Soft Power Diplomacy and Sustainable Agriculture: An Interdisciplinary Framework for Evaluating Taiwan’s Contribution to Achieving SDG-2 (Zero Hunger) in St. Vincent and the Grenadines

ABSTRACT

1. Introduction

Achieving Sustainable Development Goal (SDG)  2 (Zero Hunger) is a pressing challenge, particularly for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) like St. Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG), where climate change, limited agricultural resources, and economic constraints often undermine food security.[1] Located in the Caribbean with a population of approximately 100,647, SVG’s agricultural sector is central to its economy and food supply. However, it is vulnerable to climate-induced events and external economic pressures.[2] Within the last 4 years, the island has experienced the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the La Soufrière volcanic eruption in April 2021, hurricane Elsa in December 2021,[3] and hurricane Beryl, a category four hurricane in July 2024.[4]

According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), Latin America and the Caribbean exhibited higher food insecurity levels than the global average. Approximately 40.6% of the region’s population experienced moderate or severe food insecurity, surpassing the world average of 29.3%. Severe food insecurity was particularly prevalent, affecting 14.2% of the population in the region, compared to 11.7% globally. Over recent years, moderate or severe food insecurity has increased significantly globally and regionally.[5]

Consequently, approximately one-third of the population of St. Vincent and the Grenadines experiences moderate to severe food insecurity.[6] Furthermore, FAO further noted that Latin America and the Caribbean are not on track to meet Sustainable Development Goal 2 and World Health Assembly (WHA) targets for hunger, food insecurity, and malnutrition, with current levels still surpassing global estimates and pre-pandemic figures.[7] Addressing these issues requires external partnerships and diplomatic engagements to provide resources, expertise, and support for resilience-building in developing nations like SVG.[8]

Taiwan has emerged as a key partner for SVG through its soft power diplomacy, offering substantial agricultural assistance to enhance food security, agricultural productivity, and climate resilience.[9] Both countries established diplomatic relations on August 15, 1981.[10] As defined by Joseph Nye, soft power involves influencing others through attraction and appeal rather than coercion, which Taiwan uses strategically to foster alliances in regions with limited formal diplomatic recognition.[11] Taiwan’s agricultural assistance aligns with this approach, enhancing the country’s international standing and promoting sustainable development in recipient nations like SVG.

Moreover, Taiwan’s assistance to SVG is rooted in initiatives that improve food production, climate resilience, and rural development.[12] For example, Taiwan’s technical missions in SVG focus on introducing climate-smart technologies, such as greenhouse cultivation and improved irrigation systems, essential for adapting to climate variability and conserving resources. Such programs contribute directly to SVG’s efforts to enhance food security and build a sustainable agricultural sector that can withstand climate pressures.[13]

In terms of food security, the achievement of SDG 2 in SVG requires a multi-faceted approach. The goal of Zero Hunger is not simply about increasing food production; it also involves improving food distribution systems, ensuring access to nutritious food for all, and addressing the underlying causes of food insecurity, such as poverty and inequality.[14]  Taiwan’s agricultural assistance, while valuable, is only one part of this larger puzzle. To fully understand the role of soft power diplomacy in achieving SDG 2, it is necessary to examine the immediate impacts of Taiwan’s agricultural programs and their long-term sustainability and alignment with SVG’s broader development goals.[15]

The Zero Hunger Trust Fund initiative in St. Vincent and the Grenadines aims to eradicate hunger by 2030, reflecting the government’s commitment to poverty alleviation and improved nutrition.[16]  Moreover, the rural and banana-farming population was identified as particularly vulnerable, necessitating targeted poverty reduction strategies. Socio-demographic factors, including large household sizes and a predominance of female-headed, single-parent families, further compound this vulnerability.[17] The Fund, supported by an Act of Parliament, will leverage a 2% levy on mobile calls to generate approximately $2.7 million annually, focusing on data-driven, targeted interventions to ensure that no Vincentian goes to bed hungry.[18]

The diplomatic significance of Taiwan’s assistance goes beyond mere development aid; it represents a strategic engagement to secure partnerships and reinforce its international influence. Given its unique political status and competition with China,[19] Taiwan’s soft power approach in SVG exemplifies a model of international cooperation where development assistance fosters local growth and diplomatic goodwill.[20] Moreover, this aligns with constructivist theories in international relations, which highlight the importance of shared norms and mutual perceptions in shaping diplomatic ties.[21]

2.       Literature Review

2.1.     Taiwan’s Soft Power Diplomacy in Developing Countries

Taiwan’s soft power efforts in regions such as Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean highlight how its development assistance programs enhance bilateral relations and strengthen its international presence. Taiwan’s agricultural and technical assistance projects are key in solidifying diplomatic alliances with countries that may not otherwise recognize Taiwan diplomatically. Through targeted aid initiatives, Taiwan contributes to these regions’ economic and social development and fosters long-term partnerships based on mutual benefit.[22]

Moreover, Taiwan’s contributions are particularly significant in countries like St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Vincent & the Grenadines, where it is recognized as one of the most consistent and substantial aid donors. Through these efforts, Taiwan strengthens agricultural resilience in these nations and promotes long-term development by addressing challenges like food security and climate-related impacts on agriculture. Taiwan’s targeted agricultural aid has thus become a cornerstone of its diplomatic relations with Latin America.[23]

Additionally, Li noted that Taiwan has prioritized strengthening its relations with Central America and the Caribbean through bilateral cooperation in economics, agriculture, fisheries, culture, and technical assistance. This commitment is part of Taiwan’s long-standing tradition of providing development aid to other countries. Taiwan has dispatched several technical missions to Central and South American countries, where it maintains diplomatic ties, further reinforcing its support and engagement in the region.[24]

However, Taiwan’s soft power has strategic limitations, as its developmental assistance is sometimes overshadowed by China’s larger economic and infrastructural projects in the same regions.[25] Furthermore, Taiwan’s approach to diplomacy is deeply influenced by its complex relationship with China and its precarious international status. Unlike China, which utilizes soft power for domestic consolidation and international outreach, Taiwan employs public diplomacy as a tool for global engagement and a vital means of ensuring diplomatic survival.[26]

2.2.    Comparative Geopolitics: Taiwan vs. China in Development Assistance

Taiwan and China have made significant efforts to engage with the Caribbean region, albeit with differing strategies and outcomes. While China’s economic influence in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has grown substantially in the region in recent years, Taiwan’s engagement is often framed within the context of soft power diplomacy and development aid, focusing on maintaining diplomatic relations with countries that recognize it.[27]

Since 2000, the Taiwanese government has sought to counter Chinese efforts to poach its remaining allies by expanding and diversifying interactions with Central American and Caribbean nations. A key strategy has been frequent, high-profile official visits by Taiwan’s president and vice president and a steady flow of Central American and Caribbean leaders to Taipei. Taiwan has also actively pursued bilateral free-trade agreements with Paraguay and countries in the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA).[28]

According to Alexander, Taiwan and China’s competition for international allies, particularly in the Caribbean and Latin America, involves a range of diplomatic tools, including military and educational diplomacy, financial aid, and, at times, state bribery. He further noted that Taiwan’s investment in international development assistance is a strategic element of its broader ideological rivalry with China, with fluctuations in aid efforts often reflecting shifts in cross-strait relations. As tensions rise, Taiwan has increased its aid and development projects, particularly in countries with diplomatic recognition, to strengthen alliances and promote its values.[29]

Harold et al. noted that investments in infrastructure, trade, and development aid primarily drive China’s strategy in the Caribbean. China’s presence in the region has been bolstered by high-profile visits from senior leaders like Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, which reflect its growing diplomatic and economic interest. Notably, China has invested heavily in infrastructure projects, such as constructing a US$720 million north-south highway in Jamaica and port developments in the Bahamas, including a casino and luxury hotel complex.[30] These investments are part of China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to strengthen global trade networks and increase worldwide influence.[31]

Furthermore, the China-Pacific Islands Economic Development and Cooperation Forum, established in April 2006, facilitated significant Chinese aid, particularly concessional loans with a 2–3% interest rate and 15–20-year repayment terms, including a grace period. In 2006 and 2013, China pledged two concessional loans totaling US$474 million and US$1 billion, respectively. As a result, China became a major donor in the Pacific, ranking third in 2016 and fourth in 2017 by aid disbursements.[32]

According to Wallis, critics of China’s ‘checkbook diplomacy’ argue that much of its aid, including concessional loans and unconditional grants, is intended to gain political influence. Moreover, while China claims a ‘no strings attached’ approach, underlying interests exist, including competition with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition; this has contributed to corruption and political instability, as seen in the 2006 riots in the Solomon Islands and Tonga, fueled by resentment toward Chinese and Taiwanese influence on local politics.[33]

Li noted that diplomatic ties remain vulnerable despite Taiwan being the largest aid donor to some Caribbean nations, including St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Taiwan’s membership in the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) and agreements with institutions like the IDB have strengthened its influence. However, relations can break down when Taiwan cannot meet specific demands, as seen with Dominica’s $58 million aid request in 2004. After Taiwan’s refusal, Dominica shifted its allegiance to China, which offered over $100 million in aid.[34]

Moreover, Taiwan’s diplomatic relations with some states are largely sustained through its provision of development aid, a key tool for maintaining recognition. However, this strategy may contribute to Taiwan’s further diplomatic isolation over time despite not significantly affecting its economic strength, particularly in the tech sector.[35]

2.3.    Taiwan International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF)

The Taiwan International Cooperation and Development Fund (TaiwanICDF) play a key role in advancing socio-economic development, human resource capacity, and international partnerships through lending, technical cooperation, humanitarian aid, and education initiatives. Its projects are carefully aligned with the strategic development goals of partner countries and are implemented through structured agreements and rigorous project cycles.[36]

According to Alexander, the Taiwan ICDF is a development agency and a strategic tool for Taiwan’s political communication and international engagement. While it focuses on capacity building and aligning with universal values, its operations aim to strengthen ties with foreign elites and enhance Taiwan’s global visibility. Rather than purely philanthropic, ICDF reflects Taiwan’s broader efforts to consolidate political, economic, and social capital in the face of limited formal recognition.[37]

Moreover, Taiwan ICDF’s vision emphasizes partnerships for progress and sustainable development, with core objectives focused on improving rural livelihoods, enhancing industrial competitiveness, and promoting environmental sustainability. Furthermore, Taiwan ICDF actively strengthens global cooperation while advancing social and economic development in partner countries.[38]

Additionally, Erikson and Chen noted that financial assistance in the form of development aid remains vital for maintaining Taiwan’s diplomatic relationships. Moreover, they highlighted that a significant portion of Taiwan’s official aid budget is channeled through the International Cooperation and Development Fund, the primary vehicle for delivering its development cooperation and soft power initiatives.[39]

2.4.    Foreign Aid and Agricultural Resilience in SIDS

In Small Island Developing States (SIDS), agriculture is increasingly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, including extreme weather events that threaten crop productivity and food security. In this context, foreign aid, particularly in the form of agricultural assistance, plays a pivotal role in strengthening agricultural resilience.[40]

Furthermore, food systems in Small Island Developing States are highly complex and especially vulnerable to external pressures such as environmental degradation and global market volatility. These conditions have introduced significant challenges to food security and sovereignty, as SIDS increasingly rely on imports while facing shifting consumption patterns and a changing climate.[41]

Trentinaglia, Baldi, and Peri emphasize the importance of distinguishing between adaptation and mitigation aid, noting that such targeted interventions significantly enhance agricultural productivity. They argue that this distinction is especially relevant in countries highly vulnerable to climate change, where foreign aid offers immediate relief and contributes to long-term sustainability.[42]

Moreover, ensuring food security in SIDS requires a focus on strengthening resilient local food systems. Despite efforts by civil society and private enterprises, domestic agriculture in many SIDS remains marginalized due to insufficient funding, outdated practices, and over-reliance on external markets.[43]

Additionally, Foreign aid, such as Taiwan’s technical assistance through the Taiwan Technical Mission (TTM) in the Marshall Islands, is crucial in supporting sustainable agricultural development in vulnerable states. Beyond financial transfers, this aid strengthens local capacity by introducing appropriate crops and livestock, training farmers, and promoting long-term food security and resilience.[44]

Consequently, the United Nations climate system has become the leading international platform through which Small Island Developing States address climate issues. Due to internal vulnerabilities and exposure to external shocks, local efforts in SIDS often require international aid and support to succeed. As such, a stronger international action plan is needed.[45]

2.5.    Climate Challenges in Sustainable Agricultural Development in SIDS

SIDS face several key challenges, including limited land resources, lack of access to global markets, and vulnerability to external economic and environmental shocks.[46] Furthermore, SIDS are already grappling with the adverse effects of climate change, such as rising temperatures, sea-level rise, altered precipitation patterns, and more intense tropical storms.[47]

Events like Hurricane Matthew in the Caribbean (2016) and Tropical Cyclones Pam (2015) and Winston (2016) in the Pacific highlight the vulnerability of these nations. As climate change accelerates, the need for effective, sustainable adaptation strategies for SIDS becomes more urgent. [48] Addressing these challenges is central to enhancing agricultural resilience, a key focus of Taiwan’s role in supporting St. Vincent and the Grenadines’ agricultural development amid these climate threats.[49]

Moreover, disasters pose significant direct and indirect threats to smallholder farmers’ livelihoods and food security, often resulting in widespread agricultural production disruptions and disruptions to essential services. During 2015–2016, El Niño-related droughts and floods severely impacted over 60 million people. Such events’ increasing frequency and intensity push many poor farmers toward low-risk, low-return agricultural practices, ultimately limiting future productivity and deepening food insecurity.[50]

Additionally, climate change impacts food systems unevenly, disproportionately affecting vulnerable social groups due to existing social inequities related to factors such as gender, indigeneity, class, and age. Moreover, these groups often face reduced adaptive capacity and are at greater risk of disruptions to food access, affordability, and nutritional adequacy disruptions, particularly in regions like the tropics and subtropics, where climate-induced shifts in marine species threaten dietary staples.[51]

3. Methodology

Data for this paper were drawn from both secondary sources and structured questionnaires administered to key stakeholders. Documents included official reports, policy documents, and publications from the Government of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Taiwan’s International Cooperation and Development Fund, and international agencies such as the FAO, United Nations (UN) and Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA). These documents provided contextual and normative evidence and helped triangulate the field findings.

Primary data collection targeted two groups. The first consisted of 27 experts purposively selected for their specialist knowledge of agricultural development, food security, and international cooperation. These participants included senior officials and policymakers from the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, the Zero Hunger Trust Fund, IICA, and relevant NGOs. Their inclusion was based on their direct involvement in or oversight of Taiwan-supported agricultural initiatives. The second group was comprised of 103 farmers drawn from different agricultural regions through stratified random sampling. Stratification was based on geographic location and participation in Taiwan-funded programs, ensuring that diverse farming communities were represented.

Structured questionnaires were designed separately for experts and farmers. The expert questionnaire, distributed electronically via SurveyMonkey, focused on policy frameworks, diplomatic strategies, and institutional perspectives on Taiwan’s agricultural assistance. The farmer questionnaire, administered in person by trained assistants, captured first-hand experiences of Taiwan’s agricultural programs, including training, adoption of introduced techniques, and perceived outcomes related to food security, productivity, and climate preparedness.

Quantitative data analysis combined descriptive and inferential techniques. Expert responses were analyzed primarily through descriptive statistics to summarize institutional perspectives. Farmer data, by contrast, were subjected to a range of inferential tests appropriate to the measurement of variables, including ordinal logistic regression for food security and productivity outcomes, binary logistic regression for climate preparedness, and a Chi-square tests of independence for examining perceptions of bilateral collaboration. These methods allowed the study to assess the predictive and associative relationships between program participation, adoption of techniques, knowledge sharing, and perceived agricultural outcomes. This approach provided a robust foundation for evaluating Taiwan’s soft power diplomacy in advancing food security and agricultural resilience in St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

4. Findings and Discussion

This paper examines the impact of Taiwan-supported agricultural programs in St. Vincent and the Grenadines across four key areas: household food security, agricultural productivity, climate preparedness, and support for continued bilateral collaboration. The analysis demonstrates how program participation, training, and adoption of introduced techniques influence farmers’ livelihoods while shaping broader perceptions of Taiwan’s role as a development partner. The following subsections present the results in detail, integrating statistical evidence with theoretical and policy insights.

4.1. Perceived Impact on Household Food Security

Farmers who participated more frequently in Taiwan-supported agricultural programs reported significantly greater improvements in household food security. The ordinal logistic regression model in Table 1 was statistically significant (χ² (9) = 43.310, p < .001), indicating a strong overall fit. Increased participation frequency substantially improved the odds of higher household food security (β = –1.707, p < .001). In addition, farm size (β = –1.301, p = .015) and access to disease control support (β = 1.715, p = .020) also emerged as significant predictors, suggesting that structural resources and program-specific interventions contribute to household food security outcomes.

These findings are consistent with farmers’ perceptions in Figures 1 and 2, respectively (see the PDF version): 66% reported improved food security at the household level, and 70% noted moderate to significant progress. Notably, the data indicate that these improvements are linked to receiving aid and farmers’ active participation in the program’s various components, including training sessions, new techniques, and sharing information with peers.

The farmers’ education data in Figure 3 (see the PDF version) reveal that 55% have at least a secondary education, supporting strong engagement with Taiwan’s agricultural programs. This likely contributed to the significant regression results. Moreover, education enhances farmers’ ability to effectively understand and apply new practices.[52] These findings suggest Taiwan’s interventions are well-matched to the local capacity, advancing SDG 2 outcomes.

Furthermore, this outcome aligns with sustainable agricultural development theory, which promotes enhancing food systems through increased productivity, resource efficiency, and knowledge transfer across farming communities.[53][54] Taiwan’s programs in SVG have addressed these pillars by equipping farmers with improved planting materials, guidance on pest control, and training in food production techniques suited to the island’s terrain and climate.[55]

The significance of engagement in the model also reflects Rogers’ Innovation Diffusion Theory, which emphasizes the role of knowledge, persuasion, and trial in driving adoption.[56] The program’s emphasis on interpersonal channels through workshops, extension visits, and demonstration plots facilitated the adoption process. Moreover, the fact that 75% of farmers shared the knowledge they gained highlights the community-driven dynamic of the intervention, supporting the Participatory Development Framework, which views local actors not as passive recipients but as partners in innovation.[57]

Alexander observed that Taiwan’s agricultural and technical assistance programs in Latin America and the Caribbean have become instrumental in solidifying diplomatic alliances by addressing critical development needs. He noted that these initiatives foster long-term partnerships when structured around mutual benefit and tailored to the socio-economic context of smallholder farming systems.[58] In countries such as St. Vincent and the Grenadines, such programs have contributed to agricultural productivity and broader food security objectives, thereby reinforcing Taiwan’s role as a credible and development-oriented partner in the region.

Additionally, the evidence supports Taiwan’s broader soft power diplomacy, wherein agricultural assistance fosters mutual development and strengthens diplomatic relationships.[59] By helping smallholder farmers reduce food insecurity through sustainable and collaborative practices, Taiwan addresses urgent development needs and enhances its image as a responsive and community-oriented development partner. This grassroots success reflects Taiwan’s evolving soft power model, which balances development credibility with strategic visibility.

4.2. Engagement and Technique Adoption Impact on Agricultural Productivity

Productivity outcomes also showed a strong association with engagement in Taiwan-supported programs. The ordinal logistic regression model in Table 2 was statistically significant (χ² (10) = 126.073, p < .001), indicating that greater participation frequency substantially improved the odds of reporting productivity gains (β = –3.029, p < .001). Additional significant predictors included equipment support (β = –2.269, p = .003) and disease control assistance (β = 2.073, p < .001), highlighting the combined influence of both program intensity and targeted technical inputs.

Similarly, the adoption of Taiwan-introduced techniques emerged as a powerful predictor of productivity improvement. The corresponding ordinal logistic regression model in Table 3 was statistically significant (χ² (4) = 85.167, p < .001), with adoption significantly increasing the odds of higher reported productivity (β = –3.542, p < .001). Training participation (β = –1.072, p = .031) and farm size (β = –0.922, p = .015) also contributed significantly, indicating that capacity building and farm-level resources influence how farmers perceive productivity benefits.

Primary data collected reinforced these results, with 72% of farmers reporting productivity improvements and 65% adopting techniques introduced with Taiwan’s support. These increases are notable, given that 96% of respondents cultivate less than five acres, as shown in Figure 4 (see the PDF version), which highlights how Taiwan’s interventions are tailored to and effective for small-scale production systems, an essential consideration in SVG’s agricultural landscape.

Furthermore, this finding aligns strongly with Innovation Diffusion Theory, particularly that repeated, direct interaction with new ideas and tools, such as training sessions, field demonstrations, and extension support, enhances adoption and effectiveness.[60] Taiwan’s model facilitates this process by creating an enabling environment for behavioral change among farmers, consistent with Rogers’ stages of innovation uptake. The role of sustained engagement also highlights how iterative contact reinforces confidence, learning, and implementation, increasing the likelihood that new practices take root.

Beyond innovation diffusion, the findings reflect key principles of Sustainable Agricultural Development Theory, which emphasize yield improvements, ecological compatibility, and resilience.[61] Many of Taiwan’s contributions, including technical support for pest control, propagation of disease-free plant materials, and the support of crop diversification, advance these sustainability objectives while also strengthening on-farm productivity.

Moreover, the effectiveness of Taiwan’s assistance in boosting productivity strengthens the country’s image among farmers. In addition, it is vital to note that soft power is not only about values but also about credibility and development programs that generate visible results among grassroots populations to build long-term goodwill and legitimacy. From the results, Taiwan’s agricultural engagement in SVG serves this dual purpose: it promotes agricultural transformation while reinforcing bilateral relationships in a geopolitically competitive environment.

4.3. Climate Preparedness Training and Shared Knowledge

Climate preparedness emerged as a critical outcome of Taiwan-supported agricultural programs. The binary logistic regression model in Table 4 was statistically significant (Δχ² (5) = 47.731, p < .001), with moderate to strong explanatory power (Nagelkerke R² = 0.495). Training participation significantly increased the odds of farmers reporting that they felt prepared for climate-related agricultural challenges (β = 2.510, p = .002). Exposure to frequent climate risks also proved to be a significant predictor (β = 1.470, p < .001), underscoring the role of training and lived experience in shaping preparedness.

Awareness of climate risks and knowledge sharing among farmers also played an important role. The second binary logistic regression model in Table 5 (see the PDF version) was statistically significant (Δχ² (2) = 33.800, p < .001), with moderate explanatory power (Nagelkerke R² = 0.373). Both predictors were significant, with climate risk frequency (β = 0.650, p = 0.036) and knowledge sharing (β = 3.038, p < .001) strongly associated with higher levels of reported preparedness. These findings highlight the importance of information exchange and collective learning in building resilience to climate-induced agricultural challenges.

These results reflect what many farmers have already observed in practice. Half of the respondents reported feeling more prepared to handle climate risks after engaging with Taiwan’s programs, and 75% indicated that they had shared what they learned with others. While formal training sessions played an important role, the strength of peer networks, where farmers exchange ideas, strategies, and coping methods, emerged as a central driver of resilience. This mirrors the informal diffusion of innovation, where interpersonal relationships and peer interaction often do more to spread ideas than formal channels alone.[62]

Yet, while many farmers feel more knowledgeable, the data reveal structural vulnerabilities that limit real adaptation. Over half reported being constantly affected by climate-related events, and just 14% had access to irrigation, a gap that points to more than just a need for knowledge; it speaks to an absence of infrastructure. This disconnect between individual awareness and systemic readiness echoes concerns from expert perspectives. Figure 6 (see the PDF version) highlights that only 22% of experts viewed the programs as effective in building climate resilience, and several noted the lack of climate-specific strategies or investment in risk-reducing infrastructure.

The experience in SVG aligns with patterns identified across SIDS. Klöck and Nunn, and Trentinaglia et al. have shown that while awareness and soft interventions help, resilience in small island states requires targeted adaptation support.[63][64] While valuable, Taiwan’s current training and knowledge transfer focus has yet to address these deeper, more systemic vulnerabilities fully. Still, it’s worth recognizing that the pathway to resilience often begins with precisely what Taiwan’s model provides: accessible training, farmer engagement, and platforms for local knowledge exchange. The data collected also reveals that farmers are not just passive recipients of aid but active agents in shaping their responses to external threats.

5. Support for Continued Collaboration

Support for continued bilateral collaboration with Taiwan was strongly associated with farmers’ perceptions of the benefits of agricultural programs. The Chi-Square Tests of Independence in Table 6 (see the PDF version) indicated that all three predictors were statistically significant. Perceived community-wide benefit (χ² (1) = 18.949, p < .001), perceived personal benefit (χ² (1) = 9.199, p = .002), and trust in Taiwan’s role (χ² (1) = 11.651, p = .001) were each positively associated with farmers’ willingness to endorse ongoing collaboration. These results suggest that positive perceptions of Taiwan-supported initiatives at both the community and individual levels are critical drivers of diplomatic goodwill, reinforcing the role of agricultural assistance in sustaining long-term partnerships.

Additionally, Figure 7 (see the PDF version) shows that 91% of the farmers believed Taiwan’s agricultural programs benefited the wider community, while 99% expressed support for continued collaboration, as shown in Figure 8. This strong consensus suggests that farmers are not only evaluating personal benefits but are also considering how these programs uplift the collective agricultural sector.

This perspective was further reflected in Figure 9, where 75% of farmers who shared acquired knowledge with their peers, signaling a sense of communal responsibility and social diffusion of benefits.

Moreover, the willingness of farmers to support continued collaboration with Taiwan reflects more than a pragmatic calculation; it embodies the principles of the Participatory Development Framework. As Ward and El-Gack explain, participatory development emphasizes collective ownership, shared learning, and the inclusion of community stakeholders in shaping the interventions that affect their lives. When farmers witness tangible improvements in food availability, productivity, and peer training, they are more inclined to view external partnerships as legitimate, impactful, and worth sustaining.[65]^,[66]

This response also reflects the success of Taiwan’s public diplomacy. According to Cull[67]  and Nye[68], soft power is most effective when grounded in trust, mutual respect, and visible local benefits rather than coercion or conditionality. Taiwan’s agricultural assistance, characterized by training, farmer engagement, and context-specific solutions, aligns with these ideals. Rather than imposing rigid models, Taiwan’s approach embeds itself in the needs and capacities of local communities. As such, farmers are not merely recipients of aid but co-creators in a development partnership marked by mutual agency.

At the same time, this bottom-up validation offers an essential complement to traditional, state-centric diplomacy. While the empirical literature confirms that Taiwan’s agricultural engagement is partly a response to geopolitical pressure to maintain diplomatic recognition in the face of China’s competing presence,[69] this study highlights that long-term diplomatic credibility may ultimately rest on Taiwan’s ability to foster goodwill and trust at the grassroots level. In this regard, its success in SVG reflects a foreign policy win and a deeper model of development-oriented diplomacy rooted in community-level legitimacy.

6. Conclusion

This study demonstrates that Taiwan’s agricultural assistance has significantly contributed to household food security, productivity, and climate preparedness in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Frequent participation in training and program activities and access to technical support, such as equipment and disease control, substantially enhanced farmers’ food security and productivity outcomes. Adoption of Taiwan-introduced techniques further amplified these gains, highlighting the role of knowledge transfer and sustained engagement in strengthening smallholder agriculture.

Findings also show that training, awareness of climate risks, and peer-to-peer knowledge sharing were critical in shaping farmers’ perceptions of climate preparedness. While these interventions increased awareness and readiness at the individual level, structural vulnerabilities such as limited irrigation and weak climate-specific infrastructure constrain broader resilience.

Finally, positive perceptions of program benefits at individual and community levels were strongly linked to support for continued bilateral collaboration with Taiwan. This underscores how soft power diplomacy, grounded in tangible agricultural improvements, fosters development outcomes and enduring diplomatic goodwill. Together, these results reinforce the potential of agricultural assistance as a strategic tool for advancing SDG 2 while deepening diplomatic partnerships in climate-vulnerable small island states.

7. Implications for Intergovernmental Action

The findings carry important implications for intergovernmental action in small island developing states. Taiwan’s agricultural engagement in St. Vincent and the Grenadines demonstrates how technical cooperation can strengthen food security and climate preparedness when aligned with local priorities while reinforcing diplomatic partnerships. This underscores the value of embedding agricultural assistance within broader climate adaptation and sustainable development frameworks for regional and international actors.

At the multilateral level, organizations such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Organization of the Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), the FAO, and the United Nations system could leverage Taiwan’s technical expertise and locally tailored interventions as complementary inputs to existing programs targeting SDG 2. Integrating such bilateral efforts into regional strategies would help avoid duplication, expand scalability, and foster policy coherence across agriculture, food security, and climate resilience.

Furthermore, the strong link between perceived community benefits and support for ongoing collaboration highlights the importance of participatory approaches. Intergovernmental initiatives prioritizing farmer training, peer-to-peer knowledge sharing, and inclusive program design are more likely to build legitimacy and sustain local ownership. By adopting these principles, development partners can move beyond short-term interventions to support long-term resilience and trust at the community and diplomatic levels.

8. Conflict of Interest

The author states that there is no conflict of interest.

9. Acknowledgement

I gratefully acknowledge the support of Euclid University and all who contributed to the completion of the dissertation underlying this paper.

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