	0% = 0 (best outcomes) 50-80%= +1 100%= +2
2	Conflicts Resolution Rate	0%	10%	+2	100% = 0 (best outcomes) 50-80%= +1 0%= +2
3	Global Trust Index (GTI)	1.7 (70% weightage to survey and 30% to peacekeeping operation data)	20%	1.7   +1 (Based on peacekeeping operation data) +2 based on survey outcomes	>80% trust = 0 (best outcomes) 50-80%= +1 <50%= +2
4	P5 Alignment factor	Poor	10%	+2	100%= Strong alignment= 0 (best outcomes) weak= +1 Poor= +2
5	Internally Displaced People	Significantly high	10%	+2	low= 0 (best outcomes) High= +1 Significantly high= +2
6	Regional Power Influence	High	10%	+1	low= 0 (best outcomes) High= +1 Significantly high= +2
7	ICJ proceedings due to P5 Veto	100+	10%	+2	0= 0 (best outcomes) <50= High= +1 >50= Significantly high= +2
8	Draft Resolutions criticality factor	32%	10%	+1	0= 0 (best outcomes) <50%= High= +1 >50%= Significantly high= +2

Table 6-Summary of Key Indicators

All eight indicators were used to measure overall impact by measuring the Global Governance and Regional Power Shift Index (GGRPSI). The Index Range is 0 (means no impact) to +2 (complete shift to a multipolar global order driven by veto use consequences).

The Global Governance and Regional Power Shift Index (GGRPSI) is a composite indicator designed to measure the long-term consequences of the use of veto power by the UNSC P5 on global governance structures and the evolution of a multipolar global order.

GGRPSI= ∑W_{i  *} I_I          0 (no impact) ≤GGRPSI≤ 2 (complete shift to a multipolar global order driven by veto use consequences).

W_i = Weightage of each Indicator

I_I = Indicator

High Score (2): Indicates significant long-term consequences of UNSC vetoes, including reduced UN legitimacy and greater multipolarity.

Low Score (0): Suggests minimal impact of veto use on global governance structures and power dynamics.

After keeping all indicator values and associated weightage, the computed value of GGRPSI was 1.54, which means that the long-term consequences of UNSC vetoes are near the maximum value.

6.3. Conclusions 

The absence of restrictions on veto use by P5 members has led to frequent deadlocks in the Security Council. This has undermined the Council’s ability to address international peace and security effectively, mainly when one of the P5 is a party to the conflict or indirectly involved in the conflict. Efforts to reform this practice face significant obstacles due to the P5’s self-interest in preserving their privileges. Nonetheless, such practices have hampered the prestige of other UN organizations.

This dissertation has satisfied the aims and objectives specified in the first chapter. The introduction chapter set five research questions. Chapters five to seven provided the necessary information to answer five research questions. Chapter Eight provided an analysis of the survey. The complex indicator defined in chapter nine, Governance and Regional Power Shift Index, used eight indicators to measure the long-term consequences of veto power. The analysis of the long-term consequences of the UNSC P5 use of veto power reveals significant implications for the evolution of global governance and the emergence of a post-World War II multipolar order.

 

This study highlighted how the strategic deployment of veto power while serving the short-term national interests of the P5 has contributed to a systemic erosion of the UN’s legitimacy, impaired regional and global power imbalances, and catalyzed the proliferation of alternative governance mechanisms.

Four critical effects have been observed by these analyses:

i) Erosion of Trust in Multilateralism

The repeated use of veto power to block critical resolutions on conflicts, humanitarian crises, and global security challenges has diminished the UNSC’s expected neutrality and effectiveness. This erosion has weakened the institution’s ability to act as a trusted global arbitrator.

ii) Proliferation of Regional Alternatives

In response to UNSC inaction, regional organizations and coalitions, such as BRICS, the SCO, and AU, have gained prominence. These entities have assumed roles traditionally dominated by the UN, signaling a shift toward decentralized and regionally focused governance.

iii) Acceleration of Multipolarity

The inability of the UNSC to effectively address major global crises, often due to veto-induced deadlocks, has prompted the rise of new power centers. Emerging economies, regional alliances, and non-state actors are increasingly shaping international norms, challenging the dominance of the P5, and fostering a multipolar world order.

iv) Impact on Conflict Resolution and Global Stability

The use of veto power has often paralyzed the UNSC’s decision-making, leaving critical conflicts unresolved. This gap has led to greater reliance on unilateral or coalition-led interventions, which lacked global consensus and aggravated instability.

To conclude, while the dominance of the P5 is still maintained, it has also inadvertently fostered a more fragmented and multipolar world. The world was relying on P5 to make critical decisions on their behalf. However, the continuous use of vetoes to preserve self-interest has affected the world’s trust. Even smaller countries can perceive these changes. However, the good news is that some trust in the UNSC still remains in the world, which can help recoup lost trust.

This thesis concluded that as the international community navigates this evolving landscape, the balance between maintaining global stability and embracing multipolarity will define the future of international relations. This thesis contributed to the discourse by offering a comprehensive understanding of the long-term dynamics at play, providing a foundation for future research and policy innovation in global governance.

6.4. Recommendations

Based on the findings of this thesis, here are key recommendations aimed at addressing the long-term consequences of veto power use by the P5 and guiding the transition toward a more inclusive, effective, and multipolar global order:

1. We should prohibit the use of the veto power of P5 for critical cases, such as cases involving mass atrocities, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
2. Instead of giving a veto to each P5 member, it should be converted into the majority. That is, a minimum of 50% of P5 should veto the proposed resolution.
3. Membership in the UNSC should cover major geographical regions of the world.
4. P5 status can be rotational so that other powerful countries can get the position and take responsibility for understanding the role and associated challenges. A list of criteria for participating in P5 elections should be developed. These criteria may be based on economy, power, and demography, along with contributions to the world, such as funding or contributing to humanitarian welfare and the United Nations.
5. Clear guidelines about common voice must be incorporated into UNSC Proceedings. If more than 80% of members of the UN General Assembly agree to some action, there is no right with a specific State to ignore a common voice, irrespective of how powerful the State is.
6. There is a strong need to create a list of criteria that can be used to veto any draft resolution. Each P5 must submit its rationale to the veto decision, and it should be able to meet at least one criterion for veto.
7. As many States are gaining more interest in regional organizations, it is vital that the UNSC closely collaborates with them in their decision-making.
8. ICJ needs to be strengthened in reviewing and providing advisory opinions on UNSC deadlocks caused by vetoes.
9. Last but not least, there is a need to promote academic research, workshops, and conferences on UNSC reform and multipolarity to foster informed global discourse.

6.5. Future Research Scope

Further studies are needed to focus on particular aspects of various characteristics mentioned in this thesis. Evidently, at least three P5, China, Russia, and the US, have used frequent vetoes in the last decade, and they will never agree to leave this power. France and the UK have not used veto power in the last 10 years and supported UNSC reforms. Therefore, an agreement to leave veto by all P5 is not possible. It is necessary to study what additional measures can be taken while keeping the power of P5 to prevent P5 from misusing its power. Additional research in this direction will be useful.

In multilateralism, consensus by all mechanisms is impossible. Therefore, veto power must be maintained. It will prevent the time and resources of the UNSC, as most members will utilize offline discussion and lobbying to get a consensus in advance. How the membership of veto members should be finalized and what minimum criteria they should fulfill requires additional research.

The research can explore how the ICJ can support the UNSC mechanism efficiently and supersede the decisions of the UNSC.

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