ABSTRACT

Although recent research has increasingly questioned the link between natural resources and international conflict, the quest for hydrocarbons is peculiarly significant in igniting conflicts. Since a conflict-ridden oil producer is highly dependent on such resources, its revenue is hardly spent on distributional policies and the security apparatus – with less impact on the producing communities and regions. As such, this paper examines the dynamics of natural resource-based international conflicts, by evaluating the role of natural resources in the Cameroon-Nigeria border conflict, with a particular focus on the Bakassi dispute. Since the neglect and subsequent discovery of hydrocarbon deposits in the Bakassi Peninsula subjected it to claims and counter-claims for sovereignty, military occupation, and recourse to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). With the ICJ having ruled in favor of Cameroon, after considering sound historical evidence, which sparked consternation and an implementation dilemma. Thus, a perusal of the archival materials and relevant documents revealed that the dispute was largely driven by the availability of natural resources like hydrocarbons and sea products in the peninsula. On this base, the paper posits that the exploration of hydrocarbon resources in the peninsula that will contribute to the economy of both States influenced the violent dimensions that the dispute took, even after the case was taken to the ICJ. However, the good faith of both protagonists under the auspices of the United Nations led to the Green-Tree Agreement and other instruments in resolving the dispute. Which led to the complete withdrawal of the Nigerian military, police, and administration from the peninsula. As such, putting aside the disruptive activities by some social movements, the entire process is viewed as a model for the peaceful resolution of border conflicts – despite the socio-economic implications of the implementation process. On this account, the findings of the paper illuminate that natural resources is a crucial factor in igniting conflicts. Thus, there is a need to use more integrative approaches in designing appropriate balances between all the stakeholders in conflict situations.

1. Introduction

In point of fact, territorial claims, ideology, colonialism, nationalism, religion, and natural resources have typically been the main sources of conflict throughout the world. However, while the influence of some of these is waning, the struggle for the control of valuable natural resources like hydrocarbons has remained a persistent feature of national and international affairs for decades. As such, in addition to helping some of the most corrupt and oppressive regimes to remain in power, the presence of natural resources has fuelled conflicts within and between African States. With such conflict situations often taking the form of territorial disputes over the possession of oil-laden border areas, factional struggles among the leaders of oil-rich countries, and major inter-state wars over the control of vital oil and mineral zones (Klare, 2004). That’s why although Africa was initially and largely controlled by the indigenous people in the 1870s – but by 1914, it became almost exclusively subjugated and divided into protectorates/colonies by the European powers (Rourke, 1997; Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor, 2006). As a result, the colonial boundaries of these new configurations were not established according to the various indigenous groupings. This led to a situation whereby the nations were grouped together in some cases but divided in others as long as it was consistent with the security and economic interests of the colonial powers. On this basis, with the advent of independence, most African States have become and are still troubled by the legacy of getting different indigenous groupings to live peacefully in a single State, or to get the same ethnic group to live peacefully in different neighboring States. For this reason, just as in most of Africa, the origins of the border conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria can be traced to the colonial era and some post-independence political activities. As the border between both territories extending from Lake Chad in the north to the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) in the south, has been a bone of contention dating back to 1913. A situation that eventually escalated with the discovery of huge deposits of hydrocarbon reserves in the waters surrounding the Bakassi Peninsula, thus, deteriorating the relationship between both States as of 1981. With these dynamics setting in motion a series of events that strained their relations – as the military of both States engaged in violent combat leading to the loss of lives and destruction of properties in the peninsula.

As a consequence, the violent conflict reached its climax in 1994, when the intensity of the battles led Nigeria to station 3000 troops in the peninsula – which led the Government of Cameroon (GoC) to file a suit before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), claiming sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula. While Nigeria in accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ also filed a counter-claim of ownership of the peninsula. Thus, with this claim and counter-claim, the Justices of the ICJ after over eight years of reviewing documents dating back to over 100 years delivered their rulings in favor of Cameroon on 10 October 2002. As the majority of the ICJ Justices relied copiously on the colonial agreements, especially the agreements between Britain and Germany during the colonial era, in giving their verdict. On this based, the degeneration of the relationship between both States, which had harmonious coexistence prior to the discovery of hydrocarbon resources in the peninsula deserved a crucial analysis. Since before the discovery of natural resources, both States had a harmonious relationship, which even led to the signing of several bilateral agreements like the pact of neutrality during the Nigerian Civil War. A position affirmed by Klare (2004), who posits that the close link between oil and conflict is derived from three essential features of petroleum, which are: (i) Its vital importance to the economic and military power of nations; (ii) its irregular geographical distribution; and (iii) its imminent changing center of gravity. These iconize the premises why the Nigerian troops occupied the Bakassi Peninsula in 1993 – which became very serious in 1994, after serious incidents of border incursions that provoked the shooting, resulting in several casualties and deaths of soldiers on both sides. Thus, prompting the GoC to submit the border-related disputes with Nigeria to the ICJ for adjudication. With the ICJ having ruled that Cameroon is the rightful owner of the oil-rich peninsula – based on the 1913 Anglo-German Treaty, which traced the borders between the two colonial powers. This subsequently led to intensive diplomatic activities culminating on 12 June 2006, with the Green-Tree Agreement (GTA) brokered by the United Nations (UN) and witnessed by Britain, France, Germany, and the United States – with Nigeria agreeing to unconditionally hand over the oil-rich peninsula to Cameroon. Which eventually took place on 14 August 2006 when Nigeria effectively pulled out its military and the Cameroonian flag hoisted. While on 14 August 2008, the remaining Nigerian administration and police left the peninsula. On this account, this paper seeks to examine the following question – Does the quest for natural resources like hydrocarbons act as a catalyst for igniting international conflicts in the Bakassi Peninsula? Thus, to address this question, the paper proceeds to provide an overview of the main theoretical arguments and empirical findings of past studies. With the aim to assess the spectrum and implications of the Cameroon-Nigeria conflict resolution, which is presented under the following three sections – with the first dwelling on the conceptual framework of natural resources as an engine of international conflicts. While the second examines the spectrum and development of the Bakassi question, and the third x-rays the implications of the ICJ verdict and other instruments in resolving the Bakassi dispute, and the subsequent impact on the socioeconomic development of Cameroon – with the aim to provide policy recommendations based on the analysis.

2. Natural Resources as Engine of International Conflicts

In this regard, to have a colossal view of resource-related conflicts, there is a need to cascade the nature and dynamics of international conflicts – with a peculiarity on the quest for hydrocarbon resources as an engine and fuel in igniting such conflicts. On this base, this section peruses the nature and dynamics of international conflicts, while assessing the perspectives and premises of hydrocarbons as a catalyst of international conflicts. With the raison être being to establish and provide the fountain on which the conflicts between Cameroon and Nigeria are based.

• The Nature and Dynamics of International Conflicts

Overall, conflict is generally regarded as inevitable in human relations. Since it is as old as the history of mankind, thus, normal, natural, and unavoidable – although it can generate negative and very destructive impacts, as well as awareness, economic growth, and development (Ivorgba, 2005). With the crucial issue being how to respond to conflict and post-conflict situations. This is because as conflict is part of human existence, the way it is handled, therefore, determines how society and humans grow and develop. Especially as conflict is an indication that somehow, there is a misunderstanding that requires attention and proper action – which often results in incompatible interests among the peoples or States. On this base, Lund (1997) defines conflict as a fallout of parties that promotes incompatible interests that usually culminate in competition over power, resource, status, and identity. As the incompatibility of interests of the parties often makes each of the actors to be driven by personal interests without caring about the interests of other actors. In this vein, the view of Lund on conflict has made a remarkable contribution to the issue even though it focuses on the general overview. In this context, Albert (2001) adds that conflict involved the existence of two opposing parties fighting against each other over needs, values, resources, and lack of communication. As he posits that information management is quite critical as it principally determines the perceptions and reactions of the parties to the issues at stake. Since the lack of access to the resources in society by the parties to meet their needs often triggers violent behavior. As such, he makes a very useful and insightful contribution to the meaning of conflict although not specific to international conflicts like that between Cameroon and Nigeria. By the same token, Igwe (2002) avers that conflict is a natural and unavoidable phenomenon in human existence. As such, it is a universal and permanent attribute of life and society that is necessary and unavoidable in terms of dialectics. Therefore, to him, conflict serves to advance the positive evolution of phenomena that are necessary and unavoidable, but when irresolvable their consequences are negative for society and man. From this, the author makes a telling contribution to the discourse on conflict in general, without focusing on the Nigeria-Cameroon dimensions. Moreover, an analysis of international conflict by Asobie (2003) reveals that international conflicts are “struggles between primary social classes, clashing across national boundaries.” On this base, he posits that the social classes are the real actors in international conflicts that used and mobilized the States’ apparatus to promote their objectives. Since their objective is to exploit the productive resources and unequally distribute them in favor of the ruling elites. A situation that often ignites some dissatisfied people to attract and support social movements to oppose the ruling elites – as these elites often determine the course of the conflict, which usually s from the disagreement in the exploitation of the resource. From this, it is worth noting that although the view of Asobie is apt and captures the dynamics in international disputes, its focus is limited and narrowed without taking into cognizance the Nigeria-Cameroon peculiarities beyond the social classes. As such, from this brief analysis, the paper predicates conflict as the emergence of disagreement among parties that shared incompatible interests with the interest of the parties based on resources, values, or other concerns – with the adversarial attitudes of the parties often degenerating the disagreement into violence except compromise is reached.

On this account, international conflict can be described as the existence of dispute or disagreement between two or more States usually influence by incompatible interests and goals. These interests and goals could be socio-cultural, economic, or political, as the States strive to monopolize the exploitation of natural resources in the disputed territories. Besides, these can also arise when a nation-state intervenes in the domestic disputes of another State. Likewise, a conflict may occasionally occur where the nationals of one State are attacked, dehumanized, killed, or maimed by the agents of another State. Especially as conflicts between States are often presented as occurring between their governments, with such situations being conducted or perceived as inter-governmental struggles – since the bone of contention is the quest for territory or some other economic resource (Asobie, 2003). Besides, although the welfare of the ordinary citizens of the States concerned is seldom brandished as the main cause that has provoked the conflict situations in Africa. However, it is worth noting that even when such reasons are brandished, they often turn out to be an attempt to conceal other agendas. Since the real actors in international conflicts are often the ruling elite, who, in their struggles, mobilize and use the various State institutions to push forward their goals – which are mostly contests relating to the control of productive resources. Moreover, it is observed that even when such resources are exploited, the proceeds are often disproportionately distributed in favor of the ruling classes, their cronies, and protégés – which can result in conflict if the people are aware of the unequal distribution of the resources (Ibid.).

In addition, hiding behind the governments, in some international conflicts, are the monopolistic capitalists operating trans-nationally with multinational tentacles – in the hydrocarbons and mining sectors. As these dominant expatriate capitalists are often in simultaneous alliances with the respective ruling classes in the exploitation of the resources in the States. With these unpleasant alliances usually manifest in millions of hard currency being diverted and stacked away in foreign banks, thus, opening the avenues to intervene in the domestic affairs of the host States, to serve the interest of the multinationals even at the cost of an inter-state conflict. In this case, the victims of the conflict are the working class – especially the youth, women, and child soldiers, as well as old people who find it difficult to escape the conflict zones, emigrate, or seek refugee status elsewhere. From this, it is essential to note that the dynamics of most international conflicts are shaped by the following three critical factors: (i) The nature and size of the booty that would accrue from the conflict, that is, the relative utility and size of the presumed productive resources that the victor might gain after the struggle; (ii) the nature of the relationship between the social classes that constitute the primary actors in the conflict. Since once the monopolistic capitalists of one side or both sides of the State territorial boundaries have high stakes in the outcome of the conflict, the spiral of international conflicts will be almost unending; (iii) the nature of domestic politics in the nation-states that form the bases for the contending parties. This includes the nature of the regime in power – as authoritarian/dictatorial regimes tend to provoke the emergence of violent inter-state politics, so as to divert attention from burning domestic issues and prolong their stay in power (Asobie, 2003). For this reason, it is observed that when violent conflicts erupt between two contending ruling classes of two distinct States, they are extensions of violent intra-state conflicts promoted by the various discontented social groups who may be having international connections. In this vein, Hoffmann (1985) posits that one definitely cannot imagine non-violent diplomacy as long as violence has not been eliminated from intra-state politics. Since the social movements within the territorial boundaries frequently seek to establish links with similar bodies in the neighboring States, and as such will spare no effort in taking advantage of a conflict situation to canvass for international recognition.

• The Precept and Perspective of Natural Resources in International Conflicts

From the foregoing, it is observed that disputes over the ownership, use, and extraction of natural resources, such as hydrocarbons and minerals – often play a disruptive role in peace and security. As such, a great deal of research over the past two decades has explored how different natural resources play a role in the political economy of fragile States and, in particular, the likelihood of violent conflict. This is because such natural resources are major sources of national income for several countries. As a result, there is growing recognition among researchers and decision-makers that in several fragile States, disputes over these resources have fed into, and underpinned, violent conflict and instability – with research suggesting that 40–60% of civil wars over the past 60 years are been triggered, funded, or sustained by natural resources (UNEP, 2009). For this reason, the two significant variables are the location of the resources, and the amounts of capital and technology needed to extract them. That’s why, the rich deposits of minerals or hydrocarbons in one region, for example, tend to be associated with secessionist rebellions. As a consequence, dispersed or offshore hydrocarbon resources may encourage attempts to overthrow national governments and assume control, rather than split off from central authorities. Likewise, resources that can be extracted with relatively little access to technology or capital are more ‘lootable’ and can become the focus of rebel groups searching for sources of revenue to finance their operations (Brack and Hayman, 2006).

On this account, the wealth and revenue that the exploitation and production of natural resources can bring to a State – can aggravate resource conflicts in the local and international scenes. As perceived in most resource-based conflicts like that between Argentina and Britain over the potentially oil-rich Falkland islands; Japan and China over the oil-rich Senkaku Islands; and the Soviet Union (USSR) and Finland war over the Petsamo region of Finland with huge deposits of nickel, which were strategically important for the USSR (Ugbudian, 2018). As such, it is worth noting that conflicts are not a new phenomenon, as people have been fighting each other since the inception of humanity. With the only thing that has changed being the size of the respective forces, the availability of technology, and the reasons for the conflict. Since there has never been a shortage of reasons, which often ranged from ideological and religious beliefs to ego-centric wishes to increase one’s prestige by acquiring new territories. As the bloodshed, justified by the nobility of the goal at hand, has haunted humanity for generations of the bigger and more brutal battle. This is because whether a particular battle is fought for the protection of democratic values, or the liberation of an oppressed nation, the prime cause is often centered within the realm of natural resources. On this base, Kish avers that natural resources like oil, diamonds, copper, and cobalt have huge positive economic potential for States. Although such resources can also do more harm than good if used towards ulterior motives like corruption, the unequal distribution of wealth, and to fuel violence.” Since, to him, natural resources have over the years also promoted violence through financing, corruption, patronage, and competition for territorial control by different actors (Kishi, 2014). Even though Amnesty International (2013) alludes that it is complicated to ascertain the exact role that natural resources may play in promoting violence. Despite this, some of the countries where natural resources have been used to sponsor violence include the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Angola, and Sierra Leone, where diamonds played a key role in the violence. In this vein, the ACLED database reveals that there is an upsurge in violence induced by the presence of natural resources, which is over five times more in the late 1990s. With ACLED placing more emphasis on subnational resources-based violence, which is often manifested in the forms of protests against oil companies and kidnapping of the workers of the mining companies, particularly in Africa. For this reason, natural resource extraction is conceived as having huge potential in promoting disputes in Africa, which has led to a series of violence (Berman et al, 2017). Likewise, the Institute of Security Studies blames the avalanche of natural resource-related violence in Africa on poor regulation of the extractive industries and corruption, as well as underdevelopment. Especially as poor regulation coupled with corruption and underdevelopment has made the majority of the people on the continent to live in extreme poverty despite the extraction of huge natural resource deposits (ISS, 2013).

In addition, Basedau and Wegenast (2009) aver that most States that have a high reserve of precious natural resources often witnessed conflict – with these conflicts often traced to inequality and limited opportunities in the distribution of the wealth derived from the natural resources revenue. In this vein, Brown and Keating posit that the following four types of resource-related disputes can present a general challenge to national stability: secessionist conflicts in which resource-rich regions seek to split away from the rest of the country; disputes over resources as part of a new national compact (i.e. in the context of a peace agreement or new constitution); grievances over standalone projects like mines and hydroelectric dams; and the cumulative impact of multiple small-scale clashes, typically over land, livestock or fresh water. Equally, they also submit that the unrelenting search for ‘hydrocarbons’ and other minerals resources is driving the extraction into ‘more technically challenging and environmentally complicated sectors – which has resulted in conflicts with the impact of undermining global peace and security. As such, there is a high turnover of conflicts related to natural resources like minerals, land, fishing, and water. With the authors affirming that such conflict over natural resources can also result in violence with the attendant negative consequences of loss and destruction of lives and infrastructures. Since violence is most prevalent in States with socioeconomic and ethno-religious disunity, graft, and poor governance, as these trajectories, when put together, strongly suggest that disputes over resources will occur more frequently in the future. As they may arise over issues and resources that are hard even to imagine now, and in places that one may not anticipate. This is critical, especially since in our globalized world the costs of violent conflict are not only incurred locally in terms of human lives and destruction but also regionally and internationally (Brown and Keating, 2015b).

For this reason, it may not be exaggerated to suggest that politics in the 21^st Century will be shaped, in part, by how well these disputes can be resolved. With Klare postulating that the nexus between oil and conflict could be traced to the following three vital aspects of petroleum: (i) Its vital importance to the economic and military power of nations; (ii) its irregular geographical distribution; and (iii) its imminent changing center of gravity (Klare, 2004). On this base, it is worth noting that Klare’s view reveals the dynamics of power relations in the international and sub-national context in the usage of hydrocarbons. This is because resource-based conflicts are often disagreements over natural resources that could be national or international in scope – though most are often sub-national. As a consequence, the subnational resource-based dispute is mostly driven by limited opportunities, degradation, and inequalities in the use of the wealth derived from it. For this reason, a better understanding of a conflict can itself be a powerful tool for dispute resolution. As such, by encouraging protagonists to embark on joint conflict analysis and planning – can help to develop common approaches and joint strategies. Similarly, helping the different parties to get access to impartial scientific and technical information about the resource in dispute can build confidence among the parties, thus, paving the way for negotiation on more equal terms (Brown et al., 2015). This is because natural resource management can offer useful opportunities for more creative crisis management and conflict prevention (Conca et al., 2005). In this vein, the international community can play an important role in equalizing the knowledge base between the parties – by helping the different parties to find a peaceful and symbiotic solution (Regan and Aydin, 2006). Especially in cases where a resource dispute might turn on scientific or technical information (such as the amount of water flowing in a river, or the quantity of oil remaining in a well) that may be misunderstood by the parties (Jensen and Lonergan, 2012). As the contestation of two or more States over an area rich in natural resources is often fuelled by the benefits derivable from it, as envisaged in the case of the quest for the Bakassi Peninsula.

3. Spectrum and Development of the Bakassi Question

The Bakassi Peninsula is situated along the 1600-kilometer (km) Nigeria-Cameroon borders that extend from Lake Chad in the north to the GoG in the south. The size of the peninsula is about 665 km², largely of mangroves with half of the area submerged and occupied by fishermen settlers (Anene, 1970). Equally, the peninsula lies between latitudes 4°25? and 5°10?N and longitudes 8°20? and 9°08?E – with a population between 150,000 and 300,000, who are mostly Nigerians. Indeed, the population of Nigerians of the Efik ethnic stock found largely in the Cross Rivers and Akwa Ibom states of Nigeria, constitute not less than 90% of the peninsula’s demography. This huge Nigerian population in the peninsula can be traced to the ancient period when the Obong of Calabar exercised authority over several communities and settlements including the Bakassi and adjourning kingdoms. The integration of these diverse ethnic groups including the Ibibio and Efik in the kingdom is strengthened by trade and a common language. Nonetheless, the quest for colonial possession by the Germans, who signed several treaties with the kings and chiefs of Akwa and Bell of Douala in Kamerun on 14 July 1884, influenced and pressurized the British Console Hewett to sign treaties with the kings and chiefs of the old Calabar on 10 September 1884 – which gave the British a strong footing to lay claims over territories on the Nigerian side including Bakassi, while Germany declared a protectorate over a large span that cuts across the Rio del Rey area to Gabon (Weladji, 1995). These claims by the Germans in Kamerun, and the British in Nigeria were given a legal seal, approval, and recognition by other European powers at the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885. Even though the Berlin Conference on Africa was held to avert wars among the European powers scrambling for African territories without the consent of the concerned African kingdoms and people. As the European powers used different strategies like deception and falsehood to lay claim to many African lands, as their colonies to meet up with the effective occupation criterion outlined in the conference as a prerequisite for validation of claims. Especially as they were more concerned about establishing outposts to exploit the natural resources and create overseas markets for their finished commodities. In this vein, it is worth examining the spectrum of the Bakassi question, the development of the Bakassi dispute, the impact of oil as an engine of conflicts, and the dispute settlement linkages.

• The Spectrum of the Bakassi Question

As aforementioned, it is essential to note that Britain formally established its colonial rule in Nigeria in 1900, having made Bakassi part of the Niger protectorate in 1893 – which was a significant part of Southern Nigeria. On this base, from that time, the peninsula was effectively part of Nigeria and had its administrative headquarters in Calabar. However, the status of the peninsula subsequently underwent a dynamic change following a series of agreements signed between Britain and Germany in addressing the boundaries issues. With the two most significant agreements being the Anglo-German agreement of 11 March 1913 and the Anglo-German Protocol of 12 April 1913. Since the first agreement signed in 1913 in London resolved the Nigeria-Cameroon border that extends from Yola in the north to the sea in the Cross river estuary in the south. While the second was signed in Obokun by W. V. Nugent of Britain and Hans Detzner of Germany, readjusting the earlier boundary demarcation. With the new boundary placing its southward line west of Bakassi, which effectively placed the peninsula under the control of Germany as part of Kamerun. Despite this resounding move, the impact of such an agreement was not manifested physically because of the outbreak of WWI – which Germany lost, and all its colonies in Africa were placed under the mandate of Britain and France by the League of Nations, and later by the Trusteeship of the UN at the end of WWII in 1946. On this account, it is worth emphasizing that the allocation of the Southern Cameroons to Britain under the mandate system in 1919 meant that it was administered along with Nigeria. What’s more, by 10 July 1919, there was an Anglo-French agreement on the Cameroon question following the transfer of the colonies to both countries. With Henry Simon, the French minister for colonies, and Vincent Milner, the British Secretary for colonies reinforcing the 1913 agreements, thus, settling the boundary between the British Cameroons and French Cameroon. As such, the British at this time administered the British Cameroons along with Bakassi jointly with Nigeria (Omoigui, 2012).

That being the case, it is worth reiterating that since the 1913 Anglo-German pact, Bakassi became part of Kamerun, and from 1919 as part of British Southern Cameroons – a British mandated and trusteeship territory from 1919 until 1961, hence not part of Nigeria (Eze, 2007). Even though the majority of the people of the peninsula remained Nigerians. As a result, under the auspices of the UN, separate referenda were conducted in 1959 and 1961 in the British Cameroons. With the majority of the people in the Southern Cameroons having voted to gain independence by uniting with French Cameroon – with over 75% of the people in Bakassi having voted for integration with Cameroon during the referendum. On this based, the result of the referendum was nonetheless accepted by the Nigerian government leading to the exchange of diplomatic documents between Nigeria and Cameroon, with Maps sent by Nigeria to the latter in 1961 (www.postwatchmagazine.com). Moreover, the results of the plebiscite were also accepted by the UN General Assembly in 1961 – although the process was not finalized with a Union Treaty. From this brief analysis, it is worth noting that the history of Bakassi has undergone twists and turns between 1884 and 1961. As in 1961, it presumably became part of Cameroon upon the joining of the British Southern Cameroons. A situation that prompted the Nigerian and Cameroonian governments to engage in diplomatic exchanges, particularly during the 30 months of the Nigerian Civil War from 1967 to 1970. Besides, there were summits between both States in Kano, Lagos, Yaounde, and Maroua between 1970 and 1975. With these summits aimed to settle the northern and southern boundaries of both States as per the Yaounde II and Maroua declarations that placed Bakassi on the side of Cameroon. Despite this, it is of interest to note that Bakassi was still under Nigerian effective governance and control without reservation by the GoC, until the discovery of hydrocarbon resources, when the GoC started developing a keen interest in the Bakassi Peninsula.

• The Motive and Development of the Bakassi Dispute

In this connection, the Bakassi Peninsula is generally regarded as a natural resource-rich area, with huge deposits of sea foods of diverse kinds and hydrocarbons. As hydrocarbon is one of the major resources that have changed industrialization in the world and a source of revenue for several countries. Nigeria began the production and exportation of hydrocarbons in commercial quantity in 1957 and has remained the largest African producer of the product. As such, it is on this base that its quest for the huge deposit of hydrocarbons in the Bakassi Peninsula eventually sparked the dispute between itself and Cameroon – despite the prior harmonious and non-adversary relationship between them after gaining independence in the 1960s, prior to the discovery of the hydrocarbon resources. Especially as Cameroon on the behest of Nigeria was neutral during the Nigerian Civil. With this being followed up by a series of meetings between both States towards the mutual benefit and pacific co-existence. But the discovery of huge hydrocarbon deposits in the surrounding of the peninsula attracted the interest of the two States. As Nigeria wanted to boost its primacy in oil production, since joining the league of natural oil producing countries in 1957 – with the concomitant benefits accruing to the ruling elites, as well as the construction of elephant projects, while Cameroon saw it as an opportunity to increase its financial muscle and influence. On this based, the discovery of huge hydrocarbon reserves illuminates the hitherto abandoned, desolate, and remote peninsula to be a precious area for both States, which eventually result in violence from 1981. A position buttressed by Sango, who affirms that the relationship between Nigeria and Cameroon became strained immediately after it was discovered that Bakassi has a huge oil deposit in the 1980s (Sango, 2012). Likewise, the Democratic Socialists Movement also points out that the discovery of hydrocarbons was the major issue that fuelled the conflict. With its Nigerian chapter adding that the Bakassi dispute was induced by oil and the strategic position of the peninsula to the two capitalist neighbors. Despite the signing in 1975 of “The Maroua Declaration” by the Nigerian President – General Gowon, ceding the peninsula to Cameroon, to compensate President Ahidjo’s neutrality during the Nigerian Civil War. The interest over the ownership of the peninsula by both States eventually erupted upon the discovery that the peninsula is floating on reserves of crude oil and is a strategic location in the GoG (DSM, 2002).

As a consequence of the role of hydrocarbons in the Bakassi dispute, a Joint Commission on the exploration of crude oil along the borders of the two States for mutual benefits was established under the auspices of the UN. This commission was set up as part of a comprehensive agreement to resolve the fallout of the ICJ Judgment on the Bakassi dispute. Since Nigeria and Cameroon agreed on the exploration of the cross-border oil platforms and wells to start in March 2011. The Commission contracted Addax Petroleum – a Canadian oil company, which already has investments in the oil and gas sector in both States (Mena, 2012). This further buttresses the fact that oil and other resources fuelled the violent conflict. Since such natural resources play a pivotal role in the economic development and growth of a country if used judiciously and effectively. As such, the rent-seeking tendency that dominates most developing countries has made the quest for natural resources intense and sometimes violent. That’s why the discovery of huge deposits of hydrocarbons in the peninsula is the prime motive that erupted and fuelled the Bakassi dispute.

• The Impact of Oil as Engine and Fuel of Conflicts

Although it is possible that in some cases, conflicts can erupt before the discovery of natural resources. Nonetheless, the situation can become interwoven with oil issues as the importance of oil as a factor of production increases. For this reason, the drivers of such tendencies are often territorial disputes, separatist struggles, and factional/dynastic struggles. This is because territorial disputes usually occur in border zones and offshore areas, which were thought to possess no particular value, but suddenly become very valuable with the discovery of natural resources. A scenario that is peculiar to the Cameroon-Nigeria border conflict – whereby for several decades, neither governments have shown any particular interest in the Bakassi Peninsula, nor have concerned or initiated any program that can ameliorate the deplorable conditions of the people of the peninsula. But eventually, the struggle over ownership of the peninsula by both States began immediately with the discovery, in the 1980s that the peninsula is floating on huge reserves of crude oil (Sango, 2002). A discovery that prompted both States to make serious claims and counter-claims over the peninsula. By the same token, separatist struggles usually occur when natural resources are exploited or presumed to exist in an area largely inhabited by an ethnic minority, but a bulk of its revenue goes or is expected to go to the government officials in the national capital. This often prompts members of the ethnic minority with the tendency to break away and establish their own ethnic state – in view of getting all the revenues from the natural resources. As seen in the case of the struggle for southern Sudan – where the predominantly Christian population struggled and gained their independence. Likewise, that is currently the situation in Cameroon, where the Southern Cameroons Peoples Organisation (SCAPO) sympathizes with advocates for the independence of the Bakassi Peninsula, as part of the ‘Republic of Ambazonia’ (Gumne, 2006). While in other cases like the Delta region of Nigeria, the ethnic minorities are fighting to gain greater autonomy (and a larger share of oil revenues) rather than to have a separate state. This can lead to factional/dynastic struggles, which often occur because whoever controls the government of oil-producing States also controls the allocation of oil revenues. On this base, those in control usually seek to retain power for as long as possible, by use of heavy-handed repression and election rigging. As such, those excluded from the power structure often have a powerful incentive to use any means necessary to gain control (like armed rebellion, terrorism, or coup d’état). From this, it is worth noting that these sorts of factional struggles are a consistent pattern in States like Nigeria and Saudi Arabia, as well as in most oil-rich States. What’s more, in some States like Venezuela, disputes over the allocation of oil revenues have taken the form of political violence between competing parties and interest groups (Klare, 2004).

• The Linkages between Cameroon and Nigeria in the Dispute Resolution

In line with the foregoing, it is interesting to note that the conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria was a boundary and territorial dispute – with the Bakassi Peninsula being the most contested area. Even though attempts were made in the past to resolve the dispute through bilateral negotiations. However, in 1981, and subsequently in 1993, 1994, and 1996, the claim and counter-claim of the peninsula nearly escalated into a full-blown war. This prompted the matter to be submitted to the ICJ for resolution in 1994, which finally pronounced its verdict in October 2002 in favor of Cameroon, thus, initially irritating the Nigerian government to reject the verdict. Nevertheless, following the coordinated negotiations between the two States under the auspices of the UN, the GTA was signed in June 2006 in New York – which subsequently led to the complete withdrawal of the Nigerian administration, military, and police from the Bakassi Peninsula in August 2008. As such, this dispute resolution has been described as a remarkable outcome and benchmark for conflict resolution in Africa. For this reason, it is inappropriate to proceed without providing a crucial assessment of the linkages that have propelled the conflict resolution processes. Since an understanding of the relationships between the various actors and issues of the dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula is vital in predicting the way forward. On this base, the prime actors in the conflict are Cameroon and Nigeria – with the ICJ and UN being instrumental in playing the adjudicatory and diplomatic roles, respectively. These roles were crucial in determining the way forward, as the ICJ does not have any enforcement mechanism but depends on the UN for enforcement – since the Nigerian parliament posited that the handover would be unconstitutional and demanded a referendum (Price, 2005).

A situation that prompted the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) on the request of President Paul Biya of Cameroon and President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, to set up the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC), to negotiate a peaceful settlement and transfer of the peninsula to Cameroon. As such, the role of the CNMC was to determine the possible ways to implement the ICJ verdict and move the process forward (United Nations, 2006). Since the border struggle between Cameroon and Nigeria was the product of the following contradictions: (i) There is a clash between tradition and modernity, as the precolonial history of the ancient kingdom of Calabar is haunting the post-colonial reality of contemporary Nigeria and Cameroon; (ii) there is the tension between cartographical fact and cultural reality, as the geographical map conflicts with the people; (iii) there is a conflict between the dictates of international law and citizenship; (iv) there is a gap between the demands for pragmatism and the needs and concerns of the citizens. That being the case, it is observed that the potential for peace and the judicious exploitation of the natural resources in and around the Bakassi Peninsula will aptly depend on the ‘principle of good faith’ (Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor, 2006) – coupled with the responses of the various social movements like the Anglophone separatist movements, and the Nigerian migrant community in the Bakassi Peninsula. On this based, the two simultaneous issues to guard against are: The sabotage resulting from subsequent oil development and fisheries in the Bakassi area; and the potential for further violence as the Anglophone separatist movements, other Cameroonians, and Nigerians living in the Bakassi Peninsula are contesting or undermining the ICJ verdict. As such, there is a need for Cameroon and Nigeria, as well as the international community, to foster credible measures to sustain the peace dividend outlined in the GTA.

4. Discussion of the Implications and Impact of the ICJ Verdict

In the context of resource-related dispute resolution, the skills of collaborative leadership, facilitation, and mediation are significant – though complicated by the multiplicity of international actors, which at times makes consistent and coherent action increasingly challenging (but at the same time can provide new ideas and approaches for dispute resolution). Especially as the international community often has little coercive power to force the implementation of an international agreement. As a consequence, building national ownership over dispute-resolution processes is critical, in order to complement the better leadership and management efforts of the international community in resolving disputes – which can help in addressing some of the problems of weak coordination and inconsistent action. On this basis, it is vital to have sufficient planning and collaboration – by bringing together the various strands of the international community to work in a more strategic framework to address the sources of conflict; strengthen national capacities; promote coherence, coordination, and integration; and establish mutual accountability of the national and international actors (McCandless and Tschirgi, 2010). In this context, it is worth examining the problems and implications of implementing the ICJ verdict and the subsequent Green-Tree Agreement (GTA), and the resulting socio-economic implications of such initiatives in resolving the Bakassi question.

• The Implications of Implementing the ICJ Verdict

As highlighted above, following the occupation of Bakassi by the Nigerian troops on 12 December 1993, Cameroon promptly filed a suit against Nigeria before the ICJ in 1994. By anchoring its claim over the ownership of Bakassi on the Anglo-German Treaty of 11 March 1913 – when both territories now called Cameroon and Nigeria were under colonial rule. While Nigeria depending on the principle of ‘Effectivité’ tried unsuccessfully to challenge the legal basis of the 1913 Treaty – by arguing that the two colonial masters had no locus standi to cede territories, as the agreement was not ratified by the parliaments of both nations. Likewise, Nigeria also unsuccessfully maintained that the alleged ceding of the peninsula by General Gowon was not endorsed by the Supreme Military Council, which was the law-making body of the country at the time (Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor, 2006). Notwithstanding these convincing arguments, on 10 October 2002, after about eight years of deliberations, the ICJ delivered its verdict in favor of Cameroon, basing its decision on old colonial documents (Lacey and Banerjee, 2002). With the boundaries in the Lake Chad region being determined by the Thomson-Marchand Declarations of 1929–1930, while that in Bakassi was determined by the Anglo-German Treaty of 11 March 1913. On this base, the ICJ requested Nigeria to quickly and unconditionally withdraw its military, police, and administration from the area of Lake Chad under Cameroonian sovereignty and the Bakassi Peninsula. Similarly, the ICJ also requested Cameroon to expeditiously and without condition remove its administration, military, and police forces, which may be present along the land boundary from Lake Chad to the Bakassi Peninsula on territories which, according to the judgment, fall within the sovereignty of Nigeria. As such, the ICJ verdict fixed the land boundaries from Lake Chad in the north to Bakassi in the south. Although the ICJ did not specify a definite location off the coast of Equatorial Guinea where the maritime boundary between the two States would terminate (Bekker, 2003). Despite this, Nigeria immediately rejected the verdict, thus, making it seems possible that the dispute might flare into open war, but the timely intervention of the UN brought the two sides to the table (Friends of the Earth, 2003; Sango, 2002).

A process that was initiated by the Heads of State of Cameroon and Nigeria requesting the UNSG to form the CNMC, when it was clear that it will be difficult to implement the ICJ verdict. With the CNMC to practically demarcate the land boundaries. Since such initiative will develop other projects that will promote joint economic ventures and cross-border cooperation to be monitored by the CNMC – which included the construction of border markets and roads linking both States. In this vein, some villages further north and around Lake Chad were exchanged until the handing-over process reached the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula. Despite this, it is worth noting that as the two withdrawal timetables were not respected – thousands of Nigerians in the peninsula were not sure where they stood in terms of citizenship, as many wanted to remain as Nigerians due to their close social and economic ties with Nigeria (Borzello, 2004). As such, this and other reasons predicated why Nigeria failed to give Cameroon full control of the peninsula on 15 September 2004 – as it argued that its withdrawal would lead to the collapse of law and order in the peninsula. Besides, Nigeria alluded that the most democratic manner to decide the sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula would be to hold a referendum – since about 90% of the people on the peninsula do not want to become Cameroonians (Eboh, 2005). On this based, Nigeria posited that its claim over the peninsula was not a matter of the oil or natural resources embedded there, but rather the welfare and well-being of the Nigerians on the land (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2002). As a consequence, some Nigerians called on the Nigerian government to go to war over the matter. With this school of thought arguing that “there is no morality in international relations,” thus, it is against the national interest of Nigeria in terms of security and economic interest to accept the ICJ verdict in its totality (Etim-Bassey, 2002). Despite these sentiments, other Nigerians cautioned against war – by arguing that women and children are the most vulnerable victims of war – as the youths are often the greatest losers in all social conflicts, be them domestic or international, and not the men who often ask for war (Asobie, 2003). In this light, they further maintained that “the principle of good faith” in international relations demands that Nigeria should not disavow her word of honor as evidenced by the Diplomatic Note of 1962 (Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor, 2006). Nonetheless, the situation becomes even more precarious since the ICJ has a limited capacity to ensure and facilitate the enforcement of its decisions, due to the fragile interplay between passing the verdicts and the enforcement mechanisms. On this base, the implementation of the ICJ rulings is largely dependent on the goodwill of the States in conflict. Thus, where the States involved are outward looking and cherish international credibility, diplomatic pressure can act as a credible tool that can be used to generate incentives for compliance with international obligations.

In this context, following intense diplomatic offensives and the good office of the UNSG, Cameroon was able to secure the GTA with Nigeria on 12 June 2006 – which was brokered by the UNSG and witnessed by Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. Thus, as per the GTA, the Nigerian troops were to withdraw from the peninsula within 90 days, and a transition period of two years was given for its administration to be replaced by that of Cameroon. What’s more, the Nigerians living in the peninsula were allowed to remain there under a special regime for four years after Cameroon takes full control and could continue staying there. On this base, the then President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria affirms that the GTA is a great achievement for conflict prevention – since it practically reflects cost-effectiveness when compared with other alternative conflict resolution mechanisms. As such, he urges that such initiative should be a model for the resolution of similar conflicts in Africa and the world at large. A dynamic that has prompted him to play a leading role in conflict resolution among African States. Despite this, it is interesting to note that his decision to respect the ICJ verdict and withdraw Nigerian military forces from Bakassi, however, met with strong opposition from some radicals – who felt that Nigeria’s military might should have been used for expansionist ambitions. Notwithstanding, in line with his Nigerian counterpart, President Paul Biya of Cameroon also underscores the significance of respecting the ICJ verdict – by averring that their credibility, coupled with efforts of the UN greatly aids in its implementation, to procreate a new era of trust, peace, and cooperation between both States. An era that eventually commences on 14 August 2006, when the Nigerian troops, in a solemn ceremony, peacefully withdrew from the Bakassi Peninsula, marking the climax of a long and meandering peace process that spanned 12 years. On this account, the effective withdrawal of the Nigerian forces from Bakassi presents a blueprint that it is possible for African States battling over territorial rights and other issues to resolve them amicably. Thus, avoiding carnage, blood-shed, socioeconomic and political dislocations that several post-independent African States have suffered. As such, the GTA and the various stages that led to the handing over of the peninsula are a model for the pacific settlement of disputes in Africa. As the entire process was graced by the Treaty of Calabar between both States on 14 August 2008, which marked the complete withdrawal of the Nigerian administration as per the GTA.

• The Socio-economic Implications and Impact of the Bakassi Dispute Resolution

This can be assessed by considering the effects of expenditure reduction due to the amicable settlement, the impact of international credibility and cross-border activities as enhanced by the new-found confidence, and the need for other accompanying measures. Since in an escalating border conflict situation, the States involved usually spend much more on security and military activities, to the detriment of the social spending on health, education, and infrastructure – a practice that negatively affects the welfare situation of the citizenry. However, as hostilities are scaled down through a negotiated settlement, the wasteful military spending is scaled down, as well as the expenditure-reducing effect of the peaceful settlement of border conflicts. As there are potentials and incentives for switching from military spending to social sector spending, so as to enhance the general welfare of the population. As such, concerning the Bakassi question, both Cameroon and Nigeria realize that such savings in the military and associated logistical expenditures can be more judiciously used to enhance the living standards of the populations via infrastructural development to generate income and employment opportunities. Although the success depends on the good faith of the governments in place and the reduction of corruption.

On this account, the pacific resolution of the Bakassi dispute has readily increased the international credibility of Cameroon and Nigeria. With this new-found credibility acting as an incentive for both domestic and foreign investors to invest and create employment opportunities. Which have provided the income-generating activities needed to reverse the dismal socioeconomic situation of both States. As Cameroon is currently valorizing its oil deposits and promoting modern fishing in the peninsula, especially at a time when the country is reaping the fallouts of the 2006 completion point of the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative – which was facilitated both by the peace dividend and the accompanying incentives to pull in the transnational oil and fishing companies. With the implication being that the effective exploitation of these resources will improve the trade balance, fiscal revenue, and poverty eradication programs in the country. A situation that is consistent with the three major contributions that investment in oil development can bring to a host country, that is, employment opportunities, foreign exchange earnings, and technology transfer that enhances local capacities (Oruwari and Owei, 2005).

In addition, owing to the historical and ethno-linguistic ties between Cameroon and Nigeria, it is observed that even during the hostilities, trans-border trading did not stop (Konings, 2005). On this based, it is expected that with the peaceful handing over of Bakassi to Cameroon, the fruitful socio-economic activities between the two States will be revamped. As such, it is in the interest of both States to negotiate more formal trading arrangements, so as to curb smuggling, enhance the competitiveness of the home industries, and increase tax revenues accordingly. By the same token, cross-border activities can be enhanced further if both States push forward their intentions to initiate several political and economic confidence-building measures and consider the adoption of a treaty of friendship and non-aggression between them. Especially as the Bakassi question illustrates the crucial role of multilateral measures, via the use of adjudication and diplomacy under the auspices of the UN. As the CNMC is regarded as a remarkable initiative and an excellent model for preventive diplomacy – which is a precious tool for moving from a culture of confrontation to a culture of peace.

In this connection, there is a need for accompanying measures by Cameroon, Nigeria, and the international community, to enhance the peace dividend for the socio-economic and political developments emanating from the entire border conflict resolution. As such, the Government of Cameroon (GoC) needs to improve the infrastructural developments in the domains of health, education, road, water, and telecommunications in the Bakassi Peninsula. Since this will ease the precarious living conditions of the Bakassi residents, and act as an incentive for other Cameroonians to accept working there. An initiative that will go a long way to discourage any social movements that may be nurturing the intention to instigate the Bakassi indigenous people, to reject the peace dividends that they stand to gain from the implementation of the GTA. What’s more, the donor community, acting individually or in the coalition, is assisting in infrastructural developments in the Bakassi Peninsula. This is because, since the complete withdrawal of the Nigerian authorities from the peninsula, the hydrocarbon resources are yet to be exploited. On this basis, the GoC and its development partners like the European Union via the European Development Fund, and the French Development Agency, from 2007 to 2009, have spent over CFAF 12 billion to execute some Priority Projects (Kendemeh, 2010). As such, to ensure the effective implementation of these Priority Projects in the peninsula, the GoC created a Coordination and Follow-up Committee (CFC) on 27 August 2007 to that effect. With these Priority Projects having been carried out in Idabato, Kombo Itindi, Kombo Abedimo, and Bamusso Sub-divisions – which include the construction of classrooms, government offices, health centers, residences for workers, markets, speed-boats for administrative authorities, water supply, generators for energy supply, social centers, women’s empowerment centers and support to farmers’ organizations (Kendemeh, 2010).

Correspondingly, as per the progress report presented on 11 March 2010 by Lekunze Ketuma, the chairman of the CFC, the pressing issue for the administration is how to populate the area with Cameroonian nationals and motivate government workers to go and work in the Bakassi Peninsula. On this account, some of the projects earmarked for 2010 worth CFAF 2.5 billion to reduce this problem are the construction of camps for the fishermen, the construction of improved facilities for communal fish smoking, the extension of oil palm plantation and the construction of camps for workers, and the tarring of the Loum-Kumba-Ekondo-Titi-Mundemba-Isangele-Akwa road (Kendemeh, 2010). While other projects include mobile telephone relay antennas, a Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV) signal relay tower, and a broadcast center. Despite these resounding efforts, the general impression is that the process has been rather slow. As such, the first-ever Fish Festival chaired by the Cameroon Minister of Livestock, Fisheries, and Animal Industries was held in Bamusso Sub-division in April 2010, which brought together local and foreign fishermen, traditional rulers, and administrative and municipal authorities (Efande, 2010). With the aim to promote fishing and encourage the peaceful co-existence between the natives and foreigners in tandem with the GTA. Since it is important to design dispute-resolution processes that give appropriate weight to planning and follow-up, as well as implementation. With a focus on building local capacity wherever possible, while providing impartial dispute-resolution support where appropriate and necessary. – which will go a long way to facilitate investment endeavors in natural resources in the Bakassi Peninsula.

5. Conclusion

As discussed and analyzed, natural resources – such as land, freshwater, fishing rights, hydrocarbons, and minerals – are critical for the livelihoods and economic well-being of individuals and States. As such, they are often loaded with concepts of identity and ethnicity – as well as they are subject to rapid fluctuations in value, or the interest of transnational corporations in ways that can make them highly contentious. On this base, in States with weak governance, or a history of conflict, resource disputes can become violent and destructive, damaging development, affecting the lives of the people, thus, posing a significant threat to long-term peace and stability. Therefore, to avoid resource conflicts, national governments need to address resource disputes more effectively. While in certain circumstances the international community may have an important role to play, especially where the dispute is particularly intractable, where funds to support the resource dispute resolution are lacking, or where there is a need for an impartial outsider to bring the protagonists together and develop creative solutions. As a well-designed intervention can help shift the incentives of the parties towards the cooperative and equitable management of resources, thus, reducing the likelihood of conflict and violence. Notwithstanding, the intervention of the international community in resource conflicts needs to be approached with caution. Since the prime role of the international community is to support the ability of the States to resolve their natural resource disputes. As such, the focus should be to build local capacity wherever possible, while providing impartial dispute-resolution support where appropriate and necessary. On this account, an effective international response can include direct support for dispute resolution, such as through the provision of mediation services, or indirect support, such as capacity development to create the conditions for better resolution of natural resource disputes. As appreciated in the process of the resolution of the Bakassi Peninsula dispute – whereby the CNMC and Joint Commission were set up to that effect, with the mandate to build local capacity wherever possible, while providing impartial dispute-resolution support where appropriate and necessary. For this reason, the best mix of direct and indirect measures depends, of course, on the scale and location of the resource dispute – whether it is over potential secession; a new constitution or national compact; the impact of a standalone project; or rooted in community-level conflicts over land, water, and livestock. Besides, it also depends on the issue at hand – whether the dispute is over the absolute ownership of the resource, the power to manage the resource, the partition of revenues, or the environmental and social damage caused by the extraction of the resource. Especially as the quest for natural resources like hydrocarbons often, directly and indirectly, causes violence. Though recent research still questioned the direct, deterministic link, by stressing the importance of resource-related conditions like the type of resource, the degree of abundance and dependence, the use of resource money, the mode of extraction, and the location of resources.

In this context, the paper finds that the Bakassi Peninsula dispute is a classic example of an international conflict driven by the quest for natural resources – hydrocarbons. Since the pacific and amicable relations that existed between Cameroon and Nigeria since 1960, were shattered by the struggles for the possession of the huge hydrocarbon reserves in the peninsula from 1981. Notwithstanding the shared values and policies that both States have engaged in during the Nigerian Civil War, coupled with the followed up of diplomatic exchanges, visits, and agreements in the 1970s. The onset of hostilities between both States readily led to the disruption of such diplomatic relations, and the socioeconomic activities of the peninsula, which resulted in the loss of hundreds of lives. On this account, the asymmetry nature of the conflict ignited Cameroon to approach the ICJ, which after almost a decade of adjudication decided in its favor to the constellation of Nigeria. A situation that prompted a paper of this nature to evaluate the implications of the ICJ verdict on the sustainable peace, and economic development of the protagonists. This commenced with the critical assessment of the dynamics and nature of international conflict resolution and its implications on the socioeconomic dimension of the Bakassi dispute resolution process. As created by the colonial powers, who had subjugated and divided Africa with no regard to the existing relations between the territorial boundaries and the anthropogenic homogeneity and/or characteristics of the various ethnic groupings. Especially as international conflicts are depicted as being shaped by the nature and size of the booty that would accrue from the conflict, the nature of the relationship between the social classes that constitute the main actors in the conflict, and the nature of the domestic politics in the nation-states that form the bases for the contending parties. On this base, it is noted that the effective withdrawal of the Nigerian military, police, and administration from Bakassi, is a great indication that African States in conflict can resolve their matters amicably to avoid the carnage, blood-shed, socioeconomic, and political dislocations – which several post-independent African States have inflicted on themselves. As such, the entire process leading to the final handing-over of the peninsula is a model for the pacific settlement of disputes in Africa.

In a nutshell, the evaluation of the possible socioeconomic implications of the Bakassi dispute resolution was anchored on the expenditure reduction effects of the pacific settlements, the wealth-generating effects of international credibility, and the need for accompanying measures to enhance the peace dividends as per the GTA. From these, it is noted that the neglect of border areas contributed to the problem of border incursions. Especially as Cameroonians along the Nigerian border mostly use foreign currency, watch Nigerian television, listen to Nigerian radio, and are cut off from contact with their own country. As such, it is recommended that the GoC should enhance its border policy by continuing to construct schools, hospitals, roads, agricultural posts, telecommunications networks, pipe-borne water, etc. Since it is by carrying out such infrastructural developments and effectively occupying the border areas that future incursions can be checked and sustainable peace guaranteed. A policy orientation that if well implemented can be a catalyst for pacific settlements of similar international conflicts in Africa. As the dimensions inherent and explicit in international resource-based conflicts often involve a high rate of escalation within the concerned area and beyond. On this account, in responding to whether “Does the quest for natural resources like hydrocarbons act as a catalyst of igniting international conflicts in the Bakassi Peninsula?” the paper concludes by affirming, while applauding the intervention of the international community via adjudication and diplomacy, with the resultant ICJ verdict, and the subsequent GTA that led to the setting up of the CNCM and Joint Commission for the exploration of hydrocarbons in the cross border areas. As a great achievement and model in terms of pacific conflict resolution in Africa, despite the postures and agitation of several groups. As the CNCM and Joint Commission did a marvelous job to capture the reason behind the conflict, by creating a platform for a win-win solution for both States.

6. Conflict of Interest

The author states that there is no conflict of interest.

7. Acknowledgment

I acknowledge all the support from Euclid University and my supervising professor, Prof. Laurent Cleenewerck, in completing my Thesis from which this paper derived.

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